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Pierre André Chiappori (Columbia) "Family Economics" - Cemmap

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7. Matching on the Marriage Market: Theory 303<br />

with a reservation utility ui and is selected by the woman that gains the<br />

highest surplus zij − ui from marrying him. Similarly, woman j enters with<br />

a reservation utility vj and is selected by the man who has the highest gain<br />

zij − vj from marrying her. In equilibrium, each agent receives a share in<br />

marital surplus that equals his\her reservation utility. In a sense, ui and vj<br />

can be thought of as the ‘price’ that must be paid to marry Mr. i or Mrs.<br />

j; each agent maximizes his/her welfare taking as given this ‘price’ vector.<br />

It is important to note that the informational requirements for implementing<br />

a stable assignment with transferable utility is quite different than<br />

for the Gale-Shapley no transfer case. For the latter, we only require that<br />

each person can rank the members of the opposite sex. With transferable<br />

utility, the planner needs to know the surplus values of all possible matches<br />

and agents should each know the share of the surplus that they would<br />

receive with any potential spouse.<br />

In general, there is a whole set of values for ui ,vj that support a stable<br />

assignment. While the issues related to the distribution of surplus will be<br />

discussed in the next Chapter, we present in the table below three (of<br />

many) such imputations, denoted by a, b and c, for the stable assignment<br />

in example 7.4.<br />

Imputation a b c<br />

Individual shares<br />

W M<br />

v1 2 u1 3<br />

v2 5 u2 5<br />

v3 1 u3 0<br />

W M<br />

v1 2 u1 4<br />

v2 4 u2 5.5<br />

v3 0.5 u3 0<br />

The reader can readily check that each of these imputations supports a<br />

stable match.<br />

Extension: continuum of agents<br />

Finally, although the previous argument is presented in a finite setting, it<br />

is fully general, and applies to continuous models as well. From a general<br />

perspective, we only need that the set of men and the set of women, denoted<br />

X and Y , be complete, separable metric spaces equipped with Borel<br />

probability measures F and G; note that no restriction is imposed on the<br />

dimension of these spaces (it may even be infinite). The surplus function<br />

h (x, y) is only assumed to be upper semi-continuous. The problem can be<br />

stated as follows: find a measure Φ on X × Y such that:<br />

• The marginals of Φ on X and Y are F and G, respectively.<br />

R<br />

• The measure Φ solves maxΦ h (x, y) dΦ (x, y), wherethemaxis<br />

X×Y<br />

taken over the set of measures satisfying the previous conditions.<br />

A complete analysis of this problem is outside the scope of this book; the<br />

reader is referred to <strong>Chiappori</strong>, McCann and Neishem (2010) or Ekeland<br />

W M<br />

v1 1 u1 5<br />

v2 3 u2 6<br />

v3 0 u3 1

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