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Pierre André Chiappori (Columbia) "Family Economics" - Cemmap

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114 3. Preferences and decision making<br />

likely to appear. To bring out the essential features of the analysis, let<br />

us assume that there is only one public good and one private good and<br />

that each person has egotistic preferences; see Chen and Wooley (2001)<br />

and Browning, <strong>Chiappori</strong> and Lechene (2010). Given that we have a public<br />

good and individual incomes a natural, noncooperative process to consider<br />

is a voluntary contributions game in which each person contributes to the<br />

purchase of the public good and then uses any money remaining to buy the<br />

private good for themselves. That is, the two agents have the problems:<br />

© a<br />

max u ¡ Q a + Q b ,q a¢ subject to PQ a + pq a = Y aª<br />

Q a ,q a<br />

max<br />

Q b ,q b<br />

© u b ¡ Q a + Q b ,q b¢ subject to PQ b + pq b = Y bª<br />

(3.28)<br />

where Q s denotes agent s’s contribution to the public good. Assuming that<br />

both goods are normal, this interaction has exactly one Nash equilibrium,<br />

which can take one of two forms. In the first form, both agents contribute<br />

to the public good. Since this is an interior solution for both we have:<br />

u a Q<br />

ua q<br />

ub Q<br />

ub q<br />

³ ˆQ, ˆq a ´<br />

³ ˆQ, ˆq b ´<br />

If we sum the budget constraints we have:<br />

= P<br />

p<br />

= P<br />

p<br />

P ˆ Q + p ¡ ˆq a +ˆq b¢ = Y a + Y b<br />

(3.29)<br />

(3.30)<br />

³ ´<br />

Thus we have three equations in three unknowns ˆQ, a b ˆq , ˆq with a solution:<br />

ˆq a = ξ a ¡ P, p, Y a + Y b¢<br />

ˆq b = ξ b ¡ P, p, Y a + Y b¢<br />

ˆQ = Ξ ¡ P, p, Y a + Y b¢<br />

(3.31)<br />

We conclude that the household’s market demand for both the public good,<br />

ˆQ, and the private good, ˆq =ˆq a +ˆq b depends only on total household income<br />

Y a + Y b and not on how it is distributed. In other words, we have income<br />

pooling even though we have a non-unitary model. This is an example of<br />

the remarkable neutrality result due to Warr (1983) (see also Bergstrom,<br />

Blume and Varian (1986) and Bernheim (1986)). This shows that while<br />

income pooling is a necessary condition for the unitary model, it is not<br />

sufficient.<br />

It is important to note that income pooling here is a local property and<br />

holds only as long as both partners contribute to the public good. The other

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