Pierre André Chiappori (Columbia) "Family Economics" - Cemmap

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3. Preferences and decision making 147 [14] Brossolet Cecile, Femmes au travail : l’introuvable égalité, (Paris : L’Harmattan, 1993). [15] Browning, Martin, Chiappori, Pierre-André and Valérie Lechene, “Distributional effects in household models: separate spheres and income pooling”, Economic Journal, 120 (545) (2010). [16] Browning, Martin, Chiappori, Pierre-André and Arthur Lewbel, ‘Estimating Consumption Economies of Scale, Adult Equivalence Scales, and Household Bargaining Power’, CAM Working Paper No. 2003-12, (2006). [17] Bruce, Neil and Michael Waldman, ‘The Rotten-Kid Theorem Meets the Samaritan’s Dilemma’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 105 (1990), 155-165. [18] Chen, Zhiqi and Frances Woolley, ‘A Cournot-Nash Model of Family Decision Making’, The Economic Journal, 111 (2001), 722-748. [19] Chiappori, Pierre-André, ‘Rational Household Labor Supply’, Econometrica, 56 (1988), 63-90. [20] Chiappori, Pierre-André, ‘Collective Labor Supply and Welfare’, Journal of Political Economy, 100 (1992), 437-67. [21] Chiappori, Pierre-André, ‘Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: A Rejoinder’, International Economic Review, 32 (1991), 761-62. [22] Chiappori, Pierre-André, ‘Random Labor Supply’, Columbia University, (2009). [23] Chiappori, Pierre-André, Olivier Donni and Ivana Komunjer (2010), ‘Learning From a Piece of Pie’, Mimeo, Columbia University. [24] Chiappori, Pierre-André and Ivan Werning, ‘Comment on "Rotten Kids, Purity, and Perfection"’, Journal of Political Economy, 110 (2002), 475-504. [25] Cornes, Richard C. and Emilson C.D. Silva, ‘Rotten Kids, Purity and Perfection’, Journal of Political Economy, 107 (1999), 1034-1040. [26] Gersbach, Hans and Hans Haller, ‘Allocation among Multi-Member Households: Issues, Cores and Equilibria’, in Alkan, Ahmet (eds.), Aliprantis, Charalambos D. (eds.) and Yannelis, Nicholas C. (eds.), Current Trends in Economics: Theory and Applications (Studies in Economic Theory, 8), (New York: Springer-verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 1999). [27] Gronau, Reuben, ‘Home Production and the Macro Economy-Some Lessons from Pollak and Wachter and from Transition Russia’, NBER Working Paper No. 12287, (2006).
148 3. Preferences and decision making [28] Grossbard-Shechtman, Shoshana, On the Economics of Marriage: A Theory of Marriage, Labor, and Divorce, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993). [29] Haddad, Lawrence and Ravi Kanbur, ‘Intrahousehold Inequality and the Theory of Targeting’, European Economic Review, 36 (1992), 372-378. [30] Haller, Hans, ‘Household Decisions and Equilibrium Efficiency’, International Economic Review, 41 (2000), 835-847. [31] Konrad, Kai A. and Kjell Erik Lommerud, ‘Family Policy with Non- Cooperative Families’, The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 97 (1995), 581-601. [32] Lundberg, Shelly and Robert A. Pollak, ‘Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market’, Journal of Political Economy, 101 (6), 988-1010. [33] Lundberg, Shelly and Robert A. Pollak, ‘Efficiency in Marriage’, Review of Economics of the Household, 1 (2003), 153-167. [34] Manser, Marilyn and Murray Brown, ‘Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A Bargaining Analysis’, International Economic Review, 21 (1980), 31-44. [35] Mas-Colell, Andreu, Whinston, Michael D. and Jerry R. Green, Microeconomic Theory, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). [36] Matthews, Steven A., ‘Smooth Monotone Contribution Games’, PIER Working Paper Archive 06-018, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, (2006). [37] McElroy, Marjorie B. and Mary Jean Horney, ‘Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: Toward a Generalization of the Theory of Demand’, International Economic Review, 22 (1981), 333-349. [38] Myerson, Roger B., Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict ,(Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 1991). [39] Pollak, Robert A. and Michael L. Wachter, ‘The Relevance of the Household Production Function and Its Implications for the Allocation of Time’, The Journal of Political Economy, 83 (1975), 255-278. [40] Samuelson, Paul A., ‘Social Indifference Curves’, The Quaterly Journal of Economics, 70 (1956), 1-22. [41] Samuelson, Paul A., ‘The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure’, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 36 (1954), 387-389.
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Family Economics Martin Browning Pi
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iv 3.2 Householdproduction ........
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vi 6.4 IntertemporalBehavior ......
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viii 11 Marriage, Divorce, Children
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List of Figures 1.1 Marriage Rates
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xiii 4.2 Apotentiallycompensatingva
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Introduction The existence of a nuc
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two distinct solution concepts; one
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were affectedbytherisinginvestments
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Murat Iyigun, Guy Lacroix, Valérie
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Part I Models of Household Behavior
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14 1. Facts there appear to be age,
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16 1. Facts 1.1.4 Transitions The m
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18 1. Facts sumption goods within h
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20 1. Facts may not capture the ful
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22 1. Facts This process is driven
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24 1. Facts 1.4 Children Children a
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26 1. Facts a major policy concern
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28 1. Facts have means for, say, hi
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30 1. Facts [21] Michael, Robert,
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32 1. Facts Age group USA Denmark 1
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34 1. Facts Birth cohort 1931-36 19
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36 1. Facts USA Canada UK Norway Ye
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38 1. Facts Country Male Participat
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40 1. Facts Mother’s Age 20-30 31
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42 1. Facts rate per 1000, 20+ 18 1
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44 1. Facts Marriage rate per 1000
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46 1. Facts percent entering first
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48 1. Facts percent entering divorc
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50 1. Facts 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50
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52 1. Facts 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 23
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54 1. Facts 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 23 25
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56 1. Facts 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 1968
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58 1. Facts 6.8 6.6 6.4 6.2 6 5.8 2
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60 1. Facts 0.4 0.2 0 -0.2 -0.4 196
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62 1. Facts 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 1968 1970
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64 1. Facts FIGURE 1.23. Age Pyrami
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66 1. Facts 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 1930 1933
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68 1. Facts 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0%
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70 1. Facts 0.35 0.3 0.25 0.2 0.15
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72 1. Facts 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0%
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74 1. Facts Average number of child
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76 1. Facts Age 28 27 26 25 24 23 1
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78 1. Facts FIGURE 1.37. Consumptio
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80 1. Facts
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82 2. The gains from marriage for o
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84 2. The gains from marriage Q 2 y
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86 2. The gains from marriage this
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88 2. The gains from marriage as wh
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90 2. The gains from marriage ing a
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92 2. The gains from marriage absen
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94 2. The gains from marriage 2.5 C
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198 4. The collective model: a form
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200 5. Empirical issues for the col
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244 6. Uncertainty and Dynamics in
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292
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294 7. Matching on the Marriage Mar
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334 8. Sharing the gains from marri
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392 9. Investment in Schooling and
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436 10. An equilibrium model of mar
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460 11. Marriage, Divorce, Children
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Pierre André Chiappori (Columbia) "Family Economics" - Cemmap

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