The Scope and Implications of a Tracing Mechanism for Small Arms ...

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25 UN forces have actively sought to trace and disrupt illicit flows of arms as part of their peace missions in the region. Although much of this tracing cooperation has been ad hoc, contacts, procedures and habits have developed that have facilitated effective and timely tracing. The institutional separation of civilian and military marking, recordkeeping and tracing systems complicates tracing investigations involving illicit weapons that may have been held in military stocks. Sometimes procedures exist which enable civilian law enforcement agencies to request tracing information on recovered military weapons from the armed forces or other security services. In the US, for example, police tracing requests are forwarded by ATF to the US Army’s Central Registry, with replies fed back through ATF to the requesting agency. In many countries, however, these procedures often do not function well, with the security forces’ concerns with security and control of information delaying or obstructing tracing. Furthermore, in most countries, civilian law enforcement or tracing authorities are not routinely informed of military weapons losses or tracing investigations. 1.5.3.2 Tracing Illicit Arms Trafficked to Conflict Zones In principle, the tracing of illicit arms trafficked to conflict zones raises no additional issues relating to military confidentiality or security than tracing investigations into transnational trafficking by criminal organizations. There is, in fact, considerable overlap between the two spheres. In both cases, diversion of authorized international transfers may be involved, in which case tracing investigators will need to request information from national export control authorities. Furthermore, just as many crime guns are lost or stolen from military stocks, many conflict weapons are diverted from civilian markets. A particularly important source of cross-over between the two spheres is ex-military surplus weapons that are initially transferred from official stocks to commercial dealers or authorized recipients in importing States. National police, customs authorities and other law enforcement agencies regularly investigate suspected illicit arms trafficking networks as part of their work, just as they investigate the trafficking of drugs, cars and humans. Exactly the same systems are used for such tracing as those described in section 1.5.2 above.
26 That said, national intelligence services will be much more involved in tracing conflict weapons, due to the specific political and security concerns they raise. Although such services often cooperate with police and customs investigations, they tend to be less interested in collecting evidence—for a criminal prosecution, for example—than with monitoring and disrupting illicit arms flows. They are also more concerned with protecting intelligence sources and techniques than the police. This sometimes leads to accusations that they are too inclined to monitor or manipulate arms trafficking networks—as opposed to exposing and/or disrupting them. A related problem is that many producer countries may be reluctant to provide information on their legal SALW transfers, since they may use the same brokers and arms trafficking networks that are active in the illicit trade to conflict zones. Increasing tracing cooperation among armed forces in the context of peace missions (e.g. the Balkans) has already been mentioned. The UN has also conducted precedent-setting inquiries involving the tracing of arms flows to countries subject to UN arms embargoes. Among the most prominent is the UN International Commission of Inquiry on Arms Trafficking in Rwanda, established by the UN Security Council in 1995. 41 While the exact sources used in the Inquiry were kept confidential, they included the police, Interpol, customs, intelligence services, journalists, defectors and refugees. The investigators were able to link weapons illicitly trafficked to Rwanda to commercial dealers and to countries that had inadequately enforced the embargo. The Inquiry, which had a real political impact, reached its findings on the basis of a “balance of probability”, without having to prove or further substantiate its findings. The UN Security Council subsequently launched further inquiries into UN sanctions-breaking activities. In May 1999, it established a Panel of Experts to investigate violations of sanctions imposed on UNITA in Angola. Its report broke new ground in naming governments and individuals that it believed were implicated in sanctions breaking activities. 42 Similar investigations have been established in relation to Sierra Leone, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Somalia, consolidating the precedent of international tracing inquiries under the auspices of the UN. While the UN has gradually strengthened its capacity to conduct such inquiries—for example, through greater scope to pursue politically sensitive
Page 1 and 2: UNIDIR/2002/20 The Scope and Implic
Page 3 and 4: CONTENTS Page Preface. . . . . . .
Page 5: v Chapter 4 Structures and Institut
Page 8 and 9: viii point of diversion, thus inhib
Page 11 and 12: ACRONYMS ATFUS BATF BPA CFR CFR CIC
Page 13 and 14: xiii VIN WFSA WIES WR Vehicle Ident
Page 15 and 16: 2 and lines of supply of illicit SA
Page 17 and 18: 4 First, if a weapon has been invol
Page 19 and 20: 6 The UN Programme of Action includ
Page 21 and 22: 8 1.3 MARKING 1.3.1 Introduction A
Page 23 and 24: 10 uniquely identify each productio
Page 25 and 26: 12 • Ensure, at the time of trans
Page 27 and 28: 14 • increasing the resistance of
Page 29 and 30: 16 The UN Firearms Protocol, in its
Page 31 and 32: 18 component of this project is to
Page 33 and 34: 20 They clarify whether a weapon is
Page 35 and 36: 22 Though such systems have great p
Page 37: 24 have a more prominent role to pl
Page 41 and 42: 28 training and technical assistanc
Page 43 and 44: 30 This highlights one of the most
Page 45 and 46: 32 An international tracing mechani
Page 47 and 48: 34 Some of the necessary elements a
Page 49 and 50: 36 on sources and lines of supply o
Page 51 and 52: 38 In promoting international assis
Page 53 and 54: 40 3 Programme of Action to Prevent
Page 55 and 56: 42 25 This section draws on discuss
Page 58 and 59: 45 BIBLIOGRAPHY Berkol, Ilhan, Mark
Page 60 and 61: CHAPTER 2 WHAT TO MARK AND WHAT TO
Page 62 and 63: 49 tracing method for all SALW (con
Page 64 and 65: 51 Figure 2: : The different sub-ca
Page 66 and 67: 53 In order to better grasp the pro
Page 68 and 69: 55 SALW include weapons of war, def
Page 70 and 71: 57 The following questions should t
Page 72 and 73: 59 All of this data, while useful f
Page 74 and 75: 61 2.5 WHAT ARE THE CRITERIA FOR IN
Page 76 and 77: 63 traced, but which ones? Precisel
Page 78 and 79: 65 Table 1: Firearms recovered in c
Page 80 and 81: 67 explosives belts and dozens of t
Page 82 and 83: 69 This data provides an interestin
Page 84 and 85: 71 weapons belonging to illicit cir
Page 86 and 87: 73 imagine being able to effectivel
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75 case of Switzerland, it would be
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77 electronics in animal identifica
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79 based our reflection on goals fo
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81 10 Small Arms Survey, Annuaire s
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APPENDIX 1 83
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APPENDIX 3 85
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87 the army weapon is capable of au
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90 significance, hence in general t
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92 3.1.2 Sanitization Removal or ob
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94 Chinese Type 56-1 Unique Identif
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96 verify that the imported weapons
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98 weapons. There are risks involve
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100 China Type 56 Russia AK47 Russi
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102 channels, with the protection o
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104 3.1.9 Comments Countries seekin
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106 as a result, potentially tip-of
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108 2. All markings must be made pe
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110 shared encryption standard. The
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112 Domestic record-keeping varies
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114 Nevertheless, whilst the Wassen
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116 individual weapon, should as a
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118 • “Consolidation”—4 x 2
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120 With the scope of the Protocol
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122 The South African authorities a
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124 • (Tracing) Details of all st
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126 tracing Chinese weapons. Conseq
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128 circulating information by fax
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130 Tracing requests are normally c
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132 encourage countries along the t
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134 close enough to provide adequat
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136 3. If Interpol is not up to the
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138 which restrict the amount of in
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140 9 It was notable during negotia
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142
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144 There are other reasons as well
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146 Laws Firearms are a durable com
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148 This last point should not be u
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150 the future a firearm tracing qu
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152 There are several important ele
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154 Canada, nearly all transfers re
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156 accuracy and man-hour effective
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158 industry practices. An effectiv
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160
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162 manner in national (and possibl
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164 routine stockpile management. A
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166 International regulations on th
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168 2. The definitions of weapons,
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170 enable national authorities to
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172 serial number of the firearm. T
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174 9. Explosives: the recommendati
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176 • The States parties undertak
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178 • The following is establishe
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180 International regulations on th
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182 • The participating States ag
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184 The Convention on Plastic Explo
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186 5.3.1 European Joint Action The
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188 years in July 2001. In December
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190 • States must make efforts to
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192 a greater degree of harmonizati
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194 this may lead to the undesirabl
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196 28 Or at least difficult or imp
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198 49 Speech by Mr. Koffi Adjouman
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200 in its capacity as President of
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202 Table 1: Scope of the Seven Pri
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204 Table 1 (continued) Characteris
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206 Characteristics of the marking
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208 Characteristics of the marking
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210 Characteristics of the recordke
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212 Characteristics of the record-k
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214 Table 4: Comparison of the Stan
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216 Characteristics of the exchange
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218
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