The Scope and Implications of a Tracing Mechanism for Small Arms ...

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9 It is, in fact, important that marks cannot be easily obliterated, altered or removed. Those who hold and trade weapons, such as handguns, for criminal purposes have a strong interest in disguising their sources of (often legal) supply, particularly if they are sourced reasonably directly from a supplier such as a dishonest registered firearms dealer. Criminals will therefore try to remove or obliterate identifying marks, for example by grinding, drilling or gouging them away with metal working tools. Where successful, this process is known as “sanitization”. 14 Attempts to sanitize illicit SALW have, to date, been less common in conflict zones, where there has been less likelihood of tracing attempts and in any case the lines of supply are typically complex, with extensive recirculation among armed groups. Nevertheless, it appears that increased efforts to trace illicit arms in conflict zones have prompted an increase in sanitization efforts. 15 It is therefore important to sustain, indeed intensify, efforts to make sanitization more difficult. For example, US regulations specify a minimum depth of 0.003 inches and a height of 1/16 th inch for all firearm serial numbers. Manufacturers can place marks in less visible or accessible components of the weapons, or on delicate but essential components that would be damaged by attempts to remove marks. Marks may also be stamped on two or more locations of the same component in order to facilitate the retrieval of erased information. It is in this context that the concept of covert secondary marking has developed. This has been facilitated through the use of less traditional marking techniques, including laser etching, embedded electronic chips, and the mixing of chemical tracers in materials from which weapons parts are constructed. These can be used to make “back-up” marks that may prove essential to the future identification of the weapon. Laser etching, for example, can engrave detailed information in an area so small it will usually escape the notice of those attempting to sanitize the weapon. Techniques also exist for marking ammunition and explosives. Cartridges (rounds) for small arms are generally marked by head stamping, although this information generally identifies the batch, as opposed to individual rounds. Practices vary widely with more complex forms of ammunition, such as shells and missiles. Explosives can most easily be marked during manufacture with the use of chemical tracers, which
10 uniquely identify each production batch. This technique is now widely used during the manufacture of plastic explosives, but remains exceptional with the types of explosives used in ammunition. Many countries require that imported SALW also be marked with the ordnance mark for that country, along with the year of importation, or—in the case of civilian firearms—with the importer’s name and address or logo. The thirteen countries 16 that are members of the Commission of International Proof (CIP) have agreed regulations requiring all firearms and military small arms to be safety tested and stamped with verification marks (including a national stamp and year code) prior to use, sale or export. 1.3.3 The Content of Markings There are three main approaches to the marking of content on SALW. 17 The first involves putting all of the required information in a single code of letter and numbers (full alphanumeric code). 18 Such codes are easy to read and reproduce and provide unique identification of the weapon without reading any further information from the weapon. The second approach, used by China, Russia and many former Soviet bloc countries, combines alphanumeric code with symbols (for example, of an individual factory) to enable unique identification. 19 The effectiveness of this system is undermined by the fact that officials from other countries may miss the significance of the symbol or misinterpret it, and are prone to miscopy it in record-keeping or tracing communications. The third approach, used for example by the US, is to combine an alphanumeric code or serial number with other identifiers on the weapon denoting manufacturer, model and calibre for unique identification of the weapon. Combining all of this information provides unique identification, but officials unfamiliar with such a system may be confused about which marks on the weapon are required for identification. Most SALW also have a number of marks in addition to those comprising the unique identifier. These include proof marks, import marks, importers’ marks, armourers’ marks, selector markings and a range of other indicators that experts can use as supplementary information to help them identify an individual weapon, especially if the serial numbers or identifying
Page 1 and 2: UNIDIR/2002/20 The Scope and Implic
Page 3 and 4: CONTENTS Page Preface. . . . . . .
Page 5: v Chapter 4 Structures and Institut
Page 8 and 9: viii point of diversion, thus inhib
Page 11 and 12: ACRONYMS ATFUS BATF BPA CFR CFR CIC
Page 13 and 14: xiii VIN WFSA WIES WR Vehicle Ident
Page 15 and 16: 2 and lines of supply of illicit SA
Page 17 and 18: 4 First, if a weapon has been invol
Page 19 and 20: 6 The UN Programme of Action includ
Page 21: 8 1.3 MARKING 1.3.1 Introduction A
Page 25 and 26: 12 • Ensure, at the time of trans
Page 27 and 28: 14 • increasing the resistance of
Page 29 and 30: 16 The UN Firearms Protocol, in its
Page 31 and 32: 18 component of this project is to
Page 33 and 34: 20 They clarify whether a weapon is
Page 35 and 36: 22 Though such systems have great p
Page 37 and 38: 24 have a more prominent role to pl
Page 39 and 40: 26 That said, national intelligence
Page 41 and 42: 28 training and technical assistanc
Page 43 and 44: 30 This highlights one of the most
Page 45 and 46: 32 An international tracing mechani
Page 47 and 48: 34 Some of the necessary elements a
Page 49 and 50: 36 on sources and lines of supply o
Page 51 and 52: 38 In promoting international assis
Page 53 and 54: 40 3 Programme of Action to Prevent
Page 55 and 56: 42 25 This section draws on discuss
Page 58 and 59: 45 BIBLIOGRAPHY Berkol, Ilhan, Mark
Page 60 and 61: CHAPTER 2 WHAT TO MARK AND WHAT TO
Page 62 and 63: 49 tracing method for all SALW (con
Page 64 and 65: 51 Figure 2: : The different sub-ca
Page 66 and 67: 53 In order to better grasp the pro
Page 68 and 69: 55 SALW include weapons of war, def
Page 70 and 71: 57 The following questions should t
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59 All of this data, while useful f
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61 2.5 WHAT ARE THE CRITERIA FOR IN
Page 76 and 77:
63 traced, but which ones? Precisel
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65 Table 1: Firearms recovered in c
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67 explosives belts and dozens of t
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69 This data provides an interestin
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71 weapons belonging to illicit cir
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73 imagine being able to effectivel
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75 case of Switzerland, it would be
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77 electronics in animal identifica
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79 based our reflection on goals fo
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81 10 Small Arms Survey, Annuaire s
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APPENDIX 1 83
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APPENDIX 3 85
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87 the army weapon is capable of au
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90 significance, hence in general t
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92 3.1.2 Sanitization Removal or ob
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94 Chinese Type 56-1 Unique Identif
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96 verify that the imported weapons
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98 weapons. There are risks involve
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100 China Type 56 Russia AK47 Russi
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102 channels, with the protection o
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104 3.1.9 Comments Countries seekin
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106 as a result, potentially tip-of
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108 2. All markings must be made pe
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110 shared encryption standard. The
Page 125 and 126:
112 Domestic record-keeping varies
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114 Nevertheless, whilst the Wassen
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116 individual weapon, should as a
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118 • “Consolidation”—4 x 2
Page 133 and 134:
120 With the scope of the Protocol
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122 The South African authorities a
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124 • (Tracing) Details of all st
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126 tracing Chinese weapons. Conseq
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128 circulating information by fax
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130 Tracing requests are normally c
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132 encourage countries along the t
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134 close enough to provide adequat
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136 3. If Interpol is not up to the
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138 which restrict the amount of in
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140 9 It was notable during negotia
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142
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144 There are other reasons as well
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146 Laws Firearms are a durable com
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148 This last point should not be u
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150 the future a firearm tracing qu
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152 There are several important ele
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154 Canada, nearly all transfers re
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156 accuracy and man-hour effective
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158 industry practices. An effectiv
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160
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162 manner in national (and possibl
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164 routine stockpile management. A
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166 International regulations on th
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168 2. The definitions of weapons,
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170 enable national authorities to
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172 serial number of the firearm. T
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174 9. Explosives: the recommendati
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176 • The States parties undertak
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178 • The following is establishe
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180 International regulations on th
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182 • The participating States ag
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184 The Convention on Plastic Explo
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186 5.3.1 European Joint Action The
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188 years in July 2001. In December
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190 • States must make efforts to
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192 a greater degree of harmonizati
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194 this may lead to the undesirabl
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196 28 Or at least difficult or imp
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198 49 Speech by Mr. Koffi Adjouman
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200 in its capacity as President of
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202 Table 1: Scope of the Seven Pri
Page 217 and 218:
204 Table 1 (continued) Characteris
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206 Characteristics of the marking
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208 Characteristics of the marking
Page 223 and 224:
210 Characteristics of the recordke
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212 Characteristics of the record-k
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214 Table 4: Comparison of the Stan
Page 229 and 230:
216 Characteristics of the exchange
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218
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