Pierre André Chiappori (Columbia) "Family Economics" - Cemmap

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Part I Models of Household Behavior 11
Page 1: Family Economics Martin Browning Pi
Page 4 and 5: iv 3.2 Householdproduction ........
Page 6 and 7: vi 6.4 IntertemporalBehavior ......
Page 8 and 9: viii 11 Marriage, Divorce, Children
Page 11 and 12: List of Figures 1.1 Marriage Rates
Page 13 and 14: xiii 4.2 Apotentiallycompensatingva
Page 16 and 17: Introduction The existence of a nuc
Page 18 and 19: two distinct solution concepts; one
Page 20 and 21: were affectedbytherisinginvestments
Page 22 and 23: Murat Iyigun, Guy Lacroix, Valérie
Page 26 and 27: 1 Facts The purpose of this chapter
Page 28 and 29: 1. Facts 15 married at least once.
Page 30 and 31: 1. Facts 17 ing to their higher div
Page 32 and 33: 1. Facts 19 shopping than men, irre
Page 34 and 35: 1. Facts 21 individuals who are 30
Page 36 and 37: 1. Facts 23 out of 13.8 years, whil
Page 38 and 39: 1. Facts 25 a sharp decrease. This
Page 40 and 41: 1. Facts 27 dren in the household a
Page 42 and 43: 1. Facts 29 [9] Browning, Martin an
Page 44 and 45: 1.7 Tables and Figures 1. Facts 31
Page 46 and 47: 1. Facts 33 Single head Married cou
Page 48 and 49: % Belgium 9 Denmark 21.9 Germany 17
Page 50 and 51: 1. Facts 37 USA Canada UK Norway Ye
Page 52 and 53: Marital Status at age 35 Never marr
Page 54 and 55: 1. Facts 41 Variable Constant Log i
Page 56 and 57: ate per 1000, 20+ 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
Page 58 and 59: 200 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20
Page 60 and 61: percent entering first marriage 0.3
Page 62 and 63: per cent entering second marriage 0
Page 64 and 65: 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20
Page 66 and 67: 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 23 24 25 26 27
Page 68 and 69: 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 23 25 27 29 31 33
Page 70 and 71: 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 1. Facts 57 1968
Page 72 and 73: 6.8 6.6 6.4 6.2 6 5.8 23 24 25 26 2
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0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 1. Facts 61 1968
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FIGURE 1.22. Age Pyramid , US 1950.
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0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 1968 1970 1972 19
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100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% 1.2 0.4 0.2
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0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 1976 1. Facts 69
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proportion 100 95 90 85 80 75 1. Fa
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Birth rate 4 3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5 1. Fac
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Age 29 28 27 26 25 24 23 22 1930 19
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0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 1985 1986 1987 19
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Log expenditures -.3 -.2 -.1 0 .1 1
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2 The gains from marriage From an e
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2. The gains from marriage 83 If th
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2. The gains from marriage 85 house
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2. The gains from marriage 87 of eq
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2. The gains from marriage 89 Low M
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2. The gains from marriage 91 still
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2.4 Risk sharing 2. The gains from
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2.5.2 Intact families 2. The gains
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2. The gains from marriage 97 Case
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2.7 References 2. The gains from ma
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2. The gains from marriage 101 [28]
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3 Preferences and decision making 3
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3. Preferences and decision making
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3.2 Household production 3.2.1 The
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Integrating, we have: 3. Preference
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ub ub Low μμ UPF(P,p,x) 3. Prefer
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U b 3. Preferences and decision mak
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4 The collective model: a formal an
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For the observable demand function
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4.1.4 Distribution factors 4. The c
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4. The collective model: a formal a
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4.2.3 Welfare 4. The collective mod
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and 4. The collective model: a form
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straints - namely, it must be such
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u 4. The collective model: a formal
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5 Empirical issues for the collecti
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5. Empirical issues for the collect
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(x − ρ (x, z)). Individual a sol
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generating the aggregate demand: 5.
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C 5. Empirical issues for the colle
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conditions require that: 5. Empiric
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5.6 References 5. Empirical issues
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6 Uncertainty and Dynamics in the C
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6. Uncertainty and Dynamics in the
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y: 6. Uncertainty and Dynamics in t
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First order conditions give 6. Unce
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scribing dynamic choices is: 6. Unc
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which directly implies that: ½ βp
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U w 0 6. Uncertainty and Dynamics i
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U w 0 6. Uncertainty and Dynamics i
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Part II Equilibrium Models of the M
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7 Matching on the Marriage Market:
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7. Matching on the Marriage Market:
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u 7. Matching on the Marriage Marke
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7.4.2 Search and Assortative Mating
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8 Sharing the gains from marriage I
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8. Sharing the gains from marriage
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Equation (8.8) canberewrittenas: or
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G F 8. Sharing the gains from marri
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Y + uH Y + puH 8. Sharing the gains
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v 4 3 2 1 8. Sharing the gains from
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Utilities 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 8. Sharin
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Utilities 5 4 3 2 1 8. Sharing the
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(i, j) such that i ∈ I and j ∈
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3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 1976 19
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9 Investment in Schooling and the M
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9. Investment in Schooling and the
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Investment, no marriage 9. Investme
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V2 z22 z22 2 z22 − z12 z21 − z1
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V2 z22 z '22 z22 2 z22 − z12 z'
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10 An equilibrium model of marriage
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10. An equilibrium model of marriag
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11 Marriage,Divorce,Children 11.1 I
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11. Marriage, Divorce, Children 461
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is by increasing s. Specifically, 1
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subject to the constraints: 11. Mar
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11.11 References 11. Marriage, Divo
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Part 2: Change in the Variability o
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Part 4: Change in the Proximity Fac
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Pierre André Chiappori (Columbia) "Family Economics" - Cemmap

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