2011 report to congress - U.S.-China Economic and Security Review ...

dkrause on DSKHT7XVN1PROD with $$_JOB340Denmark, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security,defended track two exchanges with Chinese interlocutors as‘‘an invaluable source of information,’’ as well as an avenue forbuilding contacts and communication with Chinese foreign policythinkers. 147 The Commission itself has met on multiple occasionsfor discussions with representatives of Chinese think tanks, to includethose operated by intelligence entities. For example, in July2010 members of the Commission met in Beijing with representativesof the China Institute for International Strategic Studies (operatedby PLA military intelligence 148 ) and the China Institute ofContemporary International Relations (a branch of the Ministry ofState Security, China’s leading civilian intelligence service 149 ).Implications for the United StatesThe official foreign policy narrative of the Chinese governmentexpresses its desire for a peaceful and ‘‘harmonious’’ internationalenvironment as well as for economic growth that benefits Chinaand the rest of the world. If true, this offers hope for exchanges betweenthe United States and China that could produce a mutuallybeneficial trade relationship, avoid military competition, and bringabout cooperative efforts on pressing international issues such aspiracy, counterproliferation, and global climate change.However, multiple messages are emerging from China regardingits place in the world, and some of these messages conflict with theofficial ones. All governments seek to present their policy choicesin the most favorable light and frequently may claim high-mindedjustifications for actions motivated by realpolitik interests. However,the case may be particularly serious in relation to China: AlthoughChina’s diplomats and informational bureaucracy speak tointernational audiences in terms of mutually beneficial cooperation,Chinese domestic discourse reveals a profound distrust of theUnited States and a focus on approaches that favor China’s stateinterests regardless of the effects on other countries.This disparity in external and internal messages, as well as betweenChina’s words and deeds as observed in 2010 and 2011, carrieswith it troubling implications. If China’s leaders are presentingreassuring messages to the outside world for public relations purposeswhile actually implementing a contrary set of revisionist andself-interested policies, this bodes ill for policy initiatives that proceedfrom prima facie acceptance of stated PRC intentions. It couldalso portend increased security competition in Asia: By themselves,reassuring Chinese statements about a ‘‘harmonious’’ internationalorder will prove unconvincing to neighboring states alarmed byChina’s military buildup and its aggressive behavior in disputedmaritime territories.Conclusions• The Chinese government places a high priority on the managementof information as a tool of policy, to include the messagesthat it promotes to international audiences regarding its goals inforeign and national security policy. The central leadership of theChinese Communist Party selects official foreign policy messagesintended to support state policy goals. These messages are thenVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:46 Nov 10, 2011 Jkt 067464 PO 00000 Frm 00352 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 G:\GSDD\USCC\2011\067464.XXX 067464