The Scope and Implications of a Tracing Mechanism for Small Arms ...

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tracing Chinese weapons. Consequently, all tracing enquiries would have to
be referred to the Chinese authorities first and they would in turn, on a
case-by-case basis, advise what marks were relevant and the country to
which the weapon was exported. In addition, China declined to allow a
speculative search of their records (a “fishing expedition”). Instead access
would have to be made via the relevant Chinese authorities for a specific
investigation that met the criteria for mutual legal assistance, as defined in
the UN Transnational Organized Crime Convention. Potentially, this stance
is typical of many countries, which makes it unlikely, despite transparency
agreements, that specific details about every arms transfer will be disclosed
to an international database.
Notwithstanding China’s position not to reveal its marking codes,
there is a wealth of historic information on weapon markings held by
intelligence agencies worldwide, which can be exploited for tracing
purposes without necessarily having to refer back to the country of
manufacture.
It is important to remember that there are many privately owned
commercial arms dealers worldwide which hold large stocks of surplus exmilitary
small arms and light weapons. These stocks are traded on the global
market, either between arms dealers or to State and non-State actors.
Commercial arms dealers need to be subject to statutory oversight to ensure
that accurate records are maintained detailing acquisitions and sales and all
the parties engaged in each transaction. Records should be maintained to
the same standard as military arsenals with each weapon individually listed
according to its markings plus similar lists of all essential component parts
and spares held. Stocks should be open for police and/or customs
inspection and records should be automated and linked to the national
record-keeping database.
3.6.2 Access
In view of the apparent sensitivities, access to any database, military or
civilian, national or regional is restricted to law enforcement and
intelligence agencies on a case-by-case basis for the purposes of prosecuting
or disrupting organized illicit arms traffickers. Illicit trafficking is a criminal
offence and gaining legitimate access to intelligence or evidence material to
a criminal investigation is subject to rules within a judicial process and
usually restricted to national police, customs, military and intelligence