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Pierre André Chiappori (Columbia) "Family Economics" - Cemmap

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7. Matching on the Marriage Market: Theory 313<br />

Male income is denoted by x and female income is denoted by y. Weno<br />

longer assume transferable utility; hence the Pareto frontier for a couple<br />

has the general form<br />

u = H(x, y, v) (7.23)<br />

with H(0, 0,v)=0for all v.<br />

As above, if a man with income x remains single, his utility is given<br />

by H(x, 0, 0) andifawomanofincomeyremains single her utility is<br />

the solution to the equation H(0,y,v) = 0.Bydefinition, H(x, y, v) is<br />

decreasing in v; weassumethatitisincreasinginx and y, that is that a<br />

higher income, be it male’s or female’s, tends to expand the Pareto frontier.<br />

Also, we still consider a continuum of men, whose incomes x are distributed<br />

on [0, 1] according to some distribution F , and a continuum of women,<br />

whose incomes y are distributed on [0, 1] according to some distribution G;<br />

let r denote the measure of women.<br />

Finally, let us assume for the moment that an equilibrium matching exists<br />

and that it is assortative. Existence can be proved under mild conditions<br />

using a variant of the Gale-Shapley algorithm; see Crawford (1991), <strong>Chiappori</strong><br />

and Reny (2006). Regarding assortativeness, necessary conditions will<br />

be derived below. Under assortative matching, the ‘matching functions’ φ<br />

and ψ are defined exactly as above (eq. 7.19 to 7.21).<br />

Let u (x) (resp. v (y)) denote the utility level reached by Mr. x (Mrs. y)<br />

atthestableassignment.Thenitmustbethecasethat<br />

u (x) ≥ H (x, y, v (y))<br />

for all y, with an equality for y = ψ (x). Asabove,thisequationsimply<br />

translates stability: if it was violated for some x and y, a marriage between<br />

these two persons would allow to strictly increase both utilities. Hence:<br />

u (x) =maxH(x,<br />

y, v (y))<br />

y<br />

and we know that the maximum is actually reached for y = ψ (x). First<br />

order conditions imply that<br />

∂H<br />

∂y (φ (y) ,y,v(y)) + v0 (y) ∂H<br />

(φ (y) ,y,v(y)) = 0. (7.24)<br />

∂v<br />

while second order conditions for maximization are<br />

∂<br />

∂y<br />

µ<br />

∂H<br />

∂y (φ (y) ,y,v(y)) + v0 (y) ∂H<br />

(φ (y) ,y,v(y))<br />

∂v<br />

<br />

≤ 0 ∀y. (7.25)<br />

This expression may be quite difficult to exploit. Fortunately, it can be<br />

simplified using a standard trick. The first order condition can be written<br />

as:<br />

F (y, φ (y)) = 0 ∀y

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