The Scope and Implications of a Tracing Mechanism for Small Arms ...

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35 further tracing. Where there was no record of the weapon being legally transferred out of the country, the State could be expected to promptly confirm this fact, and provide results of the ensuing investigation. Since the tracing mechanism would apply to all forms of illicit SALW trafficking, including that relating to conflict zones and sanctions breaking activities, the minimum information indicated above should be made available irrespective of the nature or status of the weapon or of specific transfers. States involved in the legal transfer of the weapon at some point are not necessarily responsible for its subsequent diversion into illicit markets. Yet, the cooperation of all States is needed if diversion points and illicit trafficking routes are to be identified and disrupted. Another key issue concerns the kinds of actors that could legitimately use the tracing mechanism. These would undoubtedly include the State that has recovered or seized the illicit SALW under investigation, States conducting investigations on behalf of this State (where it lacks the resources needed to carry out the trace), and States from whose territory the weapons were diverted. Such actors would probably also include the UN— including UN investigative bodies established to investigate sanctions breaking activities—and relevant regional organizations and perhaps also NGOs. While, as a matter of principle, participating States could be encouraged to cooperate with tracing requests made by each of these actors, it will be important to specify which of them can expect full cooperation and in what circumstances. A further issue relates to the uses that could be made of information provided to assist with tracing. Key here is the question of confidentiality. Existing international cooperation in weapons traces among police or customs authorities is conducted under a norm of confidentiality, with provision for presenting the information in court and thus making it public. Similar principles should probably be applied to the international tracing mechanism. However, additional issues and sensitivities—such as the use of information relating to State-to-State transfers or losses from military stocks—will also need to be addressed. In this regard, it is to be hoped that the international tracing mechanism will not limit itself to facilitating criminal investigations geared towards prosecution, but will also enable appropriate authorities to identify, monitor and disrupt arms trafficking activity. This implies that intelligence
36 on sources and lines of supply of illicit SALW should be regularly shared among governments and international bodies involved in preventing and reducing such trafficking. The international tracing mechanism might usefully include measures to develop or strengthen systems for exchanging, collating and analyzing information relating to illicit SALW traces. Interpol mechanisms and resources, such as IWETS, are especially relevant in this context. States could be encouraged or required to provide information gathered from tracing investigations for inclusion in Interpol databases. However, it is possible that Interpol mechanisms for information sharing may need to be reinforced or supplemented for this purpose. Interpol is normally used by police in criminal investigations, but the tracing mechanism will likely extend to areas not normally dealt with by Interpol, such as loss or diversion from military stocks, or conflict weapons trafficking. In principle, Interpol mechanisms can be used for investigations into any type of illicit arms trafficking, including trafficking to conflict zones. 48 Nevertheless, this will at least have to be brought to the attention of Interpol members. Additional protocols may also be needed on the use of IWETS and other Interpol resources by the UN and Interpol member States for purposes of tracing illicit arms shipments to conflict zones or States subject to UN arms embargoes. It might also be useful to develop supplementary procedures and mechanisms to strengthen cooperation of this kind—for example between authorities tracing weapons lost from military stocks. 1.6.3.2 Promoting Good Practices and Developing International Standards on Marking and Record-Keeping An international tracing mechanism could establish programmes or mechanisms to identify and promote best practices in marking and recordkeeping. These, in turn, would help strengthen tracing capabilities and facilitate agreements to develop and strengthen international standards. From the outset, opportunities should be pursued to ensure that all participating authorities are aware of existing resources and expertise— such as the RCMP’s Firearms Reference Table—so that these are more widely shared and used. Systems to facilitate cooperation and resource
Page 1 and 2: UNIDIR/2002/20 The Scope and Implic
Page 3 and 4: CONTENTS Page Preface. . . . . . .
Page 5: v Chapter 4 Structures and Institut
Page 8 and 9: viii point of diversion, thus inhib
Page 11 and 12: ACRONYMS ATFUS BATF BPA CFR CFR CIC
Page 13 and 14: xiii VIN WFSA WIES WR Vehicle Ident
Page 15 and 16: 2 and lines of supply of illicit SA
Page 17 and 18: 4 First, if a weapon has been invol
Page 19 and 20: 6 The UN Programme of Action includ
Page 21 and 22: 8 1.3 MARKING 1.3.1 Introduction A
Page 23 and 24: 10 uniquely identify each productio
Page 25 and 26: 12 • Ensure, at the time of trans
Page 27 and 28: 14 • increasing the resistance of
Page 29 and 30: 16 The UN Firearms Protocol, in its
Page 31 and 32: 18 component of this project is to
Page 33 and 34: 20 They clarify whether a weapon is
Page 35 and 36: 22 Though such systems have great p
Page 37 and 38: 24 have a more prominent role to pl
Page 39 and 40: 26 That said, national intelligence
Page 41 and 42: 28 training and technical assistanc
Page 43 and 44: 30 This highlights one of the most
Page 45 and 46: 32 An international tracing mechani
Page 47: 34 Some of the necessary elements a
Page 51 and 52: 38 In promoting international assis
Page 53 and 54: 40 3 Programme of Action to Prevent
Page 55 and 56: 42 25 This section draws on discuss
Page 58 and 59: 45 BIBLIOGRAPHY Berkol, Ilhan, Mark
Page 60 and 61: CHAPTER 2 WHAT TO MARK AND WHAT TO
Page 62 and 63: 49 tracing method for all SALW (con
Page 64 and 65: 51 Figure 2: : The different sub-ca
Page 66 and 67: 53 In order to better grasp the pro
Page 68 and 69: 55 SALW include weapons of war, def
Page 70 and 71: 57 The following questions should t
Page 72 and 73: 59 All of this data, while useful f
Page 74 and 75: 61 2.5 WHAT ARE THE CRITERIA FOR IN
Page 76 and 77: 63 traced, but which ones? Precisel
Page 78 and 79: 65 Table 1: Firearms recovered in c
Page 80 and 81: 67 explosives belts and dozens of t
Page 82 and 83: 69 This data provides an interestin
Page 84 and 85: 71 weapons belonging to illicit cir
Page 86 and 87: 73 imagine being able to effectivel
Page 88 and 89: 75 case of Switzerland, it would be
Page 90 and 91: 77 electronics in animal identifica
Page 92 and 93: 79 based our reflection on goals fo
Page 94 and 95: 81 10 Small Arms Survey, Annuaire s
Page 96 and 97: APPENDIX 1 83
Page 98 and 99:
APPENDIX 3 85
Page 100:
87 the army weapon is capable of au
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90 significance, hence in general t
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92 3.1.2 Sanitization Removal or ob
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94 Chinese Type 56-1 Unique Identif
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96 verify that the imported weapons
Page 111 and 112:
98 weapons. There are risks involve
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100 China Type 56 Russia AK47 Russi
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102 channels, with the protection o
Page 117 and 118:
104 3.1.9 Comments Countries seekin
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106 as a result, potentially tip-of
Page 121 and 122:
108 2. All markings must be made pe
Page 123 and 124:
110 shared encryption standard. The
Page 125 and 126:
112 Domestic record-keeping varies
Page 127 and 128:
114 Nevertheless, whilst the Wassen
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116 individual weapon, should as a
Page 131 and 132:
118 • “Consolidation”—4 x 2
Page 133 and 134:
120 With the scope of the Protocol
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122 The South African authorities a
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124 • (Tracing) Details of all st
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126 tracing Chinese weapons. Conseq
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128 circulating information by fax
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130 Tracing requests are normally c
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132 encourage countries along the t
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134 close enough to provide adequat
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136 3. If Interpol is not up to the
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138 which restrict the amount of in
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140 9 It was notable during negotia
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142
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144 There are other reasons as well
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146 Laws Firearms are a durable com
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148 This last point should not be u
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150 the future a firearm tracing qu
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152 There are several important ele
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154 Canada, nearly all transfers re
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156 accuracy and man-hour effective
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158 industry practices. An effectiv
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160
Page 175 and 176:
162 manner in national (and possibl
Page 177 and 178:
164 routine stockpile management. A
Page 179 and 180:
166 International regulations on th
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168 2. The definitions of weapons,
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170 enable national authorities to
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172 serial number of the firearm. T
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174 9. Explosives: the recommendati
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176 • The States parties undertak
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178 • The following is establishe
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180 International regulations on th
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182 • The participating States ag
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184 The Convention on Plastic Explo
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186 5.3.1 European Joint Action The
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188 years in July 2001. In December
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190 • States must make efforts to
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192 a greater degree of harmonizati
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194 this may lead to the undesirabl
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196 28 Or at least difficult or imp
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198 49 Speech by Mr. Koffi Adjouman
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200 in its capacity as President of
Page 215 and 216:
202 Table 1: Scope of the Seven Pri
Page 217 and 218:
204 Table 1 (continued) Characteris
Page 219 and 220:
206 Characteristics of the marking
Page 221 and 222:
208 Characteristics of the marking
Page 223 and 224:
210 Characteristics of the recordke
Page 225 and 226:
212 Characteristics of the record-k
Page 227 and 228:
214 Table 4: Comparison of the Stan
Page 229 and 230:
216 Characteristics of the exchange
Page 231:
218
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