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2011 report to congress - U.S.-China Economic and Security Review ...

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196maritime resources, such as underwater oil <strong>and</strong> natural gas in theSouth <strong>and</strong> East <strong>China</strong> Seas. Beijing could also pressure regionalac<strong>to</strong>rs by threatening or conducting a blockade of major sea lanestraversing the region. Possession of additional l<strong>and</strong> features outsideof <strong>China</strong>’s recognized maritime borders could further extendPLA capabilities <strong>to</strong> project force throughout the region by allowingthe PLA <strong>to</strong> establish military-relevant platforms, such as sensors<strong>and</strong> supply depots, deeper in<strong>to</strong> the East <strong>and</strong> South <strong>China</strong> Seas. Inthe event of a conflict, <strong>China</strong> could also use the military’s area controlcapabilities <strong>to</strong> deny regional <strong>and</strong> outside ac<strong>to</strong>rs the ability <strong>to</strong>operate in the international bodies of water located within the FirstIsl<strong>and</strong> Chain.Figure 2:Portions of the Western Pacific Most Vulnerable <strong>to</strong> Chinese AreaControl CapabilitiesSource: Roger Cliff et al., Entering the Dragon’s Lair: Chinese Anti-Access Strategies <strong>and</strong> TheirImplications for the United States (Arling<strong>to</strong>n, VA: RAND Corporation, 2007), p. 112.dkrause on DSKHT7XVN1PROD with $$_JOBFinally, the opaque nature of Beijing’s views of what constituteshostilities, coupled with the PLA’s inclination <strong>to</strong>ward offensive operations,could result in a serious miscalculation <strong>and</strong> inadvertentconflict in the region. The crux of this argument centers on the notionof deterrence, which seeks <strong>to</strong> persuade through the threat offorce ‘‘a potential enemy that he should in his own interest avoidcourses of activity.’’ 236 However, because of the PLA’s tendency <strong>to</strong>strike first, Beijing could cause a conflict <strong>to</strong> escalate dramatically.For example, General Deptula noted that ‘‘Chinese leaders mightconsider preemptively attacking U.S. forces as they are deploying<strong>to</strong> a region in what U.S. policymakers intend as an action <strong>to</strong> detera conflict’’ [emphasis in original]. 237 The 1995–96 Taiwan StraitCrisis, where Beijing attempted <strong>to</strong> intimidate Taiwan <strong>to</strong> reject fur-VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:46 Nov 10, <strong>2011</strong> Jkt 067464 PO 00000 Frm 00208 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 G:\GSDD\USCC\<strong>2011</strong>\067464.XXX 067464Ch2Fig4.eps

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