Pierre André Chiappori (Columbia) "Family Economics" - Cemmap

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6. Uncertainty and Dynamics in the Collective model 289 [15] Chiappori, Pierre-André and Yoram Weiss, ‘Divorce, Remarriage, and Welfare: A General Equilibrium Approach’, Journal of the European Economic Association, 4 (2006), 415-426. [16] Chiappori, Pierre-André and Yoram Weiss, ‘Divorce, Remarriage, and Child Support’, Journal of Labor Economics, 25 (2007), 37-74. [17] Chiappori, Pierre-André, Iyigun, Murat, and Yoram Weiss, ‘Investment in Schooling and the Marriage Market’, American Economic Review, 99 (2009), 1689-1713. [18] Chiappori, Pierre-André, Iyigun, Murat, and Yoram Weiss, ‘Public Goods, Transferable Utility and Divorce Laws’, IZA Discussion Paper No. 2646, (2007). [19] Chiappori, Pierre-André, Iyigun, Murat, and Yoram Weiss, ‘Spousal Matching, Marriage Contracts and Property Division in Divorce’, Tel Aviv University, (2006). [20] Clark, Simon, ‘Law, Property, and Marital Dissolution’, The Economic Journal, 109 (1999), C41-C54. [21] Coase, Ronald H., ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, Journal of Law and Economics, 3 (1960), 1-44. [22] Del Boca, Daniela and Christopher Flinn, ‘Endogeneous Household Interaction’, CHILD Working Papers wp08_09, CHILD - Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic economics - ITALY, (2009). [23] Duflo, Esther and Christopher Udry, ‘Intrahousehold Resource Allocation in Cote d’Ivoire: Social Norms, Separate Accounts and Consumption Choices’, NBER Working Paper No. 10498, (2004). [24] Dufwenberg, Martin, ‘Marital investments, time consistency and emotions’, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 48 (2002), 57-69. [25] Geanakoplos, John, Pearce, David and Ennio Stacchetti, ‘Psychological games and sequential rationality’, Games and Economic Behavior, 1 (1989), 60-79. [26] Hardy, G. H., Littlewood, J. E., and G. Polya, Inequalities, (Cambridge Mathematical Library, 1952). [27] Konrad, Kai A. and Kjell Erik Lommerud, ‘The bargaining family revisited’, Canadian Journal of Economics, 33 (2000), 471-487. [28] Lundberg, Shelly and Robert A. Pollak, ‘Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market’, Journal of Political Economy, 101 (1993), 988-1010.
290 6. Uncertainty and Dynamics in the Collective model [29] Lundberg, Shelly and Robert A. Pollak, ‘Efficiency in Marriage’, Review of Economics of the Household, 1 (2003), 153-167. [30] Mazzocco, Maurizio, ‘Saving, Risk Sharing, and Preferences for Risk’, American Economic Review, 94 (2004), 1169-1182. [31] Mazzocco, Maurizio and Shiv Saini, ‘Testing Efficient Risk Sharing with Heterogeneous Risk Preferences: Semi-parametric Tests with an Application to Village Economies’, 2006 Meeting Papers 108, Society for Economic Dynamics, (2006). [32] Mazzocco, Maurizio, ‘Household Intertemporal Behaviour: A Collective Characterization and a Test of Commitment’, Review of Economic Studies, 74 (2007), 857-895. [33] Mincer, Jacob, ‘Family Migration Decisions’, Journal of Political Economy, 86 (1978), 749-773. [34] Rey, Patrick, and Bernard Salanie, ‘Long-term, Short-term and Renegotiation: On the Value of Commitment in Contracting’, Econometrica, 58 (1990), 597-619. [35] Townsend, Robert M, ‘Risk and Insurance in Village India’, Econometrica, 62 (1994), 539-591. [36] Weiss, Yoram and Robert J. Willis, ‘Transfers among Divorced Couples: Evidence and Interpretation’, Journal of Labor Economics, 11 (1993), 629-679. [37] Weiss, Yoram and Robert J. Willis, ‘Match Quality, New Information, and Marital Dissolution’, Journal of Labor Economics, 15 (1997), S293-S329. [38] Wolfers, Justin, ‘Did Unilateral Divorce Laws Raise Divorce Rates? A Reconciliation and New Results’, American Economic Review, 96 (2006), 1802-1820.
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Family Economics Martin Browning Pi
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iv 3.2 Householdproduction ........
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vi 6.4 IntertemporalBehavior ......
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viii 11 Marriage, Divorce, Children
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List of Figures 1.1 Marriage Rates
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xiii 4.2 Apotentiallycompensatingva
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Introduction The existence of a nuc
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two distinct solution concepts; one
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were affectedbytherisinginvestments
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Murat Iyigun, Guy Lacroix, Valérie
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Part I Models of Household Behavior
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14 1. Facts there appear to be age,
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16 1. Facts 1.1.4 Transitions The m
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18 1. Facts sumption goods within h
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20 1. Facts may not capture the ful
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22 1. Facts This process is driven
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24 1. Facts 1.4 Children Children a
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26 1. Facts a major policy concern
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28 1. Facts have means for, say, hi
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30 1. Facts [21] Michael, Robert,
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32 1. Facts Age group USA Denmark 1
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34 1. Facts Birth cohort 1931-36 19
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36 1. Facts USA Canada UK Norway Ye
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38 1. Facts Country Male Participat
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40 1. Facts Mother’s Age 20-30 31
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42 1. Facts rate per 1000, 20+ 18 1
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44 1. Facts Marriage rate per 1000
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46 1. Facts percent entering first
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48 1. Facts percent entering divorc
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50 1. Facts 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50
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52 1. Facts 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 23
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54 1. Facts 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 23 25
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56 1. Facts 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 1968
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58 1. Facts 6.8 6.6 6.4 6.2 6 5.8 2
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60 1. Facts 0.4 0.2 0 -0.2 -0.4 196
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62 1. Facts 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 1968 1970
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64 1. Facts FIGURE 1.23. Age Pyrami
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66 1. Facts 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 1930 1933
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68 1. Facts 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0%
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70 1. Facts 0.35 0.3 0.25 0.2 0.15
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72 1. Facts 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0%
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74 1. Facts Average number of child
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76 1. Facts Age 28 27 26 25 24 23 1
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78 1. Facts FIGURE 1.37. Consumptio
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80 1. Facts
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82 2. The gains from marriage for o
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84 2. The gains from marriage Q 2 y
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86 2. The gains from marriage this
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88 2. The gains from marriage as wh
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90 2. The gains from marriage ing a
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92 2. The gains from marriage absen
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94 2. The gains from marriage 2.5 C
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96 2. The gains from marriage 2.5.3
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98 2. The gains from marriage This
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100 2. The gains from marriage [14]
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102 2. The gains from marriage
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104 3. Preferences and decision mak
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158 4. The collective model: a form
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200 5. Empirical issues for the col
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340 8. Sharing the gains from marri
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392 9. Investment in Schooling and
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436 10. An equilibrium model of mar
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460 11. Marriage, Divorce, Children
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