The Scope and Implications of a Tracing Mechanism for Small Arms ...
The Scope and Implications of a Tracing Mechanism for Small Arms ...
The Scope and Implications of a Tracing Mechanism for Small Arms ...
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<strong>The</strong> various regions <strong>of</strong> the world have very different needs when it<br />
comes to transparency <strong>and</strong> protecting national <strong>and</strong> regional security<br />
interests. Intra-EU weapon transfers, <strong>for</strong> example, are likely to be fully<br />
transparent whereas individual EU transfers to third countries may not. It<br />
would be unrealistic to expect countries to agree to one universal, global<br />
transactions database listing all transfers <strong>and</strong> transactions <strong>of</strong> military small<br />
arms <strong>and</strong> light weapons involving States (as either the buyer or vendor) that<br />
goes beyond the current disclosure system within the UN Register on<br />
Conventional <strong>Arms</strong>. However, countries may be more prepared to disclose<br />
greater detail to a regional database that meets the individual needs <strong>for</strong><br />
promoting security <strong>and</strong> stability in that region, <strong>for</strong> example the SADC<br />
Protocol.<br />
However, as previously mentioned in this paper, in<strong>for</strong>mation<br />
concerning transfers or transactions, which subsequently lead to diversion<br />
<strong>and</strong> illicit trafficking, should be disseminated to the relevant police,<br />
customs, military <strong>and</strong> intelligence authorities worldwide, potentially via<br />
Interpol, to enable recovery <strong>of</strong> the weapons should they subsequently<br />
appear in another transfer or national record-keeping system. Such<br />
weapons are effectively ”the proceeds <strong>of</strong> crime” or “stolen goods” <strong>and</strong> can<br />
be circulated via an Interpol Orange Notice or included on IWETS.<br />
Similarly, details <strong>of</strong> the people, businesses, <strong>and</strong> end-users concerned in<br />
transactions that lead to trafficking, should be shared amongst the<br />
authorities to look out <strong>for</strong> their involvement in any subsequent transfer as a<br />
signal indicating another potentially suspicious transaction.<br />
3.13 CONFIDENTIALITY WHEN TRACING MILITARY SMALL ARMS<br />
Depending on the number <strong>of</strong> jurisdictions involved <strong>and</strong> the cultural<br />
<strong>and</strong> political disposition <strong>of</strong> each, tracing enquiries may be routed first<br />
through confidential intelligence channels to find the evidence, <strong>and</strong> a point<br />
where overt investigative activity can begin, be<strong>for</strong>e a police or customs<br />
authority becomes involved. <strong>The</strong>re are a small number <strong>of</strong> countries which<br />
would prefer not to reveal that they have cooperated in a tracing enquiry<br />
<strong>and</strong> law en<strong>for</strong>cement, intelligence <strong>and</strong> security agencies have well<br />
established procedures <strong>for</strong> protecting such sources. In these cases, police or<br />
customs will be directed to begin their investigations at a particular point<br />
that is sufficiently removed from the original source to protect them, but still