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The Scope and Implications of a Tracing Mechanism for Small Arms ...

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individual weapon, should as a minimum give sufficient in<strong>for</strong>mation to<br />

benefit subsequent tracing, e.g. to include the quantity, model,<br />

calibre <strong>and</strong> country <strong>of</strong> manufacture.<br />

3.2.4 Considerations<br />

Transfers disclosed to record-keeping systems can be cross-referenced<br />

with the Interpol IWETS database <strong>of</strong> lost or stolen firearms to identify when<br />

illicit weapons reappear on the market <strong>and</strong> help identify potential<br />

traffickers.<br />

<strong>The</strong> legal arms trade needs a system <strong>of</strong> m<strong>and</strong>atory disclosure to help<br />

prevent diversion. M<strong>and</strong>atory disclosure will require statutory underpinning<br />

to provide the necessary legislation, which allows <strong>for</strong> proactive monitoring<br />

by the authorities. This could mirror existing legislation that requires<br />

advance disclosure <strong>of</strong> financial transactions to national authorities to<br />

counter money laundering. Transfer disclosures need to include sufficient<br />

in<strong>for</strong>mation to identify all relevant parties involved in the transaction.<br />

Where a transfer subsequently leads to diversion <strong>and</strong> illicit trafficking, then<br />

the people involved should be “flagged” on the system. Any subsequent<br />

transaction involving one or more <strong>of</strong> the same parties can then be identified<br />

as potentially suspicious. <strong>The</strong> capacity to proactively monitor m<strong>and</strong>atory<br />

disclosures <strong>of</strong> intended transfers on the arms market, using computerized<br />

record-keeping systems looking <strong>for</strong> these common denominators engaged<br />

in illicit activity, enables the authorities to intervene early <strong>and</strong> either<br />

prevent, disrupt, or arrest <strong>and</strong> prosecute the traffickers. (“Front companies”<br />

are a regular feature <strong>of</strong> arms trafficking; set up <strong>for</strong> a one-<strong>of</strong>f transaction by<br />

perpetrators who quickly move on. Nevertheless, intelligence can be<br />

collected to create pr<strong>of</strong>iles enabling the authorities, <strong>for</strong> example when<br />

validating import/export licensing applications, to identify common<br />

denominators or tell-tale hallmark precursor activity, which indicate a<br />

potential “front company” <strong>and</strong> an impending illicit transaction).<br />

3.3. GAPS IN EXISTING CONTROLS OVER THE LEGAL ARMS TRADE<br />

<strong>The</strong> most serious gaps can be summarised as follows:<br />

• Limited verification <strong>of</strong> the validity <strong>of</strong> End-User Certificates;

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