IPCC_Managing Risks of Extreme Events.pdf - Climate Access

Chapter 6National Systems for Managing the Risks from Climate Extremes and Disastersthe forecasts, local knowledge, and the decisionmakers they are intendedto inform (Basher, 2006; UNISDR, 2006; Auld, 2008a; Case Study 9.2.2).Because emergency responders, the media, and the public often areunable to translate the scientific information on forecast hazards inwarnings into risk levels and responses, early warning systems are mosteffective when their users can identify and interpret the general warningmessages into simple and relevant local impacts and actions (e.g., flashflood warning and the need to evacuate areas at risk), prioritize the mostdangerous hazards, assess potential contributions from cumulative andsequential events to risks, and identify thresholds linked to escalatingrisks for infrastructure, communities, and disaster response (UNISDR,2006; Auld, 2008a).Different hazards and different sectors often require unique preparedness,warnings, and response strategies (Basher, 2006; UNISDR, 2006). Forexample, the needs and responses behind a warning of a drought, atornado, a cyclone, or a fire are very different. Some hazards mayrepresent singular extreme events, sequences, or compound combinationsof hazards while other hazards can be described as ‘creeping’ oraccumulations of events (or non-events). For example, the WorldMeteorological Organization (WMO), national meteorological andhydrological services, the World Health Organization (WHO), the Food andAgriculture Organization (FAO), and others recognize that combinationsof weather and climate hazards can result in complex emergencyresponse situations and are working to establish multi-hazard earlywarning systems for complex risks such as heat waves and vector-bornediseases (UNISDR, 2006; WMO, 2007) and early warnings of pests andfood safety threats and disease outbreaks (e.g., prediction of a potentialdesert locust crisis) (WMO, 2004, 2007; FAO, 2010). Other ‘creeping’hazards can evolve over a period of days to months; floods anddroughts, for example, can result from cumulative or sequential multihazardevents, especially when accompanied by an already existingvulnerability, while other hazards such as accumulated precipitation canlead to critical infrastructure failure (Basher, 2006; Auld, 2008a; Rogersand Tsirkunov, 2010). Section 3.1.3 provides more detail on compound,multiple, and creeping hazards.Studies indicate that an understanding by the public and communityorganizations of their risks and vulnerabilities are critical but insufficientfor risk management and that early warning systems need to becomplemented by preparedness programs as well as public educationand awareness programs (Basher, 2006; UNISDR, 2006; Gwimbi, 2007;Rogers and Tsirkunov, 2010). This requires systematic linkages andintegration between early warning systems and contingency planningprocesses (Pelham et al., 2011). For example, a significant long-termsocial protection program known as the Productive Safety NetProgramme (PSNP) was implemented in Ethiopia in 2007 in response toexperiences from a series of drought-related disaster responses duringthe late 1990s and early 2000s (Pierro and Desai, 2008; Conway andSchipper, 2011). The aim of the PSNP was to shift institutional approachesaway from just emergency responses and into more sustainable livelihoodapproaches involving asset protection and food security. Under thisprogram, millions of people in ‘chronically’ food-insecure households inrural Ethiopia received resources from the PSNP through cash transfersor food payments for their participation in labor-intensive public worksprojects with a particular focus on environmental rehabilitation(Conway and Schipper, 2011). The case study on drought (Case Study9.2.3) also emphasizes the importance of proactive steps in the form ofdrought preparedness and mitigation, and improved monitoring andearly warning systems.Some studies indicate that public awareness and support for disasterprevention and preparedness are often high immediately after a majordisaster event and that such moments can be capitalized on to strengthenand secure the sustainability of, for example, early warning systems(Basher, 2006; Rossetto, 2007). It should be noted that such windowsrequire the pre-existence of a social basis for cooperation that, in turn,supports a collaborative framework between research and management(Rossetto, 2007; Tompkins et al., 2008; Pelham et al., 2011).The timing and form of climatic information (including forecasts andprojections), and access to trusted guidance to help interpret andimplement the information and projections in decisionmaking processes,may be more important to individual users than improved reliability andforecast skill (Pulwarty and Redmond, 1997; Rayner et al., 2005;Gwimbi, 2007; Rogers and Tsirkunov, 2010). Decisionmakers typicallymanage risks holistically, while scientific information is generallyderived using reductionist approaches (Meinke et al., 2006). The netoutcome can be a ‘disconnect’ between scientists and decisionmakerswith the result that climate and hydro-meteorological information canbe developed that, although scientifically sound, may lack relevance tothe decisionmaker (Cash and Buizer, 2005; Meinke et al., 2006; Vogel andO’Brien, 2006; Averyt, 2010). Perceptions of irrelevance, inconsistency,confusion, or doubt can delay action (NRC, 2009). Some studies (Lowe,2003; Glantz, 2005; Meinke et al., 2006; Feldman and Ingram, 2009)advise scientists and practitioners to work together to produce trustworthyknowledge that combines scientific excellence with social relevance, apoint also emphasized in Case Study 9.2.2 on fire. These studies suggestthat decision support activities should be driven by users’ needs, not byscientific research priorities, and that these user needs are not alwaysknown in advance, but should be identified collaboratively and iterativelyin ongoing two-way communication between knowledge producers anddecisionmakers (Cash and Buizer, 2005; NRC, 2009). It has beensuggested that this ongoing interaction, two-way communication, andcollaboration allows scientists and decisionmakers to get to know eachother, to develop an understanding of what decisionmakers need toknow and what science can provide, to build trust, and, over time,develop highly productive relationships as the basis for effectivedecision support (Feldman and Ingram, 2009; NRC, 2009; Averyt, 2010).Since early warning information systems are multi-jurisdictional andmultidisciplinary, they usually require anticipatory coordination across aspectrum of technical and non-technical actors. National governmentscan play an important role in setting the high-level policies and supportingframeworks involving multiple organizations, in adopting multi-hazardand multi-stakeholder approaches, and in promoting community-based365