2011 report to congress - U.S.-China Economic and Security Review ...

dkrause on DSKHT7XVN1PROD with $$_JOB179Surveillance and censorshipThe Chinese government asserted a greater level of control overdomestic Internet access and content in 2011. In May, it created anew State Council-level entity to centralize ‘‘online content management,’’a euphemism in China for various forms of regulationand censorship. 150 More recently, China’s censors blocked webbasedspeculation by Chinese citizens about the health and possibledeath of former Chinese President Jiang Zemin following his failureto appear at a celebration of the 90th anniversary of the CCP’sfounding. 151 This year’s social media-assisted demonstrations inthe Arab world, sometimes leading to regime change, appear tohave intensified the Chinese government’s traditional apprehensionabout political discourse. 152Other new measures appear to be technical outgrowths of existingpolicies. Fang Binxing, the creator of China’s ‘‘great firewall,’’acknowledged in February that he personally used six virtual privatenetworks to test whether they could overcome China’s trafficblockingmeasures. 153 Subsequently, several times throughout2011, new Chinese censorship measures disrupted this previouslyreliable method used to circumvent local restrictions on overseasweb content. 154 Chinese authorities also curtailed domestic webcontent. The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences announced inJuly that the government shuttered 1.3 million websites throughout2010. 155 Some percentage of these sites probably hosted malicioussoftware as opposed to content deemed undesirable to theChinese government (such as pornography or political speech), butthe government does not make available figures with that level ofspecificity.In at least one instance this year, U.S. Internet traffic improperlytransited Chinese networks. 156 Following a series of similar incidentsdocumented in the Commission’s 2010 Annual Report, selectU.S.-generated Internet traffic from social networking siteFacebook travelled on a route through Chinese state-owned telecommunicationsfirm China Telecom on March 22, 2011.* Theexact path of the diversion could not be reconstructed, but the affectedtraffic may have traversed networks physically located inChina.† Although perhaps accidental, such an incident demonstratesa vulnerability that could be used for exploitation or attack.The capability to initiate or exploit erroneous traffic routesexists for all Internet Service Providers, but state ownership of theentire sector in China (as another ‘‘strategic industry’’) elevates therisk of systemic abuse, either as an intentional measure directedagainst external Internet users or a side effect of internal censorshippolicies.Implications for the United StatesChina appears to use computer network exploitations to conductespionage against governments and military entities, commercialentities, and nongovernmental organizations. In parallel, the PLAmaintains capabilities to execute computer network attacks. These* The data also traversed Hanaro Telecom South Korea’s networks.† Alternatively, the data could have traversed China Telecom networks physically located inNorth America. BGPmon.net, Untitled, March 26, 2011. http://bgpmon.net/blog/?p=499.VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:46 Nov 10, 2011 Jkt 067464 PO 00000 Frm 00191 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 G:\GSDD\USCC\2011\067464.XXX 067464