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Pierre André Chiappori (Columbia) "Family Economics" - Cemmap

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6. Uncertainty and Dynamics in the Collective model 261<br />

which belongs to the interval [0, 1]. Note, moreover, that 0 < ¯ρ 0 (ys) < 1<br />

unless one of the agents is (locally) risk neutral.<br />

The first statement in Proposition 6.1 is often called the mutuality principle.<br />

It states that when risk is shared efficiently, an agent’s consumption<br />

is not affected by the idiosyncratic realization of her income; only shocks<br />

affecting aggregate resources (here, total income ys) matter.Ithasbeen<br />

used to test for efficient risk sharing, although the precise test is much<br />

more complex than it may seem - we shall come back to this aspect below.<br />

Formula (6.26) is quite interesting in itself. It can be rewritten as:<br />

¯ρ 0 (ys) =<br />

− u0a (¯ρ)<br />

u 00a (¯ρ)<br />

− u0a (¯ρ)<br />

u 00a (¯ρ) − u0b (ys−¯ρ)<br />

u 00b (ys−¯ρ)<br />

(6.27)<br />

The ratio − u0a (¯ρ)<br />

u00a (¯ρ) is called the risk tolerance of A; it is the inverse of A’s<br />

risk aversion. Condition (6.27) states that the marginal risk is allocated<br />

between the agents in proportion of their respective risk tolerances. To<br />

put it differently, assume the household’s total income fluctuates by one<br />

(additional) dollar. The fraction of this one dollar fluctuation born by agent<br />

a is proportional to a’s risk tolerance. To take an extreme case, if a was<br />

infinitely risk averse - that is, her risk tolerance was nil - then ¯ρ 0 =0and<br />

her share would remain constant: all the risk would be born by b.<br />

It can actually be showed that the two conditions expressed by Proposition<br />

6.1 are also sufficient. That is, take any sharing rule ρ satisfying them.<br />

Then one can find two utility functions ua and ub such that ρ shares risk<br />

efficiently between a and b. 9<br />

6.3.3 Efficient risk sharing in a multi-commodity context: an<br />

introduction<br />

Regarding risk sharing, a multi commodity context is much more complex<br />

than the one-dimensional world just described. The key insight is that consumption<br />

decisions also depend on the relative prices of the various available<br />

commodities, and that typically these prices fluctuate as well. Surprisingly<br />

enough, sharing price risk is quite different from sharing income risk. A<br />

precise investigation would be outside the scope of the present volume;<br />

instead, we simply provide a short example. 10<br />

9 The exact result is even slightly stronger; it states that for any ρ satisfying the<br />

conditions and any increasing, strictly concave utility u A ,onecanfind some increasing,<br />

strictly concave utility u B such that ρ shares risk efficiently between A and B (see <strong>Chiappori</strong>,<br />

Samphantharak, Schulhofer-Wohl and Townsend 2010 for a precise statement).<br />

10 The reader is referred to <strong>Chiappori</strong>, Townsend and Yamada (2008) for a precise<br />

analysis. The following example is also borrowed from this article.

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