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Pierre André Chiappori (Columbia) "Family Economics" - Cemmap

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192 4. The collective model: a formal analysis<br />

Extensions<br />

Public goods<br />

In the previous analysis, the internally produced commodity was privately<br />

consumed. What if, instead, the commodity is public within the household<br />

- as it is the case for childcare, for instance? Interestingly, not much is<br />

changed, because the separation principle still applies. If the commodity,<br />

although public within the household, is marketable, then its production is<br />

driven by profit maximization; the only change regards the demand side,<br />

where the decision process can no longer be decentralized using a sharing<br />

rule. Even in the non marketable case, the logic of cost minimization prevails.<br />

In particular, under constant returns to scale, it still the case that the<br />

level of production is determined by preferences and the decision process,<br />

while for any given level the time allocation of domestic work between<br />

spouses stems from technological considerations. 19<br />

Specialization<br />

Another special (but empirically relevant) case obtains when one of the<br />

spouses - say b - does not enter the labor market, and specializes instead<br />

in home production. This happens when, for the chosen allocation of time<br />

and consumption, b’s potential wage, ¯w b , is smaller than both b’s marginal<br />

productivity in household production and b’s marginal rate of substitution<br />

between leisure and consumption. In words: the marginal hour can indifferently<br />

be spent in leisure or household production, and both uses dominate<br />

market work. 20<br />

The situation, here, is more complex, because the opportunity cost of<br />

labor for b is no longer exogenously given; instead, it is now endogenous to<br />

the program. Still, if we keep the assumption of constant return to scale<br />

domestic technology, some of the previous conclusions remain valid. Indeed,<br />

in the marketable case, efficiency in a’s allocation of time still requires that:<br />

∂F<br />

∂ta ¡ a b<br />

t ,t ¢ = wa<br />

p<br />

while the CRS condition (4.77) implies that<br />

∂F<br />

∂ta ¡ a b<br />

t ,t ¢ = Φ 0<br />

µ a t<br />

tb <br />

It follows that, again, the ratio t a /t b is pinned down by technological con-<br />

19The reader is referred to Blundell, <strong>Chiappori</strong> and Meghir (2005) for a more detailed<br />

investigation.<br />

20Technically, this result is true at the marginal level only in the absence of non<br />

convexities. In the presence of fixed costs of work or constraints on the number of hours<br />

worked, the same constraint must be redefined at a more global level.

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