VOLUME I Multinational Maritime Tactical Instructions and Procedures

MTP 1(D), Vol. I
(2) Psychological Operations — again the unseen covert nature of submarine operations is a
potent factor in creating uncertainty in the assessments of the opposing force and can be further manipulated
by public statements that are difficult to prove or disprove. Its largely independent modus operandi,
allow the submarine to be the first or among the first units to reach an area of responsibility.
(3) Exclusion Zone Enforcement — should ROE be robust enough to permit this mode of operation,
the submarine, again by virtue of its covertness can exert a disproportionate influence on the opposing
forces’ activities.
The submarine’s most significant contribution is made by virtue of its covertness. It follows from
this that its use in overt operations (boarding/warning) will detract from its primary value. In any case submarines
are poorly equipped to conduct such evolutions. When submarines are allocated for support, Prevention
of Mutual Interference and Waterspace Management problems will have to be addressed.
c. Fast Patrol Boat Operations. Fast Patrol Boats (FPBs) and similar craft may be able to make
significant contributions to both surveillance and interception of Contacts of Interest (COI). They have
particular advantages in the inshore environment and in operating against small fast craft often used for
smuggling high value cargo and personnel. The following should be kept in mind when considering their
employment:
(1) FPBs will require forward based support either ashore or afloat, in or close to their area
of operations for maintenance, fuel and crew rest.
(2) Weather may limit their operations but will also significantly effect their opponents.
(3) The effectiveness of FPBs in both surveillance and, if required, attack is greatly enhanced
by ensuring helicopter assets are assigned to cooperate and integrate into their operations.
(4) FPBs should be assigned their own area of responsibility in which to operate, together
with appropriate reporting chains. In times of actual conflict consideration should be given to exclude
all other units (other FPBs and assigned air assets) from this area to avoid Blue-on-Blue incidents.
(5) FPB Integration into a larger TF organization is made more effective by the allocation of a Liaison/Gateway
unit. This unit should carry out the functions of C 2 of FPB operations, participating on
the FPB RATT circuit, providing air defense over the FPB operating areas, control of air assets working
with FPBs and relaying instructions and information from the ASUWC or other Commanders.
d. Air Embargo. While the enforcement of an Air Embargo should be addressed along the lines
suggested above, it does however present some unique problems. While control of regular international
civil air traffic may be quickly seized by means of withdrawal of facilities, the control of internal light aviation,
short duration military flights, and clandestine resupply by air will prove to be:
(1) Asset-intensive to detect — in all probability requiring 24 hour coverage by sophisticated
AEW aircraft.
(2) Characterized by difficulty in positive identification to the required degree to enable
enforcement action to be taken.
(3) Characterized by a lack of enforcement options compared to the maritime surface situation.
Diversion/warning off may not be feasible with ROE insufficiently robust to allow engagement.
8-49 CHANGE 2