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VOLUME I Multinational Maritime Tactical Instructions and Procedures

VOLUME I Multinational Maritime Tactical Instructions and Procedures

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MTP 1(D), Vol. I<br />

12014 PRINCIPLES AFFECTING CONVOY FORMATIONS<br />

Ships in convoy should have simple <strong>and</strong> concise instructions concerning action to be taken in the<br />

event of a nuclear attack. It is important that orders <strong>and</strong> instructions to ships in convoy should be issued <strong>and</strong><br />

understood before the convoy forms up. This is best done at the convoy conference. The size of the convoy<br />

<strong>and</strong> other factors permitting, wide spacing of columns <strong>and</strong> ships in column is recommended. If possible,<br />

the spacing of ships in columns <strong>and</strong> between columns should not be reduced below 1 mile. R<strong>and</strong>om formations<br />

should be considered in order to prevent easy recognition by the enemy.<br />

NOT RELEASABLE<br />

12015 ACTION PRIOR TO NUCLEAR ATTACK<br />

a. Establishment of Formation Rendezvous (Point Romeo). OTCs of formations are to<br />

promulgate a formation rendezvous at which ships can re-form following dispersal. OTCs of dispositions<br />

are to be kept informed of the position of the formation rendezvous. If no Naval Effective Downwind Message<br />

(NAVEDM) is issued, a signal from ATP 1, Vol. II, may be used.<br />

b. Promulgation of Fallout Information. In the absence of reports from shore authorities, the<br />

OTC will promulgate information to the formation in the form of a NAVEDM, exp<strong>and</strong>ed to include information<br />

on Point Romeo. Details are in ATP 45.<br />

c. Operational Readiness for Fallout Transit. The OTC should state well in advance the required<br />

operational readiness for his units should a fallout transit become inevitable. The OTC should specify<br />

AAW, ASW, <strong>and</strong> ASUW degrees of readiness <strong>and</strong> the degree of readiness for engineering, stating the<br />

maximum speed required for fallout transit. The OTC should also nominate guard ships (e.g., radar, sonar,<br />

<strong>and</strong> EW guards), as many ships will be limited in operational performance during the transit. In general, the<br />

OTC should re-examine the principles of readiness in Chapter 1 to match the problem associated with fallout<br />

transit.<br />

12016 TACTICS FOLLOWING A NUCLEAR ATTACK<br />

Tactics to be employed <strong>and</strong> considerations are in Table 12-2.<br />

12017 — 12019 SPARE<br />

12020 SELECTION OF FORMATION RENDEZVOUS<br />

Point Romeo should be established relative to the formation center, <strong>and</strong> the course <strong>and</strong> speed of the<br />

rendezvous must be indicated. When a disposition incorporates more than one formation, each formation<br />

should promulgate its own Point Romeo. Whenever possible, Point Romeo should be up the effective<br />

downwind (EDW) from the formation center <strong>and</strong> at a distance equal to the area of immediate contamination<br />

plus the diameter of the formation. In determining the position of Point Romeo, the OTC must consider<br />

the following factors:<br />

a. Direction <strong>and</strong> strength of EDW.<br />

12-8 ORIGINAL

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