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Pierre André Chiappori (Columbia) "Family Economics" - Cemmap

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5. Empirical issues for the collective model 213<br />

clothing tend to be very colinear and we have to treat clothing as an<br />

assignable good.<br />

Two remarks are in order at that point. First, the identifiability result<br />

just presented is, by nature, non parametric, in the sense that it does not<br />

rely on the choice of a specific functional form for either preferences or<br />

Pareto weights. 7 Under an explicitly parametric approach, stronger identification<br />

results may obtain; for instance, it may be the case that one<br />

exclusive good only is sufficient to identify all the relevant parameters.<br />

Clearly, these additional properties are due to the specific functional form<br />

under consideration. Second, the result is generic, in the sense that it holds<br />

for ‘almost all’ structures. An interesting remark is that (non-generic) exceptions<br />

include the case in which Pareto weights are constant; in such a<br />

case, the collective indirect utilities are not identifiable in general. 8 To see<br />

why, simply note that, in that case, the household maximizes a collective<br />

utility of the form:<br />

U ¡ q a , q b , Q ¢ = μu a (q a , Q)+u b ¡ q b , Q ¢<br />

(5.19)<br />

under budget constraint; remember that here μ is a constant. Standard<br />

results in consumer theory guarantee that we can recover U from observed<br />

(household) demand. However, for any given U there exists a continuum of<br />

u a and u b such that (5.19) is satisfied. For instance, take any such u a and<br />

u b that are strongly increasing and concave, pick up any smooth function<br />

φ, and define ū a and ū b by:<br />

ū a (q a , Q) = u a (q a , Q)+εφ (Q)<br />

ū b ¡ q b , Q ¢ = u b ¡ q b , Q ¢ − μεφ (Q)<br />

Then μū a +ū b = U and (5.19) is satisfied; moreover, on any compact set,<br />

ū a and ū b are concave and increasing for ε small enough.<br />

Ironically, the case of a constant Pareto weight corresponds to the Samuelson<br />

justification of the unitary setting, in which a single, price-independent<br />

welfare index is maximized. From an identification viewpoint, adopting a<br />

unitary framework is thus a very inappropriate choice, since it rules out the<br />

identification of individual welfares.<br />

Our general conclusion is that welfare relevant structure is indeed identifiable<br />

in general, provided that one can observe one exclusive consumption<br />

7 This notion of ‘non parametric’, which is used for instance by econometricians,<br />

should be carefully distinguished from the perspective based on revealed preferences -<br />

which, unfortunately, is also often called ‘non parametric’. In a nutshell, the revealed<br />

preferences approach does not require the observability of a demand function, butonly<br />

of a finite number of points; it then describes relationship that must be satisfied for the<br />

points to be compatible with the model under consideration. This view will be described<br />

in Subsection 5.3.4.<br />

8 This case is ‘non generic’ in the sense that in the set of continuous functions, constant<br />

functions are non-generic.

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