IPCC_Managing Risks of Extreme Events.pdf - Climate Access

Chapter 8Toward a Sustainable and Resilient Futuresuch as Manizales (Velásquez, 1998, 2005). In Bangladesh and Cuba,successes in disaster preparedness and response leading to drasticreduction in mortality due to tropical cyclones, built on solid localorganization, have relied on sustained support from the national level(Haque and Blair, 1992; Bern et al., 1993; Ahmed et al., 1999;Chowdhury, 2002; Kossin et al., 2007; Elsner et al., 2008; Karim andMimura, 2008; Knutson et al., 2010; World Bank, 2010b). A growingnumber of examples now exist of community-driven approaches that aresupported by local and national governments as well as by internationalagencies, through mechanisms such as social funds (Bhattamishra andBarrett, 2010).Risk transfer instruments, such as insurance, reinsurance, insurancepools, catastrophe bonds, micro-insurance, and other mechanisms, shifteconomic risk from one party to another and thus provide compensationin exchange for a payment, often a premium (ex-post effect) (seeSections 5.6.3, 6.5.3, and 7.4, and Case Study 9.2.13). In addition, thesemechanisms can also help to anticipate and reduce (economic) risk asthey reduce volatility and increase economic resilience at the household,national, and regional levels (Linnerooth-Bayer et al., 2005). As oneexample, with such insurance, drought-exposed farmers in Malawi havebeen able to access improved seeds for higher yielding and higher riskcrops, thus helping them to make a leap ahead in terms of generatinghigher incomes and the adoption of higher return technologies (WorldBank, 2005; Hazell and Hess, 2010). However, many obstacles to suchschemes still exist, particularly in low-income and many middle-incomecountries, including the absence of comprehensive risk assessments andrequired data, legal frameworks, and the necessary infrastructure, andprobably more experience is required to determine the contexts inwhich they can be effective (Linnerooth-Bayer and Mechler, 2007;Cummins and Mahul, 2009; Mahul and Stutley, 2010).Disaster risk management and adaptation can also be addressedthrough the enhancement of generic adaptive capacity alongside hazardspecificresponse strategies (IFRC, 2010). This capacity includes accessto information, the skills and resources needed to reflect upon and applynew knowledge, and institutions to support inclusive decisionmaking.These are cornerstones of both sustainability and resilience. Whileuncertainty may make it difficult for decisionmakers to commit funds forhazard-specific risk reduction actions, these barriers do not preventinvestment in generic foundations of resilient and sustainable societies(Pelling, 2010a). Importantly, from such foundations, local actors maybe able to make better-informed choices on how to manage risk in theirown lives, certainly over the short and medium terms. For instance,federations formed by slum dwellers have become active in identifying andacting on disaster risk within their settlements and seeking partnershipswith local governments to make this more effective and larger scale(IFRC, 2010).Changes in systems and structures may call for new ways of thinkingabout social contracts, which describe the balance of rights andresponsibilities between different parties. Social contracts that aresuitable for technical problems can be limiting and insufficient foraddressing adaptive challenges (Heifetz, 2010). Pelling and Dill (2009)describe the ways that current social contracts are tested when disastersoccur, and how disasters may open up a space for social transformation,or catalyze transformative pathways building on pre-disaster trajectories.O’Brien et al. (2009) consider how resilience thinking can contribute tonew debates about social contracts in a changing climate, drawingattention to tradeoffs among social groups and ecosystems, and to therights of and responsibilities toward distant others and future generations.8.6.2.3. Transformational Strategies and Actionsfor Achieving Multiple ObjectivesIf extreme climate and weather events increase significantly in comingdecades, climate change adaptation and disaster risk management arelikely to require not only incremental changes, but also transformativechanges in systems and institutions. Transformation can be defined as afundamental qualitative change, or a change in composition or structurethat is often associated with changes in perspectives or initial conditions(see Box 8-1). It often involves a change in paradigm and may includeshifts in perception and meaning, changes in underlying norms andvalues, reconfiguration of social networks and patterns of interaction,changes in power structures, and the introduction of new institutionalarrangements and regulatory frameworks (Folke et al., 2009, 2010;Pahl-Wostl, 2009; Smith and Stirling, 2010).Although transformational policies and measures may be deliberatelyinvoked as a strategy to reduce disaster risk and adapt to climate change,in many cases such strategies are precipitated by an extreme event,sometimes referred to as a ‘focusing event’ (Birkland, 1996). However,whether an extreme event leads to any change at all is unclear, asprocesses of policy change are often subtle and complex and linked tolearning processes (Birkland, 2006). Exploring the relationship betweensystematic learning processes and small disasters, Voss and Wagner(2010) find that a failure to learn is the most common prerequisite forfuture disasters. There are, however, many dimensions to learning (e.g.,cognitive, normative, and relational; see Huitema et al., 2010), andlearning may be a necessary but insufficient condition for initiatingtransformational change.Understanding processes of deliberate change and change managementcan provide insights on societal responses to extreme climate andweather events. Traditional approaches to managing change successfullyin businesses and organizations focus on a series of defined steps(Harvard Business Essentials, 2003). Kotter (1996), for example, identifiesan eight-step process for promoting change: (1) create a sense of urgency;(2) pull together the guiding team; (3) develop the change vision andstrategy; (4) communicate for understanding and buy in; (5) empowerothers to act; (6) produce short-term wins; (7) don’t let up; and (8)create a new culture. Kotter (1995) also identifies eight errors that areoften made when leading change, including, for example, allowing toomuch complacency, failing to create a sufficiently powerful guidingcoalition, and underestimating the power of a sound vision. It is also465