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Pierre André Chiappori (Columbia) "Family Economics" - Cemmap

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258 6. Uncertainty and Dynamics in the Collective model<br />

for some constants c i ,i= a, b. Finally,forγ 6= 0and γ 6= 1,wehave:<br />

u i (x) =<br />

for some constants c i and γ i ,i= a, b.<br />

¡ c i + γ i x ¢ 1−1/γ i<br />

1 − 1/γ i<br />

• moreover, the ‘shape’ coefficients γ must be equal:<br />

γ a = γ b<br />

The intuition of this result is that in the ISHARA case, the sharing<br />

rule that solves (6.19) is an affine function of realized income. Note that<br />

ISHARA is not simply a property of each utility independently: the second<br />

requirement imposes a compatibility restriction between them. That said,<br />

CARA utilities always belong to the ISHARA class, even if their coefficients<br />

of absolute risk aversion are different (that’s because they correspond to<br />

γ a = γ b =0). On the other hand, constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)<br />

utilities, which correspond to c a = c b =0,areISHARAifandonlyifthe<br />

coefficient of relative risk aversion, equal to the shape parameter γ i in that<br />

case, is identical for all members (it was equal to one for both spouses in<br />

our log example).<br />

6.3.2 Efficient risk sharing in a one-commodity world<br />

Characterizing efficient risk sharing<br />

We now characterize ex ante efficient allocations. We start with the case<br />

in which prices do not vary; as seen above, we can then model efficient risk<br />

sharing in a one commodity context. A sharing rule ρ shares risk efficiently<br />

if it solves a program of the form:<br />

X £ a<br />

max πs u<br />

ρ<br />

¡ ρ ¡ y a s ,y b¢¢ b<br />

s + μu ¡ y a s + y b s − ρ ¡ y a s ,y b¢¢¤ s<br />

s<br />

for some Pareto weight μ. Thefirst order condition gives:<br />

u 0a ¡ ρ ¡ y a s ,y b¢¢ 0b<br />

s = μ.u ¡ y a s + y b s − ρ ¡ y a s ,y b¢¢ s<br />

or equivalently:<br />

u0a (ρs) u0b = μ for each s (6.21)<br />

(ys − ρs) where ys = ya s + yb s and ρs = ρ ¡ ya s ,yb ¢<br />

s .<br />

This relationship has a striking property; namely, since μ is constant, the<br />

left hand side does not depend on the state of the world. This is a standard<br />

characterization of efficient risk sharing: the ratio of marginal utilities of<br />

income of the agents remains constant across states of the world.

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