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IPCC_Managing Risks of Extreme Events.pdf - Climate Access

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National Systems for <strong>Managing</strong> the <strong>Risks</strong> from <strong>Climate</strong> <strong>Extreme</strong>s and DisastersChapter 6Box 6-7 | Building Resilience to Disasters in the Cayman IslandsKey aspects that are relevant to building disaster resilience are flexibility, learning, and adaptive governance (Adger et al., 2005; Berkes,2007), and the Cayman Islands (Tompkins et al., 2008) illustrate how such factors help to successfully manage their disaster risks. Forexample, in 2004, Hurricane Ivan (which was similar in magnitude to Hurricane Katrina that hit New Orleans in 2005) only caused tw<strong>of</strong>atalities in the island, largely due to the activities <strong>of</strong> the National Hurricane Committee (NHC), which manages hurricane disaster riskreduction in the Cayman Islands and is responsible for preparedness, response, and recovery. The NHC is a learning-based organization.It learns from its successes, but more importantly from mistakes made. Each year the disaster managers actively assess the previousyear’s risk management successes and failures. Every year the National Hurricane Plan is revised to incorporate this learning and toensure that good practices are institutionalized. Evidence <strong>of</strong> adaptive governance can be observed, for example, in the changingcomposition <strong>of</strong> the NHC, its structure, network arrangements, funding allocation, and responsibilities. Policymakers are encouraged todesign and to implement new initiatives, to make adjustments, and take motivated actions. Creating such space for experimentation,innovation, learning, and institutional adjustment is crucial for disaster resilience.predictive models and early warning systems (see Section 3.2.3 andBox 3-2; Section 9.2.11). Early warning systems are also based onmodels and consequently there is always a probability <strong>of</strong> their success (orfailure) in predicting events accurately, although the failure to heed earlywarning systems is also a function <strong>of</strong> social factors, such as perception<strong>of</strong> risk, trust in the information-providing institution, previous experience<strong>of</strong> the hazard, degree <strong>of</strong> social exclusion, and gender (see, e.g., Drabek,1986, 1999). Enhanced scientific modeling and interdisciplinaryapproaches to early warning systems can address some <strong>of</strong> theseuncertainties provided good baseline and time series information areavailable (see Section 3.2.3 and Box 3-2). Even where such informationis available, there remain other unresolved questions that influence theoutcome <strong>of</strong> hazards. These relate to the capacity <strong>of</strong> ecosystems to providebuffering services, and the ability <strong>of</strong> systems to recover. Managementapproaches that take these issues into account include adaptivemanagement and resilience, yet these approaches are not without theirchallenges (also see Section 8.6.3.1).Adaptive management, as defined in Chapter 8 (Section 8.6.3.1), is “astructured process for improving management policies and practices bysystemic learning from the outcomes <strong>of</strong> implemented strategies, and bytaking into account changes in external factors in a proactive manner”(Pahl-Wostl et al., 2009; Pahl-Wostl, 2009). It has come to also meanbringing together interdisciplinary science, experience, and traditionalknowledge into decisionmaking through ‘learning by doing’ by individualsand organizations (Walters, 1997). Decisionmakers, under adaptivemanagement, are expected to be flexible in their approach, and acceptnew information as it become available, or when new challenges emerge,and not be rigid in their responses. Proponents argue that effectiveadaptive management contributes to more rapid knowledge acquisitionand better information flows between policymakers, and ensures thatthere is shared understanding <strong>of</strong> complex problems (Lee, 1993).In most cases, adaptive management has been implemented at the localor regional scale and there are few examples <strong>of</strong> its implementation atthe national level. Examples <strong>of</strong> adaptive management abound inecosystem management (Johnson, 1999; Ladson and Argent, 2000) andin disaster risk management (Thompson and Gaviria, 2004; Tompkins,2005; see Box 6-7). Nearly 40 years <strong>of</strong> research, after the seminal paperwas published by Holling in 1973, have produced evidence <strong>of</strong> the impacts<strong>of</strong> aspects <strong>of</strong> resilience policy (notably adaptive management) on forests,coral reefs, disasters, and adaptation to climate change; however, most<strong>of</strong> this has been at the local or ecosystem scale.One <strong>of</strong> the main unresolved issues in adaptive management is how toensure that scientists and engineers tasked with investigating adaptationand disaster risk management processes are able to learn from eachother and from practitioners and how this learning can be integrated toinform policy and management practices. In the case <strong>of</strong> the restoration<strong>of</strong> the Florida Everglades, a limiting factor to effective managementobserved was the unwillingness <strong>of</strong> some parts <strong>of</strong> society to accept shorttermlosses for longer-term sustainability <strong>of</strong> ecosystem services (Kiker etal., 2001). Investment in hurricane preparedness in New Orleans prior toHurricane Katrina provides a contemporary example <strong>of</strong> science not beingincluded in disaster risk decisionmaking and planning (Laska, 2004;Congleton, 2006). The Cayman Islands hurricane management, on theother hand, demonstrates a success story in a flexible disaster managementcommittee being prepared to change its strategies and measures fromexperience, and essentially learning by doing (Box 6-7).Spare capacity within institutions has been argued to increase the ability<strong>of</strong> socio-ecological systems to address surprises or external shocks (Folkeet al., 2005). McDaniels et al. (2008), in their analysis <strong>of</strong> hospital resilienceto earthquake impacts, agreed with this finding, concluding that keyfeatures <strong>of</strong> resilience include the ability to learn from previous experience,careful management <strong>of</strong> staff during hazard, daily communication, andwillingness <strong>of</strong> staff to address specific system failures. The latter can beachieved through creating overlapping institutions with shared delivery<strong>of</strong> services/functions, and providing redundant capacity within theseinstitutions thereby allowing a sharing <strong>of</strong> the risks (Low et al., 2003).Such redundancy increases the chances <strong>of</strong> social memory being retainedwithin the institution (Ostrom, 2005). However, if not carefully managed,costs <strong>of</strong> this approach can include fragmented policy, high transactionscosts, duplication, inconsistencies, and inefficiencies (Imperial, 1999).378

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