2011 report to congress - U.S.-China Economic and Security Review ...

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dkrause on DSKHT7XVN1PROD with $$_JOB192Cyber warfare capabilities: As a Commission-sponsored reportpreviously noted, the PLA has a growing cyber warfare capabilityfueled in part by a belief that modern militaries, including the U.S.military, are overly reliant on networked computer systems to conductcombat operations. In the PLA’s view, this creates an openingto be exploited in an effort to paralyze or degrade a superior opponent’scombat capabilities. 216 A recent study by a U.S. think tank,the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, describedhow Chinese defense writings emphasize cyber attacks ‘‘againstU.S. battle networks aimed at disrupting logistics, corrupting [commandand control] systems, degrading fire control radars, denyingessential services, and degrading U.S. counter-space control, spacesituational awareness and space ground control stations.’’ 217Counterspace capabilities: As section 3 of this chapter details, thePLA has sought to develop its abilities to deny the use of space toa technologically superior opponent. Describing the reasoning behindthe PLA’s drive for counterspace capabilities, General Deptulawrote:China recognizes the overwhelming advantage the US hasin the space domain and its key role in our ability to collect,analyze and rapidly share data. They understand howdependent U.S. warfighters have become upon space productsand services for commanding deployed troops, passing[intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] data, andenabling precision targeting and engagement. China viewsthat reliance as a significant, exploitable vulnerability andhas written extensively about the subject in both opensource journals and military doctrine. As a result, they areactively pursuing a comprehensive array of space andcounterspace programs intended to degrade, disrupt, deny,or destroy our ability to gain and maintain access to the regionin the event of a conflict. 218Joint operations: According to Mr. Cooper, in 1999 the ChineseCommunist Party emphasized that the PLA focuses on acquiringthe ability to conduct joint operations * as a means successfully tocounter a more capable enemy. 219 In General Deptula’s assessment,the ability successfully to conduct joint operations willstrongly improve the PLA’s overall combat capacity. 220 Currently,the PLA’s ability to conduct joint operations remains a work inprogress. However, Mr. Cooper described in detail three ways inwhich the PLA is currently attempting to improve its ability to doso:• Deploy a command system that integrates into one networkedsystem the PLA’s disparate command and control, communications,electronic warfare, targeting, and logistics systems.* Joint operations are a form of military operations that involve two or more separate militaryservices working to conduct highly integrated combat operations where the synthesized combatpower is more than the individual capabilities simply added together. A textbook example of ajoint operation is Operation Desert Storm (1991), where the U.S. military and coalition forcesexpelled occupying Iraqi forces from Kuwait. See, for example, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint MilitaryOperations Historical Collection (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, July 15, 1997),pp. V–1—V–15.VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:46 Nov 10, 2011 Jkt 067464 PO 00000 Frm 00204 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 G:\GSDD\USCC\2011\067464.XXX 067464
dkrause on DSKHT7XVN1PROD with $$_JOB193• Implement the necessary organizational changes for joint operations,such as developing a more flexible command and controlstructure.• Develop a cohort of military personnel capable of conductingjoint operations. For example, in its 12th Five Year Plan(2011–2015), the PLA leadership determined that joint trainingwould be a major goal for the military. 221‘‘Three Warfares’’ Strategy: Since 2003, the PLA has been developingthe ability to integrate public media, international law, andpsychological warfare in support of its Area Control Strategy. DeanCheng, a research fellow at The Heritage Foundation, described tothe Commission how this strategy, collectively referred to in Chinesedefense writings as the ‘‘Three Warfares,’’ seeks to underminethe opponent’s will to fight, weaken international support for theopponent’s cause, and reinforce China’s domestic support for militaryoperations. Reflecting the PLA’s emphasis on offensive operations,Mr. Cheng noted that this strategy would likely be deployedprior to the actual outbreak of hostilities. 222 The three individualcomponents of this strategy include the following:• Psychological warfare, which targets the leadership and populationof the opponent, of third parties, and domestically inChina;• Public opinion warfare, where China would use ‘‘various massinformation channels, including the Internet, television, radio,newspapers, movies, and other forms of media’’ to guide domesticand international public opinion in a way favorable to Beijing;and• Legal warfare, which relies on the ‘‘use of domestic law, thelaws of armed conflict, and international law’’ to demonstratethat China actions are legal, and the opponent is violating thelaw. 223Implications for the United StatesChina’s Area Control Strategy has several implications for theUnited States and the Asia-Pacific Region. First, because the centraltenet of the PLA’s Area Control Strategy is to provide a meansto defeat a superior military, many of the PLA’s emerging capabilitiesappear intended directly to counter U.S. and allied military capabilitiesand exploit an opposing military’s weaknesses. As Ms.Mastro noted:China is fielding capabilities designed to deter, deny, disrupt,and delay the deployment of U.S. forces into the theaterin the case of a conflict. China seeks to capitalize onU.S. vulnerabilities, specifically the great distances theU.S. needs to travel to engage China militarily as well asU.S. reliance on unimpeded access to and use of ports, airfields,air and sea bases, and littoral waters. 224U.S. military capabilities and military bases long thought to bebeyond the PLA’s reach are increasingly vulnerable without propercountermeasures. According to Mr. Cooper, ‘‘China’s greatly im-VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:46 Nov 10, 2011 Jkt 067464 PO 00000 Frm 00205 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 G:\GSDD\USCC\2011\067464.XXX 067464
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12011REPORT TO CONGRESSof theU.S.-C
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U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY RE
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dkrause on DSKHT7XVN1PROD with $$_J
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CONTENTSPageTRANSMITTAL LETTER TO T
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23Figure 1:China’s Share of the U
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25The weakness in U.S. exports of a
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31Table 3:RMB Bond Issuances by Mul
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35of bilateral negotiations under t
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37Stonewalling the WTO: A Case Stud
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39that China’s existing system of
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41now. Because the structures of th
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43How Big Is China’s State Sector
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45Fortune Global 500, compared to j
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47panies are less profitable, after
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49erate primarily within state-cont
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57Figure 1: Chinese FDI Stock in th
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63U.S. firms with sensitive technol
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65Addendum I: SASAC Companies, Larg
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67Addendum I: SASAC Companies, Larg
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69dkrause on DSKHT7XVN1PROD with $$
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71January 2010, the heads of 19 U.S
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77cause Beijing had sought to exclu
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81China in Search of Western Techno
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83scious policy seeking to drive Ch
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89Like previous plans, the 12th Fiv
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95Consultative Conference National
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99panies account[ed] for fully 7 pe
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101Dr. Shih has testified before th
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103ment subsidies, which in turn wi
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105Addendum II: Figures 1-2Figure 1
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113drivers cited increased fuel pri
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123uating from college and hoping t
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131unfairly or unjustifiably harm U
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Page 229 and 230: RECOMMENDATIONSChina’s ‘‘Area
Page 247 and 248: 239320. Chang Xianqi, Military Astr
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243woman Jiang Yu simply expressed
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245Table 1:Timeline of Sino-North K
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249China also provides economic sup
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251economic and social strains woul
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255Iran’s South Pars Gas Field af
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257When asked by Commissioners abou
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281trade, and dispute settlement. 2
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287of Request to the United States
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289fense, since its current fleet o
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3190aRCRD&ss=Hong+Kong&s=News; Pete
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323mation Office. Day-to-day superv
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327Although the slogans change over
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335What Constitutes a ‘‘Core In
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339Selected CAIFC/CPD Track Two Exc
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341disseminated through diplomatic
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375ecutive Schedule under section 5
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APPENDIX IIIPUBLIC HEARINGS OF THE
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APPENDIX IIIALIST OF WITNESSES TEST
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393Alphabetical Listing of Panelist
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397In TaiwanU.S. Government• Amer
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APPENDIX VLIST OF RESEARCH MATERIAL
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401The National Security Implicatio
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APPENDIX VIACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIO
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