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Religion and Spirituality in Psychiatry

Religion and Spirituality in Psychiatry

Religion and Spirituality in Psychiatry

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154 Pierre-Yves Br<strong>and</strong>t <strong>and</strong> Laurence Borrasspiritual authorities are unaware of the relationshipthat is established between themselves <strong>and</strong>the person <strong>in</strong> need of help when they beg<strong>in</strong> anexorcism. A lack of professionalism <strong>in</strong> the managementof the therapeutic bond <strong>and</strong> the environmentthat is established through the practice ofexorcism can have very damag<strong>in</strong>g effects. Insteadof consider<strong>in</strong>g that spiritual <strong>and</strong> psychic suffer<strong>in</strong>gare mutually exclusive <strong>and</strong> necessitate two differentmodes of treatment, it seems wiser, <strong>in</strong> certa<strong>in</strong>cases, to try to <strong>in</strong>tegrate both approaches.7. ANTHROPOLOGICAL CRITICISMThere is a pr<strong>in</strong>cipal criterion given <strong>in</strong> the DSM-IVto differentiate a possessed person from a personsuffer<strong>in</strong>g from a DID, mean<strong>in</strong>g someone who hasseveral identities whether they are conscious ofeach other or not. In cases of possession, the identitythat takes the control of the person is felt to becom<strong>in</strong>g from the outside. The difference is essentiallya question of how the person identifies withthe different entities: a possessed person would atleast sometimes identify himself or herself withthe spirit he or she feels possessed by. In otherwords, <strong>in</strong> a case of possession, when the spirit orthe entity speaks through a human be<strong>in</strong>g us<strong>in</strong>g “I,”the spirit or entity is not thought to have its orig<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong> the subject it talks through. In the list of examplesof dissociative trances that are not consideredas pathological, the DSM-IV tends to use the termpossession with cultural differences. However, thecase of Barbara, the presence of exorcist priests <strong>in</strong>each diocese of the Roman Catholic Church allover the world, <strong>and</strong> the practice of exorcism <strong>in</strong>Pentecostal evangelic churches <strong>in</strong> North Americaas well as <strong>in</strong> Europe show that the phenomenonof possession should not be exclusively associatedwith or limited to the non-Western world. Thisconcept is part of the modern Western world aswell. Certa<strong>in</strong>ly some would say that anthropologicalpre-modern conceptions are still present<strong>in</strong> the Western world <strong>and</strong> that religious environmentssupport their conservation. But we believethat the opposition between what comes from the“<strong>in</strong>side” <strong>and</strong> what comes from the “outside” goesbeyond culture. This opposition makes it possibleto describe the multiplicity of the human psyche<strong>and</strong> identity <strong>and</strong> makes us question whether theterm dissociation is appropriate to describe thisphenomenon. When an <strong>in</strong>dividual describes himselfas be<strong>in</strong>g confronted with or hav<strong>in</strong>g to face aspirit or an entity that comes from the outside <strong>and</strong>lives with<strong>in</strong> him, why should we only talk about“dissociation” <strong>and</strong> not about “association” also?Systematically us<strong>in</strong>g the term dissociative revealsthat, although we recognize that subjects can feelthat external entities have penetrated their bodies,only one diagnosis is acceptable to us: theirpsychic cohesion is fragmented. This br<strong>in</strong>gs us toquestion an implicit assumption <strong>in</strong> this categorization;a fragmented identity or a multiple identitycan only be the result of dissociation. Thus,before such a fragmentation, the human psychewas necessarily a coherent whole, complete <strong>and</strong>unified. From this po<strong>in</strong>t of view, every k<strong>in</strong>d ofpsychic evolution that leads toward a certa<strong>in</strong> multiplicitycan only be the result of a loss of cohesion.The Western world is <strong>in</strong>fluenced by whatClifford Geertz calls “the occidental notion of theperson” (15) which1 tends to use the terms <strong>in</strong>dividual <strong>and</strong> personas if their mean<strong>in</strong>g were equivalent; <strong>in</strong> otherwords, <strong>in</strong>dividual identity <strong>and</strong> personal identityare thought of as synonyms.2 qualifies identity, <strong>in</strong> particular <strong>in</strong>dividual identity,accord<strong>in</strong>g to two criteria: unity <strong>and</strong> uniqueness.Accord<strong>in</strong>gly, the person is seen <strong>in</strong> the Westernworld “as a cognitive universe that more or lessdeterm<strong>in</strong>es behaviour, like a dynamic centre ofconsciousness, emotion, judgement <strong>and</strong> organizedaction <strong>in</strong>tegrated <strong>in</strong>to a dist<strong>in</strong>ctive whole, <strong>and</strong> that,at the same time, is opposed to other wholes <strong>and</strong>to the natural <strong>and</strong> social environment.” However,Geertz notes that <strong>in</strong> a broader global context ofdifferent cultures, this conception of a person isquite unusual. Several studies of <strong>in</strong>tercultural psychology(16) or studies concern<strong>in</strong>g the personality<strong>in</strong> the ancient world (17–19) (p. 55) (note 17)<strong>and</strong> (pp. 72–73) (note 18) have shown that, <strong>in</strong>most cultures, identity <strong>in</strong> the sense of uniquenessis assigned to a social group such as a family or a

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