2011 report to congress - U.S.-China Economic and Security Review ...

dkrause on DSKHT7XVN1PROD with $$_JOB209China, according to Dr. Moltz, is the nation’s lack of close alliesand partners in space endeavors. He testified that ‘‘[w]hile [China]cooperates with Russia, the two sides do not share strategic interests,and the bulk of China’s cooperative agreements involve developingcountries.’’ 287 As a result, China could not necessarily relyon any other country to provide support in the event of a crisis. 288Military Space ActivitiesThis subsection describes China’s military space activities. It discussesChina’s strategic approach to military space operations andthe Chinese military’s organizational features as they relate tospace operations. It also describes China’s recent developments andinitiatives. Finally, it highlights some current limitations on China’smilitary space programs.StrategySeveral obstacles prevent outsiders from truly understandingChina’s military space activities. According to testimony by BruceMacDonald, senior director of the Nonproliferation and Arms ControlProgram at the U.S. Institute of Peace, ‘‘[a] fundamental problemwe face is that China says little at an official level about itsmilitary space policy and doctrine.’’ 289 It is clear, however, thatChina’s leadership recognizes the growing importance of space, aswell as the domain’s military utility. For example, President HuJintao in late 2004 issued a new set of missions to the PLA, whichincluded the requirement to protect China’s expanding national interestsin space. 290 Official operational information is similarlyrare. According to testimony to the Commission by Dean Cheng, researchfellow at The Heritage Foundation, the lack of available informationis so complete that ‘‘there is still no indication of whetherthe PLA has developed a formal space doctrine governing militaryoperations in space. 291Authoritative Chinese military publications, however, providesome insight into China’s strategic thinking. The book Military Astronautics,by Chang Xianqi, a major general in the PLA, serves asa key example. The text explains two critical, space-related ‘‘guidingideas.’’ * First, China should seek ‘‘space supremacy,’’ defined as‘‘the power to control a certain area of space for a certain periodof time.’’ † In this context, the PLA would use communications, reconnaissance,and related activities for the purposes of enhancingits ability to conduct operations. Simultaneously, China would conductoffensive and defensive space operations to attack and defendspace-based and terrestrial military targets. The text subsequentlydescribes space supremacy as a ‘‘precondition to seizing air suprem-* Chang Xianqi, Military Astronautics, 2nd ed. (Beijing, China: National Defense IndustriesPress, 2005) OSC ID: CPP20091231572001. The source describes these guiding ideas as ‘‘anticipatoryin nature.’’ However, China’s counterspace programs increasingly provide tools to implementsuch concepts. For a fuller description of these ideas and their implications, see U.S.-ChinaEconomic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on the Implications of China’s Military andCivil Space Programs, written testimony of Dean Cheng, May 11, 2011.† The source alternatively uses the term ‘‘space control.’’ Major General Chang characterizesspace supremacy as relative, asserting that ‘‘the side which has space supremacy usually canonly expect that the other side’s interference will not undermine its operational plan, but cannotexpect that the other side will be completely unable to respond.’’ Chang Xianqi, MilitaryAstronautics, 2nd ed. (Beijing, China: National Defense Industries Press, 2005). OSC ID:CPP20091231572001.VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:46 Nov 10, 2011 Jkt 067464 PO 00000 Frm 00221 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 G:\GSDD\USCC\2011\067464.XXX 067464