PDF (PhD Thesis Susan Chipchase) - Nottingham eTheses ...

Richardson-Klavehn, 2005) with the distinction between Remembering and
Knowing may make sense to participants if Tulving’s (1985) memory model is
assumed to be true and there are two different forms of memory. However,
many researchers now argue for a single-process model of memory (e.g.
Donaldson, 1996) and in that case RKN responses may relate to participants
confidence in memory. The ambiguity and individual differences in
participants’ interpretation of task instructions is reduced with the Same /
Similar / New paradigm and the remarkably consistent results that I have found
with this paradigm across a series of experiments with small changes in the
methodology highlights the robustness of findings with this paradigm.
One potential concern in the conclusions that can be drawn from the Same /
Similar / New paradigm is what aspect of specificity of memory for emotional
and neutral items the paradigm is really measuring. I have assumed, as did
Kensinger et al. (2006, 2007a, 2007b) that this is based on memory for visual
details of the stimuli, however, it is possible that participants might be basing
their decision to classify an item as Same / Similar / new on alternative
information. One way to clarify this could be to conduct an experiment
explicitly examining memory for visual details and see if the same pattern of
results is found. For example, a change detection paradigm could be used
where participants need to identify a small change in detail is made to the
object or background of a scene.
A possible limitation of the Same / Similar / New paradigm is that
following Kensinger et al. (2006) the analysis is restricted to items that were
the same at the time of study and test. This means that although participants are
presented with a reasonably large number of stimuli during the study and test
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