Rediscovering Europe in the Netherlands - St Antony's College ...

diagnosis
more alert to European issues, enabling them in turn to mobilise potential
voters (Hooghe and Marks 2005b; Hix 2005; Pellikaan, Vollaard and Otjes
2007).
More recently, an important trend has emerged as a corollary to this
populism and the debates on constitutional issues, in that issues of identity
have been accorded more weight in the choices made by the political
parties and citizens in Europe. Socio-psychological research suggests that
European and national identity (regardless of how ‘strong’ that national
identity is) can reinforce each other, but can also compete with each other
(wrr, to be published in 2007). Elites and highly educated citizens, whose
greater knowledge and mobility means they see (or experience) the benefits
of the eu more directly than the average citizen, are moreover found to
identify less exclusively with their national state (Marks and Hooghe 2005a
en 2005b; Hix 2005: 165; Bovens 2006b). The citizens’ identification with
Europe occurs mainly as a result of common actions and ambitions over an
extended period, and is not so much based on a shared history or ‘essence’
(Pels 2007: 6-7). In other words, identity is not just a question of ‘being’,
but also of ‘doing’ (Schmidt 2006:17).
Moreover, a European identity will always be a composite of diverse
national and European elements, and as a result, will always be different
from any specific national identity. However, given that the average citizen
continues to derive his or her image of ‘Europe’ more from national media
reports and political claims than from direct European experiences, the
communicative strategies of (national) political elites and parties have a
crucial influence on the way citizens end up identifying with Europe (see
chapter 5). If a government leader turns to the national news media following
a European Council to explain how he (or she) has just rescued their
country from the clutches of a despotic eu (as Margaret Thatcher did so
very effectively in the 1980s), he or she creates an image of the irreconcilability
of the national and European identities. However, a government
leader can also choose to portray the process of European integration as a
natural extension of the political ‘vocation’ and grandeur of his or her
country (as is customary in France). This image implies that citizens are
able to identify more easily with Europe as a political community (Schmidt
2006: 37-38). In recent years, we have seen politicians in a number of
member states adopting a populist ‘framing’ of pro- or anti-European
standpoints, thereby fuelling fears of a European ‘superstate’. In the eyes
of many citizens, the eu is not simply a ‘soulless’ and remote technocratic
project with which they cannot ever possibly identify, but is also a real
threat to their own national identity.
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