The Scope and Implications of a Tracing Mechanism for Small Arms ...
The Scope and Implications of a Tracing Mechanism for Small Arms ...
The Scope and Implications of a Tracing Mechanism for Small Arms ...
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<strong>The</strong> second UNLiREC/CICAD/OAS initiative involves the development<br />
<strong>of</strong> the “Regional Clearing-house Project on Firearms, Ammunition <strong>and</strong><br />
Explosives” 8 <strong>and</strong> one <strong>of</strong> its objectives is the collection <strong>and</strong> destruction <strong>of</strong><br />
surplus <strong>and</strong> illicitly trafficked small arms <strong>and</strong> light weapons.<br />
An important element is to identify <strong>and</strong> evidentially record details <strong>of</strong><br />
seized illegal weapon caches prior to destruction <strong>and</strong> use that in<strong>for</strong>mation<br />
to trace the sources <strong>of</strong> illicit supply. To support this project, the RCMP is<br />
again making available its technology with the Firearms Reference Table.<br />
Training packages are currently being developed involving evidential<br />
procedures <strong>for</strong> identifying, cataloguing <strong>and</strong> tracing weapons, which will<br />
include the use <strong>of</strong> IWETS.<br />
<strong>The</strong> US is a major arms producer <strong>and</strong> exporter <strong>and</strong> the ATF is pivotal<br />
to much <strong>of</strong> the worldwide tracing <strong>of</strong> firearms through the National <strong>Tracing</strong><br />
Center (NTC). Access to NTC records can be made direct by law<br />
en<strong>for</strong>cement agencies or routed via their Interpol NCB. ATF records include<br />
all commercial sales <strong>and</strong> exports <strong>of</strong> civilian <strong>and</strong> surplus ex-military weapons.<br />
<strong>The</strong> ATF can also facilitate access to the US Department <strong>of</strong> Defense to<br />
check their records <strong>of</strong> US military issue weapons on a case-by-case basis.<br />
3.2.3 Recommendations<br />
1. Through international development outreach programmes, introduce<br />
harmonized regional controls based on the CICAD/UNLiREC/OAS<br />
initiatives.<br />
2. Encourage countries to set up computerized national record-keeping<br />
systems; potentially one <strong>for</strong> civilian <strong>and</strong> commercial holdings <strong>and</strong> a<br />
second <strong>for</strong> military holdings.<br />
3. Adopt the IWETS as the st<strong>and</strong>ard <strong>for</strong> international in<strong>for</strong>mation<br />
exchange to trace illicitly trafficked weapons.<br />
4. Encourage countries, which are signatories to treaties <strong>and</strong> protocols<br />
aimed at transparency over arms exports, to establish a member Statewide<br />
record-keeping system, which collates on to a computerized<br />
database all disclosures to individually identify the weapons involved.<br />
Politically sensitive transfers or transactions, if not specific to each