2011 report to congress - U.S.-China Economic and Security Review ...

dkrause on DSKHT7XVN1PROD with $$_JOB218have increased dramatically over the past five years, beginningwith China’s 2007 antisatellite test. According to AmbassadorSchulte, that test produced 14 percent of the approximately 22,000manmade objects in orbit tracked by the U.S. Strategic Command,the entity responsible for U.S. space situational awareness. StrategicCommand issues ‘‘conjunction warnings,’’ or notices about potentialcollisions between these objects, to numerous commercialentities and foreign governments. Of the 1,983 conjunction warningsissued in 2010, approximately 700 related to potential collisionswith debris from China’s 2007 antisatellite test. 325 Even absentfurther kinetic antisatellite tests, China’s increased space activitieswill continue to add to the congested nature of space.Launches leave behind rocket bodies, and satellites have finite lifespans. These items can clutter useful orbits long after their operationallives.ContestedSpace is a domain of warfare in its own right and bolsters operationalcapacity in all other domains of warfare: land, air, sea, andcyberspace. In this context, China’s advancements in military spacefunctions present two primary implications for the United States.First, China increasingly leverages space assets for the purposes offorce enhancement. As Mr. Cheng testified, ‘‘With each passingyear, China’s satellite constellations will provide better informationto military users.’’ 326 This information will benefit most aspects ofChina’s military capabilities but will enhance in particular China’scommunications as well as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissanceactivities. As a corollary, China’s reconnaissance-strikecomplexes, already advanced in some areas, appear poised to improve.This will lead not only to greater accuracy and reliability butalso to the ability to attack a geographically extended range of targets.According to Mr. Stokes, ‘‘In a future contingency requiringU.S. intervention, space-enabled long-range precision strike assetscould seek to suppress U.S. operations from forward bases inJapan, from U.S. aircraft battle groups operating in the WesternPacific, and perhaps over the next five to 10 years from U.S. baseson Guam.’’ 327Second, China’s counterspace programs seek the capability tocompromise, disrupt, deny, degrade, deceive, or destroy U.S. spaceassets. These efforts could prevent the U.S. military’s use of spacefor functions such as communications; intelligence, surveillance,and reconnaissance; and guided weapons applications. NotwithstandingChina’s increasing reliance on space for military and civilpurposes, Chinese military planners still view space assets as anattractive target. Ambassador Schulte testified that with ‘‘geographythe way it is, we are probably always going to find ourselvesmore reliant on space than [China] . . . so for the foreseeable future,that’s an asymmetry they’re going to look to exploit as they pursuean antiaccess/area denial approach.’’ 328 According to GeneralDeptula, ‘‘Continued Chinese investment in the design, development,deployment and employment of space and counterspace systemswill increasingly challenge our traditional space dominanceand could dramatically reduce our freedom of action in the eventof a conflict in the region.’’ 329VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:46 Nov 10, 2011 Jkt 067464 PO 00000 Frm 00230 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 G:\GSDD\USCC\2011\067464.XXX 067464