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Pierre André Chiappori (Columbia) "Family Economics" - Cemmap

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3. Preferences and decision making 113<br />

the simple situation in which preferences are egotistic, and all commodities<br />

are privately consumed. The noncooperative solution boils down to the<br />

following two programs:<br />

max<br />

qa {ua (q a ) subject to p 0 q a = Y a }<br />

max<br />

qb © b<br />

u ¡ q b¢ subject to p 0 q b = Y bª<br />

(3.24)<br />

In words, the noncooperative solution simply implies in that case that each<br />

agent chooses his/her level of consumption independently of the other; that<br />

is, they live side by side, but without any economic interaction. 5 Then the<br />

consumption of individual s is simply this individual’s demands at prices<br />

p and income Y s . Denote the demand functions for s by ξ s (p,Ys ³<br />

).Note<br />

that the allocation ξ a (p,Ya ) , ξ b ¡ p,Yb¢´ is Pareto efficient: clearly, the<br />

utility of, say, a can only be increased by an income transfer from b, which<br />

would reduce b’s welfare. Generally the associated household demands<br />

ξ ¡ p,Y a ,Y b¢ = ξ a (p,Y a )+ξ b ¡ p,Y b¢<br />

(3.25)<br />

will not satisfy income pooling or the Slutsky conditions. The special case<br />

in which income pooling and the Slutsky conditions will hold is if the classic<br />

aggregation conditions hold. That is, if the two agents have linear Engel<br />

curves with each partner having the same slope for any good:<br />

ξ a i = φ a i (p)+ϕ i (p) Y a<br />

ξ b i = φ b i (p)+ϕ i (p) Y b<br />

(3.26)<br />

so that the household demand for good i is given by:<br />

¡ a b<br />

ξi p,Y ,Y ¢ = φ a i (p)+φ b i (p)+ϕi (p) ¡ Y a + Y b¢<br />

= φ a i (p)+φ b i (p)+ϕi (p) Y (3.27)<br />

In this very special case income pooling holds in the sense that the household<br />

demands do not depend on the distribution of income. The distribution<br />

of the goods within the household will, however, depend on the distribution<br />

of income.<br />

3.4.2 One public good.<br />

Whenever a direct interaction between members is introduced - either because<br />

of public consumption, or because one member’s consumption has<br />

an external effect on the other member’s well being - inefficiencies are very<br />

5 Of course, this does not preclude the existence of non-economic interactions - love,<br />

sex, conversation or others.

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