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Pierre André Chiappori (Columbia) "Family Economics" - Cemmap

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3<br />

Preferences and decision<br />

making<br />

3.1 Preferences<br />

In the last chapter we informally reviewed the gains from marriage in some<br />

generality. The existence of potential gains from marriage is not sufficient to<br />

motivate marriage and to sustain it. Prospective mates need to form some<br />

notion as to whether families realize the potential gains and how they are<br />

divided. In this chapter we consider these issues in a very specific context.<br />

The context is a two person (woman a and man b) household 1 in which the<br />

only (static) decision is how much to spend on various market goods that<br />

areavailableatfixed prices, given fixed total household expenditure on<br />

all goods. Although very special this context allows us to discuss formally<br />

many of the issues that will be used in other contexts in later chapters.<br />

Some commodities are private and some public. Private goods are consumed<br />

non-jointly by each partner and public goods, such as heating, are<br />

consumed jointly and non-exclusively by the two partners. In other words,<br />

private goods are characterized by an exclusion restriction property: the<br />

fact that I consume a particular apple de facto excludes anyone else from<br />

consuming the same apple. With public goods, on the contrary, no such<br />

restriction exists: that I enjoy seeing a beautiful painting on my wall does<br />

not preclude my spouse from enjoying it just as much (or even disliking it).<br />

Several remarks can be made at that point. First, several commodities are<br />

sometimes used publicly and sometimes privately; for instance, I can drive<br />

my car alone to go to work, or the whole family may take a ride together.<br />

Second, the privateness or publicness of a good is quite independent of the<br />

type of control existing on that good and who exerts it; typically, parents<br />

have control over the (private) consumption of their young children. Finally,<br />

and more crucially, there exist subtle interactions between the (‘technical’)<br />

nature of a good and how it enters the member’s utilities. The private<br />

consumptions of member a certainly enter a’s utility; but it also may enter<br />

b’s - we then call it an externality. Conversely, some commodities, although<br />

public by nature, may in fact be exclusively consumed by one member; for<br />

instance, although both spouses may in principle watch television together<br />

without exclusion, one of them may simply dislike TV and never use it.<br />

Throughout most of the book, we assume, to keep things simple, that any<br />

1 Children will be introduced at a later point.<br />

This is page 103<br />

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