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The Scope and Implications of a Tracing Mechanism for Small Arms ...

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to the last importer indicated on the arm rather than having to trace<br />

back to the manufacturer <strong>and</strong> reconstitute all the stages <strong>of</strong> the<br />

weapon’s life. 34<br />

3. Legibility: only the Vienna Protocol specifies the way in which the<br />

“classical” marking is to be expressed, <strong>and</strong> in this context stipulates the<br />

option <strong>for</strong> certain States to use symbols—which hinders the registration<br />

<strong>and</strong> exchange <strong>of</strong> in<strong>for</strong>mation. It is important that all the mechanisms<br />

be precise on this subject (this would require the introduction <strong>of</strong> a<br />

relevant amendment <strong>for</strong> the existing mechanisms, <strong>and</strong> the exact<br />

specification <strong>of</strong> requirements at the outset <strong>of</strong> possible future<br />

mechanisms).<br />

4. Only the SADC Protocol <strong>for</strong>esees the obligation to mark several parts<br />

<strong>of</strong> firearms. This measure, already applied without obligation by some<br />

manufacturers, must be brought into wide use.<br />

5. Durability: only the Vienna Protocol takes into account the problem <strong>of</strong><br />

the ease with which traffickers can erase the markings on firearms. 35<br />

Frequent obliteration <strong>of</strong> markings justifies the systematic application <strong>of</strong><br />

security markings.<br />

6. Concerning firearms manufactured prior to the entry into <strong>for</strong>ce <strong>of</strong> the<br />

respective mechanisms: the Vienna Protocol <strong>for</strong>esees the marking <strong>of</strong><br />

weapons transferred to civilians by a State; the OAS Convention<br />

<strong>for</strong>esees the marking <strong>of</strong> confiscated weapons that would be transferred<br />

to police <strong>and</strong> security <strong>for</strong>ces; <strong>and</strong> the Plastic Explosives Convention<br />

<strong>for</strong>esees the marking, consumption or destruction <strong>of</strong> unmarked<br />

explosives within a certain timeframe.<br />

7. Extraterritoriality: only the OSCE Document <strong>for</strong>esees marking “as far as<br />

possible <strong>and</strong> within the limits <strong>of</strong> the competence <strong>of</strong> the States” <strong>of</strong><br />

firearms that are manufactured under a State's authority but outside its<br />

territory.<br />

8. Ammunition: the recommendations on the transport <strong>of</strong> dangerous<br />

goods <strong>for</strong>esee the marking <strong>of</strong> all ammunition packaging in a unique<br />

<strong>and</strong> detailed manner. <strong>The</strong> absence <strong>of</strong> unique marking on the<br />

ammunition itself is evidently a problem since traffickers can merely<br />

transfer the contents into another packaging. This mechanism<br />

nevertheless has other interesting aspects: <strong>for</strong> one, the content <strong>of</strong> the<br />

marking is quite exhaustive <strong>and</strong> almost indelible. Furthermore, in<br />

consenting to improving the traceability <strong>of</strong> ammunition (<strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong><br />

explosives) packaging, States have implicitly consented to give up a<br />

certain degree <strong>of</strong> confidentiality, since the verification <strong>of</strong> packaging<br />

allows the contents to be known by the controlling organization.<br />

173

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