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The Scope and Implications of a Tracing Mechanism for Small Arms ...

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35<br />

further tracing. Where there was no record <strong>of</strong> the weapon being legally<br />

transferred out <strong>of</strong> the country, the State could be expected to promptly<br />

confirm this fact, <strong>and</strong> provide results <strong>of</strong> the ensuing investigation.<br />

Since the tracing mechanism would apply to all <strong>for</strong>ms <strong>of</strong> illicit SALW<br />

trafficking, including that relating to conflict zones <strong>and</strong> sanctions breaking<br />

activities, the minimum in<strong>for</strong>mation indicated above should be made<br />

available irrespective <strong>of</strong> the nature or status <strong>of</strong> the weapon or <strong>of</strong> specific<br />

transfers. States involved in the legal transfer <strong>of</strong> the weapon at some point<br />

are not necessarily responsible <strong>for</strong> its subsequent diversion into illicit<br />

markets. Yet, the cooperation <strong>of</strong> all States is needed if diversion points <strong>and</strong><br />

illicit trafficking routes are to be identified <strong>and</strong> disrupted.<br />

Another key issue concerns the kinds <strong>of</strong> actors that could legitimately<br />

use the tracing mechanism. <strong>The</strong>se would undoubtedly include the State<br />

that has recovered or seized the illicit SALW under investigation, States<br />

conducting investigations on behalf <strong>of</strong> this State (where it lacks the<br />

resources needed to carry out the trace), <strong>and</strong> States from whose territory the<br />

weapons were diverted. Such actors would probably also include the UN—<br />

including UN investigative bodies established to investigate sanctions<br />

breaking activities—<strong>and</strong> relevant regional organizations <strong>and</strong> perhaps also<br />

NGOs. While, as a matter <strong>of</strong> principle, participating States could be<br />

encouraged to cooperate with tracing requests made by each <strong>of</strong> these<br />

actors, it will be important to specify which <strong>of</strong> them can expect full<br />

cooperation <strong>and</strong> in what circumstances.<br />

A further issue relates to the uses that could be made <strong>of</strong> in<strong>for</strong>mation<br />

provided to assist with tracing. Key here is the question <strong>of</strong> confidentiality.<br />

Existing international cooperation in weapons traces among police or<br />

customs authorities is conducted under a norm <strong>of</strong> confidentiality, with<br />

provision <strong>for</strong> presenting the in<strong>for</strong>mation in court <strong>and</strong> thus making it public.<br />

Similar principles should probably be applied to the international tracing<br />

mechanism. However, additional issues <strong>and</strong> sensitivities—such as the use<br />

<strong>of</strong> in<strong>for</strong>mation relating to State-to-State transfers or losses from military<br />

stocks—will also need to be addressed.<br />

In this regard, it is to be hoped that the international tracing<br />

mechanism will not limit itself to facilitating criminal investigations geared<br />

towards prosecution, but will also enable appropriate authorities to identify,<br />

monitor <strong>and</strong> disrupt arms trafficking activity. This implies that intelligence

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