2011 report to congress - U.S.-China Economic and Security Review ...

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322ences. This chapter will seek to offer greater insight into howChina frames its role in the world and its relations with othercountries, as well as the implications for U.S. policy in the Asia-Pacific region.The Chinese Government’s Formulation of Messages inMedia and Public DiplomacyThe CCP treats the control of propaganda/public diplomacy messages* to foreign audiences as a fundamental tool of statecraft. 8Furthermore, it is highly critical of what it calls the ‘‘Western media’sideological assault on the rest of the world’’ 9 and sees itselfas engaged in a ‘‘global war for public opinion.’’ 10 As an illustrationof this outlook, Li Changchun, a member of the Standing Committeeof the Politburo and the CCP’s most senior official in chargeof the government’s ideology and propaganda system, 11 stated inNovember 2008 that:Communication capacity determines influence. In the modernage . . . whichever nation’s communication capacity isstrongest, it is that nation whose culture and core valuesare able to spread far and wide, and that nation that hasthe most power to influence the world. . . . Enhancing ourcommunication capacity domestically and internationally isof direct consequence to our nation’s international influenceand international position . . . and of direct consequence tothe function and role of our nation’s media within theinternational public opinion structure. 12The processes by which leadership messages are formulated andthen transmitted through China’s informational bureaucracy areopaque. At a minimum, these decisions involve the leaders of theCCP Central Committee’s Foreign Affairs/National Security LeadingSmall Group (chaired since 2002–2003 by CCP General SecretaryHu Jintao) and the Propaganda and Ideology Leading SmallGroup (chaired since 2003 by Politburo Member Li Changchun). 13As described to the Commission this year by Ashley Esarey, anacademic specialist on China’s propaganda system:By far the most powerful decision-making body in the propagandasystem overall is the Central Leading Group onPropaganda. . . . This secretive body hides the extent towhich it controls information in China to blunt criticism ofits actions. . . . Efforts to promote foreign propaganda, inparticular, are managed by the CCP Central CommitteeForeign Propaganda Office [whose director] concurrentlyserves as the Deputy Director of the [CCP] Central PropagandaDepartment and Director of the State Council Infor-dkrause on DSKHT7XVN1PROD with $$_JOB* The Chinese term for ‘‘propaganda’’ does not necessarily carry a pejorative meaning, and theterm is used extensively in Chinese discourse. See U.S.-China Economic and Security ReviewCommission, Hearing on China’s Narratives Regarding National Security Policy, written testimonyof Ashley Esarey, March 10, 2011. As defined by another expert witness, Nicholas Cull,the term ‘‘public diplomacy’’ is ‘‘simply the process by which an international actor conducts foreignpolicy by engaging a foreign public.’’ See U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,Hearing on China’s Propaganda and Influence Operations, its Intelligence Activities thatTarget the United States, and its Resulting Impacts on US National Security, written testimonyof Nicholas Cull, April 30, 2009.VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:46 Nov 10, 2011 Jkt 067464 PO 00000 Frm 00334 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 G:\GSDD\USCC\2011\067464.XXX 067464
323mation Office. Day-to-day supervision of foreign propagandais handled by the State Council Information Office,which pays attention to media coverage of salient issues inforeign affairs and interacts with foreign journalists inChina. 14In pursuit of a larger voice in international affairs, Chinesemedia officials have significantly increased resources for state-controlledforeign language media outlets. 15 In 2009, the Global Times,an official Chinese Communist Party newspaper, launched a newEnglish edition; and in July 2010, the Xinhua News Agencylaunched a global 24-hour English-language television channel titled‘‘CNC World.’’ 16 In May 2011, Xinhua moved its North Americanheadquarters from an office in New York City’s borough ofQueens to a much more prominent location on the top floor of askyscraper in Manhattan’s Times Square. 17 In addition to expandingits international news outlets, in recent years the Chinese governmenthas sponsored increased lobbying efforts directed at U.S.policymakers. 18The Chinese government has also attempted to reach out directlyto public audiences in the United States through large-scale advertisingcampaigns. The Chinese government sponsored commercialshailing China’s cultural achievements that appeared on televisionnetworks and in Times Square during President Hu Jintao’s officialvisit to the United States in January 2011. 19 In August 2011, theXinhua News Agency complemented the move of its New York bureauby signing a lease of at least six years for a 60 foot by 40 footelectronic billboard on the side of 2 Times Square. 20 The stateownednewspaper China Daily has paid for ‘‘advertorial’’ inserts inmajor newspapers such as the Washington Post (see image below)and the New York Times. 21 The Washington Post has also createdthe China Watch page on its website to present further news articlesprovided by China Daily. 22 These articles emphasize China’sdesire for a ‘‘harmonious’’ world; 23 the benefits to Americans ofChinese economic policies; and the necessity for China to maintainCCP one-party rule. 24 Such advertising campaigns involve a significantoutlay of resources: For example, the cost of a single instanceof publishing an editorial advertising insert of the type placed byChina Daily in the Washington Post is approximately $300,000, notincluding additional fees for any related web content. 25dkrause on DSKHT7XVN1PROD with $$_JOBVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:46 Nov 10, 2011 Jkt 067464 PO 00000 Frm 00335 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 G:\GSDD\USCC\2011\067464.XXX 067464
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12011REPORT TO CONGRESSof theU.S.-C
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U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY RE
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dkrause on DSKHT7XVN1PROD with $$_J
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CONTENTSPageTRANSMITTAL LETTER TO T
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23Figure 1:China’s Share of the U
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25The weakness in U.S. exports of a
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31Table 3:RMB Bond Issuances by Mul
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35of bilateral negotiations under t
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37Stonewalling the WTO: A Case Stud
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39that China’s existing system of
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41now. Because the structures of th
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43How Big Is China’s State Sector
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45Fortune Global 500, compared to j
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47panies are less profitable, after
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49erate primarily within state-cont
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57Figure 1: Chinese FDI Stock in th
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63U.S. firms with sensitive technol
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65Addendum I: SASAC Companies, Larg
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67Addendum I: SASAC Companies, Larg
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69dkrause on DSKHT7XVN1PROD with $$
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71January 2010, the heads of 19 U.S
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77cause Beijing had sought to exclu
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81China in Search of Western Techno
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83scious policy seeking to drive Ch
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89Like previous plans, the 12th Fiv
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95Consultative Conference National
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99panies account[ed] for fully 7 pe
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101Dr. Shih has testified before th
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103ment subsidies, which in turn wi
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105Addendum II: Figures 1-2Figure 1
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113drivers cited increased fuel pri
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123uating from college and hoping t
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131unfairly or unjustifiably harm U
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161gress, the DoD noted that China
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165eral U.S. military policies, inc
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167Figure 1:Territorial Disputes in
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171provides guidelines for dealing
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173network exploitations to facilit
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181ligence, surveillance, and recon
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187Therefore, the PLA maintains the
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189Of import, the PLA’s geographi
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197ther moves toward independence,
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199trates the depth of China’s sp
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201Figure 2:Representation of Beido
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205ganization, modeled on the Europ
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207China’s leadership also places
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211[General Armaments Department] p
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213Table 2: Select Chinese Satellit
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215weapons or coorbital satellite w
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217Malicious Cyber ActivitiesDirect
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RECOMMENDATIONSChina’s ‘‘Area
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239320. Chang Xianqi, Military Astr
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243woman Jiang Yu simply expressed
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245Table 1:Timeline of Sino-North K
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249China also provides economic sup
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251economic and social strains woul
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255Iran’s South Pars Gas Field af
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257When asked by Commissioners abou
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Page 289 and 290: 281trade, and dispute settlement. 2
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Page 335 and 336: 327Although the slogans change over
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375ecutive Schedule under section 5
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APPENDIX IIIPUBLIC HEARINGS OF THE
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APPENDIX IIIALIST OF WITNESSES TEST
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393Alphabetical Listing of Panelist
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397In TaiwanU.S. Government• Amer
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APPENDIX VLIST OF RESEARCH MATERIAL
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401The National Security Implicatio
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APPENDIX VIACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIO
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