IPCC_Managing Risks of Extreme Events.pdf - Climate Access

National Systems for Managing the Risks from Climate Extremes and DisastersChapter 6Box 6-2 | National and Sub-National Coordination for Managing Disaster Riskin a Changing Climate: KenyaKenya’s National Platform is situated under the Office of the President and has made significant achievements in coordinating multiplestakeholders, but is constrained by limited resources and lack of budgets for disaster risk reduction in line ministries (National Platformfor Kenya, 2009). Some key constraints of the national system are recognized as being difficulties in integrating disaster risk reduction inplanning processes in urban and rural areas and lack of data on risks and vulnerabilities at different scales (Few et al., 2006). In this regard,Nairobi has experienced periods of drought and heavy rains in the last decade, prompting action to reduce exposure and vulnerability towhat is perceived as changing hazard trends (ActionAid, 2006). Increasing exposure and vulnerability has resulted from a rapid expansionof poor people living in informal settlements around Nairobi, leading to houses of weak building materials being constructed immediatelyadjacent to rivers and blocking natural drainage areas. While data and coordination systems are still lacking, the Government of Kenyahas established the Nairobi Rivers Rehabilitation and Restoration Programme (African Development Bank Group, 2010), designed toinstall riparian buffers, canals, and drainage channels, while also clearing existing channels. The Programme also targets the urban poorwith improved water and sanitation, paying attention to climate variability and change in the location and design of wastewaterinfrastructure and environment monitoring for flood early warning (African Development Bank Group, 2010). This demonstrates the kindof options for investments that can be achieved in the absence of a fully fledged nationally coordinated disaster management systemand in the absence of complete multi-hazard, exposure, and vulnerability data sets.integrate climate change in the context of disaster risk management,disconnects between different levels of government, and the weaknessof both disaster risk management and adaptation to climate change innational planning and budgetary processes (Few et al., 2006; Mitchelland Van Aalst 2008; Mitchell et al., 2010b) (see Box 6-2).While national level coordination is important and the majority of risksassociated with disasters and climate extremes are owned by nationalgovernments and are managed centrally (see Section 6.2.1), sourcessuggest that decentralization can be an effective risk managementstrategy, especially in support of community-based disaster riskmanagement processes (Mitchell and Van Aalst, 2008; GNDR, 2009;Scott and Tarazona, 2011). However, there are few studies that criticallyexamine the effectiveness of decentralization of disaster risk managementin detail (Twigg, 2004; Tompkins et al., 2008; Scott and Tarazona, 2011).One such study of four countries – Colombia, Mozambique, Indonesia,and South Africa – found that effective decentralization of disaster riskreduction can be constrained by (a) low capacity at the local level;(b) funds dedicated to disaster risk reduction often being channeledelsewhere; (c) the fact that decentralization does not automatically leadto more inclusive decisionmaking processes; (d) an appreciation thatdecentralized systems face significant communications challenges; and(e) knowledge that robust measures for ensuring accountability andtransparency are vital for effective disaster risk management but areoften missing (Scott and Tarazona, 2011). It appears that motivation formanagement at a particular scale promises to influence how well theimpacts of disasters and climate change are managed, and thereforeaffect disaster outcomes (Tsing et al., 1999). Decisions made at one scalemay have unintended consequences for another (Brooks and Adger,2005), meaning that governance decisions will have ramifications acrossscale and contexts. In all cases, the selection of a framework forgovernance of disasters and climate change-related risks may be issueorcontext-specific (Sabatier, 1986).6.4.3. Finance and Budget AllocationGovernments in the past have ignored catastrophic risks in decisionmaking,implicitly or explicitly exhibiting risk-neutrality (Mechler, 2004). This isconsistent with the Arrow Lind theorem (Arrow and Lind, 1970), accordingto which a government may be well equipped to efficiently (i) pool risksas it possesses a large number of independent assets and infrastructureso that the aggregate risk converges to zero, and/or (ii) spread riskacross the taxpaying population base, so that per capita risk accruing torisk-averse households converges to zero. In line with this theorem, dueto their ability to spread and diversify risks, governments are sometimestermed ‘the most effective insurance instrument of society’ (Priest 1996).Accordingly, it has been deduced that, although individuals are riskaverse[to disasters risk], governments can take a risk-neutral approach.However, the experiences of highly exposed countries suggest otherwiseand have led to a recent paradigm shift, with governments changingfrom being ‘risk neutral’ to being risk averse and managing disaster risks.Many highly exposed developing and developed countries (especially inthe wake of the recent financial crisis) have very limited economicmeans, rely on small and exhausted tax bases, have high levels ofindebtedness, and are unable to raise sufficient and timely capital toreplace or repair damaged assets and restore livelihoods followingmajor disasters. This can lead to increased impacts of disaster shocks onpoverty and development (OAS, 1991; Linnerooth-Bayer et al., 2005;Hochrainer, 2006; Mahul and Ghesquiere, 2007; Cummins and Mahul,2009). Exposed countries thus have had to rely on donors to ‘bail’ themout after events, although ex-post assistance usually only providespartial relief and reconstruction funding, and such assistance is also oftenassociated with substantial time lags (Pollner, 2000; Mechler, 2004).Furthermore, extreme events that are associated with large losses maylead to important downstream economic effects (see Section 4.5),causing depressed incomes and reduced ability to share the losses.360