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Pierre André Chiappori (Columbia) "Family Economics" - Cemmap

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108 3. Preferences and decision making<br />

two distinct roles. For example, a father who spends time with his child<br />

contributes to the development of the child (through f j (.)) andmayalso<br />

enjoy spending time with the child (captured by the presence of tb j in U b (.)).<br />

Of course, either of these effects could be negative (although not both).<br />

A standard problem with this approach is that the production function,<br />

despite its conceptual interest, cannot be estimated independently of the<br />

utility function unless the home produced commodities are independently<br />

observable; see Pollak and Wachter (1975) and Gronau (2006). Observability<br />

of outputs may be acceptable for agricultural production, or even for<br />

children’s health or education; it is less likely for, say, cleaning, and almost<br />

impossible for personal caring.<br />

If only inputs are observed and not outputs we may be able to recover<br />

information about the technology if we make auxiliary assumptions such<br />

as constant returns to scale and assumptions on preferences. To illustrate<br />

this, consider two partners who consume one single public good C and one<br />

private good c such that a consumes ca and b consumes cb with preferences<br />

given by us (C, cs ) ,s= a, b. Assume that the private good is purchased in<br />

the market and that the public commodity is produced using only the time<br />

inputs of the two partners. That is,<br />

C = f ¡ t a ,t b¢ . (3.11)<br />

Assuming that both partners participate in the labor market at wages w a<br />

and w b respectively, it can then be shown that for any efficient allocation<br />

the partners will minimize the cost of producing the public commodity in<br />

terms of the forgone private commodity, yielding<br />

¡<br />

a b t ,t ¢<br />

f1<br />

f2 (t a ,t b )<br />

= wa<br />

w b<br />

(3.12)<br />

in any interior solution. If we assume constant returns to scale, we can<br />

write:<br />

C = f ¡ t a ,t b¢ = t b φ (r) (3.13)<br />

for some function φ (r) where r = ta<br />

tb . The condition (3.12) then reduces to:<br />

φ 0 (r)<br />

φ (r) − rφ 0 wa<br />

=<br />

(r) wb (3.14)<br />

The testable implication of this equality is that r only depends on the wage<br />

ratio ω; this can be tested on a data set that reports wages and time spent<br />

on household production. Defining,<br />

h(r) =<br />

φ 0 (r)<br />

φ (r) − rφ 0 (r)<br />

this equation can be re-written as:<br />

φ 0 (r)<br />

φ (r) =<br />

1<br />

r + 1<br />

h(r)<br />

(3.15)

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