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Pierre André Chiappori (Columbia) "Family Economics" - Cemmap

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222 5. Empirical issues for the collective model<br />

Secondly, the computations above rely on the assumption that labor<br />

supply is a continuous variable. This may fail to hold for two reasons.<br />

First, in some households one member may elect not to participate; in<br />

that case, the person’s labor supply is at a corner solution equal to zero.<br />

Secondly, the structure of labor markets may put constraints on the number<br />

of hours supplied by individuals. For instance, the choice may be only<br />

between working part time, full time or not at all; then labor supply should<br />

rather be modelled as a discrete variable. Extensions of the previous model<br />

to such situations have been studied by Blundell et al (2007) and Donni<br />

(2007).<br />

Although very convenient, this framework has its limitations. The privateness<br />

assumption has been criticized on two grounds. First, while some<br />

consumptions are indeed private, others are not. Children expenditures are<br />

a typical example of public goods within the household. Blundell, <strong>Chiappori</strong><br />

and Meghir (2005) analyze a model similar to the previous one but for the<br />

consumption good, which is taken to be public. They show that, again, the<br />

model is identifiable from the observation of labor supply behavior. They<br />

show how their approach can be extended to household production under<br />

various specifications. A second criticism concerns the private nature of<br />

individual leisure. It could indeed be argued that leisure is, to some extent,<br />

publicly consumed; after all, the utility I derive from my own free time may<br />

be higher when my spouse is available as well. The general insight, here, is<br />

that a model in which both members’ leisure enter each individual utility is<br />

still identifiable, provided that some other commodities are exclusive (this<br />

is a consequence of the general identifiability results described in Section<br />

2). Fong and Zhang (2001) analyze a framework in which leisure is partly<br />

private and partly public; they show that one assignable good is sufficient<br />

for identification in the presence of a distribution factor.<br />

Finally, a standard problem with traditional models of labor supply is the<br />

implicit assumption that time is divided between market work and leisure<br />

- so that any moment not spend working of a wage tends to be assimilated<br />

with leisure. This, of course, disregards domestic production, and may result<br />

in misleading evaluations. For instance, if a given reform is found to<br />

reduce female market labor supply, we may conclude that it increases her<br />

leisure, hence her utility, whereas the actual outcome is more domestic work<br />

(and ultimately less leisure) for the wife. Donni (2008) shows, however, that<br />

the direction of the mistake depends on the properties of the domestic production<br />

function. To take an extreme example, consider the case in which<br />

the latter is additively separable; that is, when t s denotes the time spend<br />

on domestic production by agent s, then the outcome is:<br />

C = f a (t a )+f b ¡ t b¢<br />

Assuming that the domestic good is marketable with price p, first order

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