2011 report to congress - U.S.-China Economic and Security Review ...

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338ernment officials conducting discussions in an unofficial capacity.*Such exchanges have come to occupy a prominent place in U.S.-Chinese relations as conducted outside of formal government channels.For example, from 2002–2008 the Institute for U.S.-ChinaIssues at the University of Oklahoma conducted annual meetingsof ‘‘The Sino-American Security Dialogue’’ in partnership with Chineseacademic institutions; this subsequently changed to the ‘‘US–China Diplomatic Dialogue’’ for mid-career U.S. and Chinese diplomats,which last met in summer 2011 in Anhui, China. 138Track two exchanges offer many potential benefits, to includegreater mutual understanding and the opportunity for discussion ofcontentious topics outside of the restrictions of official diplomaticchannels. However, the representatives of PRC friendship associationsand think tanks are not independent actors: Virtually all aresubordinate to a government ministry or Communist Party body, 139and their personnel appointments are dependent upon CCP vettingand approval. 140 Therefore, such exchanges also offer opportunitiesfor Chinese government–controlled front organizations to reinforceofficial propaganda messages and to conduct subtle perceptionmanagement efforts under the guise of nominally independent person-to-personand scholarly exchanges.The Commission’s examination of this issue revealed a prominentrole for PRC intelligence entities in organizing and hostingtrack two exchanges. For example, one prominent Chinese sponsorof exchange trips and dialogues is the China Association for InternationalFriendly Contact (CAIFC), which is a front organizationfor the International Liaison Department of the PLA General PoliticalDepartment. 141 The International Liaison Department performsdual roles of intelligence collection and conducting PRC propagandaand perception management † campaigns, particularly inthe case of efforts focused on foreign military forces. 142dkrause on DSKHT7XVN1PROD with $$_JOB* According to a definition provided by the Berghof Foundation for Conflict Studies, a Danishthink tank, track 1.5 exchanges involve ‘‘informal dialogue and problem-solving formats withhigh ranking politicians and decision-makers. Involves Track 1 participants, but employs Track2 approaches.’’ See Berghof Foundation for Conflict Studies. ‘‘Glossary: Track 1.5,’’ http://www.berghof-foundation.de/en/glossary/track-1.5.† The term ‘‘perception management’’ has been defined by the Department of Defense as follows:‘‘Actions to convey and/or deny selected information and indicators to foreign audiencesto influence their emotions, motives, and objective reasoning as well as to intelligence systemsand leaders at all levels to influence official estimates, ultimately resulting in foreign behaviorsand official actions favorable to the originator’s objectives.’’ See U.S. Department of Defense,Joint Publication 1–02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms(Washington, DC: April 2001 [as amended through October 31, 2009]), p. 411.VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:46 Nov 10, 2011 Jkt 067464 PO 00000 Frm 00350 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 G:\GSDD\USCC\2011\067464.XXX 067464
339Selected CAIFC/CPD Track Two Exchanges with GovernmentOfficials and Think Tank Scholars in 2009–2010 143In addition to activities that it sponsors directly, the Chinese Associationfor International Friendly Contact also operates its own associatedthink tank, the Center for Peace and Development (CPD). 144 Not countingthe extensive number of programs run by other Chinese organizations,the CAIFC and CPD conduct a very active list of exchanges. A listof selected exchanges sponsored by CAIFC and/or CPD from the years2009–2010 includes the following:DatesJune 27–July 9, 2010June 15,2010April 4–13,2010November25, 2009October 16–24, 2009May 19,2009May 15,2009April 8–18,2009Participating Foreign Organization(s)/Person(s)and Issues Discussed (If Known)A delegation from CAIFC meets in Washington, DC, with Membersof Congress and representatives of the Asia Society and theCenter for Strategic and International Studies, among others.They also meet in New York with faculty at Columbia University.Topics discussed reportedly focused on U.S and Chinese policy inCentral Asia.CAIFC hosts a visit to China by the governor of Hawaii and an accompanyingdelegation from the Hawaii Chamber of Commerce.CAIFC sponsors a delegation of five former Members of Congressto visit China; in Beijing, they visit the National People’s Congress,the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Commerce,and the People’s Bank of China.CPD hosts a visiting delegation from Britain’s Royal United ServicesInstitute for Defence and Security Studies. Topics discussedreportedly included Chinese-European relations, Afghanistan, andthe Iranian nuclear program.In the second round of meetings of the ‘‘Sanya Initiative,’’ 145 a delegationof retired Chinese generals visits the United States. Theyvisit U.S. Pacific Command headquarters in Honolulu; and subsequentlytravel to Washington, D.C., where they meet with Secretaryof State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Vice Chairman of theJoint Chiefs General James Cartwright, and members of the ChinaWorking Group caucus of the U.S. House of Representatives.CAIFC representatives, including former Foreign Minister LiZhaoxing, entertain a visiting delegation of senior-ranking retiredJapanese military officers at the Diaoyutai Guest House in Beijing.Hosted by CAIFC, a delegation from the Asia-Pacific Center forSecurity Studies visits the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the ChinaInstitute of International Studies, the Chinese Academy of SocialSciences Institute of American Studies, and Qinghua University.A delegation of CAIFC representatives travels to Washington Stateto meet with state political and business leaders and subsequentlyto Washington, DC, for discussions at The Brookings Institutionand the Center for Strategic and International Studies.dkrause on DSKHT7XVN1PROD with $$_JOBDespite concerns raised by the sponsorship role of Chinese intelligenceand Communist Party-controlled entities—and their role asconduits for propaganda messages targeted at foreign elites—manyU.S. participants involved with track two exchanges have emphasizedthe value of dialogue with PRC state-controlled think tanksand other like bodies, noting that these discussions offer insightsinto the policy positions favored by the government parent organization.146 In testimony before the Commission this year, AbrahamVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:46 Nov 10, 2011 Jkt 067464 PO 00000 Frm 00351 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 G:\GSDD\USCC\2011\067464.XXX 067464
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12011REPORT TO CONGRESSof theU.S.-C
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U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY RE
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dkrause on DSKHT7XVN1PROD with $$_J
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CONTENTSPageTRANSMITTAL LETTER TO T
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23Figure 1:China’s Share of the U
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25The weakness in U.S. exports of a
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31Table 3:RMB Bond Issuances by Mul
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35of bilateral negotiations under t
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37Stonewalling the WTO: A Case Stud
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39that China’s existing system of
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41now. Because the structures of th
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43How Big Is China’s State Sector
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45Fortune Global 500, compared to j
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47panies are less profitable, after
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49erate primarily within state-cont
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57Figure 1: Chinese FDI Stock in th
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63U.S. firms with sensitive technol
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65Addendum I: SASAC Companies, Larg
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67Addendum I: SASAC Companies, Larg
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69dkrause on DSKHT7XVN1PROD with $$
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71January 2010, the heads of 19 U.S
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77cause Beijing had sought to exclu
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81China in Search of Western Techno
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83scious policy seeking to drive Ch
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89Like previous plans, the 12th Fiv
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95Consultative Conference National
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99panies account[ed] for fully 7 pe
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101Dr. Shih has testified before th
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103ment subsidies, which in turn wi
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105Addendum II: Figures 1-2Figure 1
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113drivers cited increased fuel pri
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123uating from college and hoping t
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131unfairly or unjustifiably harm U
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161gress, the DoD noted that China
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165eral U.S. military policies, inc
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167Figure 1:Territorial Disputes in
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171provides guidelines for dealing
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173network exploitations to facilit
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181ligence, surveillance, and recon
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187Therefore, the PLA maintains the
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189Of import, the PLA’s geographi
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197ther moves toward independence,
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199trates the depth of China’s sp
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201Figure 2:Representation of Beido
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205ganization, modeled on the Europ
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207China’s leadership also places
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211[General Armaments Department] p
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213Table 2: Select Chinese Satellit
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215weapons or coorbital satellite w
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217Malicious Cyber ActivitiesDirect
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RECOMMENDATIONSChina’s ‘‘Area
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239320. Chang Xianqi, Military Astr
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243woman Jiang Yu simply expressed
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245Table 1:Timeline of Sino-North K
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249China also provides economic sup
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251economic and social strains woul
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255Iran’s South Pars Gas Field af
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257When asked by Commissioners abou
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281trade, and dispute settlement. 2
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Page 349 and 350: 341disseminated through diplomatic
Page 383 and 384: 375ecutive Schedule under section 5
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APPENDIX IIIALIST OF WITNESSES TEST
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393Alphabetical Listing of Panelist
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397In TaiwanU.S. Government• Amer
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APPENDIX VLIST OF RESEARCH MATERIAL
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401The National Security Implicatio
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APPENDIX VIACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIO
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