Rediscovering Europe in the Netherlands - St Antony's College ...

ediscovering europe in the netherlands
The wrr supports the proposal of the National Convention to set up an
independent Constitutional Court charged with reviewing the constitutionality
of legislation. A Constitutional Court could also apply the safeguards
referred to above. That would create a new mechanism of accountability
which, given experiences in other eu member states, could take its
own part in the legitimisation of eu policy in the Netherlands. This
accountability mechanism would not only be relevant in an eu context,
but would also focus on the responsibilities of the national legislature and
politicians (‘does the national legislator comply with constitutional
norms?’).
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A frequently heard objection to the introduction of national constitutional
safeguards is that they are too static, and could impede the dynamics of
European integration. For many citizens, however, that dynamic is part of
the problem and thus the need to control and contain it to at least some
degree has emerged. Moreover, Germany has shown that constitutional
review is perfectly possible without unnecessarily impeding the dynamics
of European integration, provided the formulation of the provisions in the
Constitution are sufficiently general and ‘open’. A major advantage of
constitutional review is that the political and legal debate which precedes
the formulation of safeguards in the Constitution (and thus constitutional
review) generates a great deal of media attention and may thus contribute
to the political legitimisation of eu policy when citizens see that guarantees
are being carefully protected. Moreover, the symbolic significance of
such safeguards should not be underestimated. On the one hand, to some
extent, they thwart the cheap populism which plays on the fears of an
autonomy ‘sell-out’, while, on the other hand, forcing politicians to meet
these kinds of sell-out accusations head on at an early stage.
Formulating what the eu should and should not (continue to) do also
deserves a political debate in the shorter term. This would not necessarily
require constitutional safeguards. In the case of major decisions such as
treaty reforms or a highly controversial theme, political safeguards may be
of help. Although such safeguards have powerful effects in the shorter
term, they can also move in line with changes, priorities and challenges in
the long term. An effective example of these political safeguards are ‘red
lines’: political lines that the government and/or political parties draw in
the negotiating sand with regard to the content of eu policy. They provide
clear public statements about what powers a member state is definitely not
prepared to transfer to the eu and which ones the media and the public
regard as hard political guarantees. Concessions on red lines thus exact a
political price, for which the government must render account in the
subsequent political debate. Red lines are by definition concerned with