IPCC_Managing Risks of Extreme Events.pdf - Climate Access

Case StudiesChapter 94.5 million affected (Mirza, 2003; Hellmuth et al., 2007; WMO, 2011a;World Bank, 2011b).The flooding was the result of a cascade of events. It started withabove-average rainfall in southern Mozambique and adjacent countriesfrom October to December 1999 (Hellmuth et al., 2007). Exacerbatingthe situation was the series of cyclones Astride, Connie, Eline, and Gloriawith the main impact coming from cyclone Eline (UNESC, 2000; Asanteet al., 2007; Hellmuth et al., 2007). Cyclone Eline, after tracking over7,000 km west across the tropical south Indian Ocean (Reason and Keibel,2004), made landfall on 22 February 2000, crossing the Mozambiquecoastline and moving over the headwater basins of the Limpopo River,making a critical situation worse.The rainfall that occurred over Mozambique and the northeastern partsof South Africa and Zimbabwe was exceptional; record flooding ensueddownstream on the Limpopo and Zambezi rivers (Carmo Vaz, 2000;Kadomura, 2005), and in parts of the Sabie catchment the return periodwas in excess of 200 years (Smithers et al., 2001).As a result of the floods it was reported that many small towns andvillages remained under water for approximately two months (Hellmuthet al., 2007). Access roads were rendered impassable with railways, bridges,water management systems (including water intake and treatmentplants), and more than 600 primary schools damaged or destroyed(UNESC, 2000; Dyson and van Heerden, 2001; Reason and Keibel, 2004).The UN World Food Programme reported that Mozambique lost 167,000ha of agricultural land (FAO and WFP, 2000). Dams were overwhelmed;for example, the total inflow to Massingir reservoir between Januaryand March was approximately eight times the storage capacity of thereservoir at that time (Carmo Vaz, 2000).Although floodwaters can wash away breeding sites and, hence, reducemosquito-borne disease transmission (Sidley, 2000), the collection ofemergency clinic data and interviews of 62 families found that theincidence of malaria was reported as increasing by a factor of 1.5 to 2.0.Diarrhea also increased by a factor of 2 to 4 (Kondo et al., 2002).The government declared an emergency, mobilized its disaster responsemechanisms, and made appeals for assistance from other countries(Hellmuth et al., 2007).The enormous material damage and humanlosses during the floods in Mozambique in 2000 were associated withthe following problems:• Institutional problems: It was only in 1999 that the NationalPolicy on Disaster Management in Mozambique began to shiftfrom a reactive to a proactive approach, with an aim to develop aculture of prevention (Asante et al., 2005; Hellmuth et al., 2007).• Technological problems: In 2000, in Mozambique, there wereproblems with the installation and maintenance of in situ gaugingequipment due to financial constraints. In addition, the hydrologicaland precipitation gauges were washed away and many key stationswere destroyed, leaving Mozambican water authorities with nosource of information on the actual magnitude of floodwaters(Dyson and van Heerden, 2001; Smithers et al., 2001; Asante etal., 2005).• Financial problems: The UN Economic and Social Council (UNESC,2000) reported that the Government of Mozambique responded tothe emergency despite limited means, but due to the extensiveinternational financial support requested help in its coordinationfrom the UN. The World Bank estimates that the direct losses as aresult of the 2000 floods amounted to US$ 273 million (UNESC,2000).9.2.6.4. InterventionsAfter the catastrophic floods in 2000, the Government of Mozambiquetook a range of measures to improve the effectiveness of disaster riskmanagement. In 2001, an Action Plan for the Reduction of AbsolutePoverty (PARPA I) was adopted (Republic of Mozambique, 2001); andthis was revised for the period 2006 to 2009 (PARPA II) (Republic ofMozambique, 2006a,b; Foley, 2007). In 2006, the government alsoadopted a Master Plan, which provides a comprehensive strategy fordealing with Mozambique’s vulnerability to natural disasters (Republicof Mozambique, 2006a).After the 2000 floods, Mozambique implemented intensive programs tomove people to safe areas (World Bank, 2005a). Since the 2000 floods,a large resettlement program for communities affected by the floodsand tropical cyclones was initiated, with about 59,000 families resettledalthough a lack of funds for improved livelihoods has reduced thesuccess of this program (WMO, 2011a).Success and effectiveness of warnings depend not only on the accuracyof the forecast, but also their delivery in adequate time before thedisaster to put in place prevention strategies. From November 2006 toNovember 2007 the Severe Weather Forecasting Demonstration Project,conducted by the World Meteorological Organization in southeasternAfrica, tested a new concept for capacity building and this servicecontributed to the forecasting and warnings about Cyclone Favio inFebruary 2007 (Poolman et al., 2008). The demonstration phase was foundto be valuable, and the implementation phase – with training, supportedwith efficient and effective forecasting and warning of tropical cyclonesin developing countries – continues (WMO, 2011b).Besides high-level alerting it is important that a warning is receivedby each person in the disaster zone, in an easily understandable way(UNISDR, 2010). In 2005 and 2006 the German Agency for TechnicalCooperation developed a simple but effective early warning system alongthe River Búzi (Bollin et al., 2005; Loster and Wolf, 2007). This warningsystem was adapted to the specific needs and skills of the people. Thevillage officials receive daily precipitation and water levels at strategicpoints along the Búzi River basin. If precipitation is particularly heavy orthe river reaches critical levels, this information is passed on by radioand blue, yellow, or red flags are raised depending on the flood alertlevel (Bollin et al., 2005; UNISDR, 2010).506