2011 report to congress - U.S.-China Economic and Security Review ...

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dkrause on DSKHT7XVN1PROD with $$_JOB34636. Peter Hays Gries, ‘‘Tears of Rage: Chinese Nationalist Reactions to the BelgradeEmbassy Bombing,’’ The China Journal 46 (July 2001); and Peter Hays Gries,China’s New Nationalism (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004), pp.98–108. The 1999 U.S.-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) bombingcampaign against the former Republic of Yugoslavia has itself been consistently depictedin PRC commentary as part of an effort to ‘‘further contain and weaken Russia’’by diminishing a Russian ally and expanding NATO military control of Europe.See Wang Naicheng, ‘‘Failure of the New Strategic Concept,’’ Jiefangjun Bao (PLADaily), May 22, 1999. OSC ID FBIS–CHI–1999–0601, as cited in Michael Pillsbury,China Debates the Future Security Environment (Honolulu, HI: University Press ofthe Pacific, 2005), p. 169.37. Li Mingbo, ‘‘Mei Mimou Jian Dongya Fandao Tixi’’ (America’s Scheme toBuild an Anti-Missile System in East Asia), Guangzhou Ribao (Guangzhou Daily,online edition), February 13, 2010. Available as ‘‘PRC Experts on US ’Plot’ To BuildEast Asia Antimissile System To ’Encircle’ PRC.’’ OSD ID CPP201002140 01002.www.opensource.gov.38. ‘‘Most Chinese analysts believe (and there is virtual consensus across thespectrum) that the whole concept of global governance is a Western trap which triesto undermine China’s sovereignty and lure it into a variety of entanglements whereChina does not belong. There is a widespread perception that U.S. and EU calls forChina to be a ‘responsible power’ (fuzeren de daguo) or ‘responsible internationalstakeholder’ are just the latest ruse for retarding and undermining China’s power.’’David Shambaugh, ‘‘Coping with a Conflicted China,’’ Washington Quarterly (Winter2011).39. ’’Quanqiu Jinrong Weiji Shi Meiguo de Yinmou Ma’’ (Is the Financial Crisisan American Conspiracy?) Huanqiu Shibao (Global Times), October 23, 2008. Translationby USCC staff. http://www.otliba.com/show_news.asp?ID = 40. See also OiwanLam, ‘‘U.S. Economic Crisis a Hot Topic on Chinese Blogs,’’ Global News JournalBlog (Reuters News Service), October 2, 2008. http://blogs.reuters.com/global/2008/10/02/us-economic-crisis-a-hot-topic-on-chinese-blogs.40. Shi Jianxun, ‘‘RMB Appreciation Pressure Harmful to Interests of China,EU,’’ People’s Daily OnLine (in English), October 9, 2010. http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90780/91421/7161021.html. See also China Stakes.com, ‘‘ConspiracyTheory Stalks China-US Financial Relations,’’ January 25, 2008. http://www.chinastakes.com/2008/1/conspiracy-theory-stalks-china-us-financial-relations.html.41. People’s Republic of China State Council Information Office, ‘‘Human RightsRecord of the United States in 2010’’ (Beijing, China: April 11, 2011). http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-04/11/content_12300327.htm.42. As an example of PRC state media commentary on alleged U.S. involvementin Tibetan unrest, see Xinhua (in English), ‘‘Double Act, Old Trick Behind TibetChaos,’’ April 18, 2008. The article is posted on the website of the Embassy of thePeople’s Republic of China in the United States at http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t426629. For similar allegations of U.S. involvement in Xinjiang, see People’sDaily Online (in English), ‘‘Rebiya Kadeer’s Funding Sources,’’ July 14, 2009. http://www.globaltimes.cn/www/english/truexinjiang/urumqi-riot/rebiya-kadeer/2009-07/446397.html.43. Michael Wines, ‘‘Cables Reveal Early Tensions Between U.S. and China onNobel Winner,’’ New York Times, December 9, 2010; and Malcolm Moore, ‘‘ChinaSteps Up Anti-Nobel Campaign by Blocking BBC Website,’’ Telegraph (United Kingdom),December 9, 2010.44. Global Times, ‘‘2010 Nobel Peace Prize a Disgrace,’’ October 9, 2010. http://opinion.globaltimes.cn/editorial/2010-10/580091.html. For a more detailed discussionof the controversy in China surrounding the awarding of the 2010 Nobel Peace Prizeto Liu Xiaobo, see John Dotson, ‘‘The Confucian Revival in the Propaganda Narrativesof the Chinese Government’’ (Washington, DC: U.S.-China Economic and SecurityReview Commission, staff research report), July 20, 2011. http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2011/Confucian_Revival_Paper.pdf.45. Bonnie Glaser, ‘‘Ensuring that China Rises Peacefully’’ (Clingendael, TheNetherlands: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, December 23, 2010).http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2010/20101223_CAF_artikel_BGlaser.pdf.46. Quotation attributed to PRC Vice President Xi Jinping in ‘‘China, U.S. AgreeBilateral Relations ‘Most Important’’’ People’s Daily Online (in English), January 13,2009. http://english.people daily.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/6572553.html.47. David Shambaugh, ‘‘Coping with a Conflicted China,’’ Washington Quarterly(Winter 2011).48. See U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’sPropaganda and Influence Operations, Its Intelligence Activities that Target theVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:46 Nov 10, 2011 Jkt 067464 PO 00000 Frm 00358 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 G:\GSDD\USCC\2011\067464.XXX 067464
dkrause on DSKHT7XVN1PROD with $$_JOB347United States, and the Resulting Impacts on U.S. National Security, written testimonyof Anne-Marie Brady, April 30, 2009; People’s Republic of China State CouncilInformation Office, China’s Peaceful Development Road (government white paper onChina’s development goals) (Beijing, China: December 22, 2005). http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200512/22/eng20051222_230059.html; and People’s Republicof China State Council Information Office, China’s National Defense in 2010(government white paper on China’s defense policies) (Beijing, China: March 31,2011). http://news.xinhuanet.com/english 2010/china/2011-03/31/c_13806851.htm.49. John Garver, ‘‘The Chinese Communist Party and the Collapse of SovietCommunism,’’ China Quarterly 133 (March 1993).50. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: MilitaryPower of the People’s Republic of China 2008 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department ofDefense, 2008), p. 8. Some PRC commentators have written that western governmentsand media have misunderstood aspects of the ‘‘24 Character Strategy,’’ particularlythe phrase ‘‘hide our capacities and bide our time.’’ As stated in a 2010essay posted on an official CCP website, ‘‘‘Hide our capabilities and bide our time,make some contributions’ and related thoughts, these were put forward by DengXiaoping for the ‘special period’ of the late 1980s and early 1990s, in the midst ofsudden changes in Eastern Europe and the collapse of the socialist camp. . . . Currently,there are people in other countries who have produced misunderstandingsand distortions of ‘hide our capabilities and bide our time.’ These people believe thatChina’s foreign policy strategy has a long-term, undeclared content and purpose:This is that China believes that its current strength is insufficient, and the timehas not yet come to announce and implement this great strategy, and consequentlymust ‘Hide our capabilities and bide our time,’ concealing the true situation andwaiting for the right time of opportunity. . . . However, this is . . . a serious misunderstandingand distortion of the ‘hide our capabilities and bide our time’ idea statedby Comrade Deng Xiaoping . . . the original idea of using the expression ‘hide ourcapabilities and bide our time’ was the strategy of ‘developing ourselves,’ and notat all to ‘seek revenge on others’ after we have developed.’’ See Xiao Feng, ‘‘WasComrade Deng Xiaoping’s Idea of ‘Hide Our Capabilities and Bide Our Time’ aMeasure of Expediency?’’ (Deng Xiaoping Tongzhi de ‘Tao Guang Yang Hui’ Sixiangshi ‘Quan Yi Zhi Ji’ Ma?) Beijing Daily (in Chinese), April 6, 2010. http://dangshi.people.com.cn/GB/138903/141370/11297254.html. Translation by USCC staff.51. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: MilitaryPower of the People’s Republic of China 2008 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department ofDefense, 2008), p. 8.52. Gilbert Rozman, Chinese Strategic Thought Toward Asia (New York, NY:Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), p. 3.53. Xinhuanet (in English), ‘‘Backgrounder: Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,’’June 14, 2004. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-04/08/content_2803638.htm.54. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: MilitaryPower of the People’s Republic of China 2008 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department ofDefense), p. 8.55. Zheng Bijian, ‘‘China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ to Great-Power Status,’’ Foreign Affairs84: 5 (September-October 2005).56. Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China,China’s Peaceful Development Road (Beijing, China: December 22, 2005). Of note,President Hu’s speech at the 2004 Boao Forum for Asia on Hainan Island was expectedto reiterate the theme of ‘‘peaceful rise,’’ but instead it emphasized a newnarrative, ‘‘peaceful development.’’ Robert L. Suttinger, ‘‘The Rise and Descent of‘Peaceful Rise’,’’ China Leadership Monitor 12 (2004).57. Hsin Pao, Hong Kong Economic Journal (January 27, 2006). OSC ID:CPP20060222904001. http://www.opensource.gov; and Zheng Bijian, ‘‘China’s ‘‘PeacefulRise’’ to Great-Power Status,’’ Foreign Affairs 84: 5 (September-October 2005):18–24.58. Robert L. Seuttinger, ‘‘The Rise and Descent of ‘Peaceful Rise’,’’ China LeadershipMonitor 12 (2004).59. Zheng Bijian, ‘‘China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ to Great Power Status,’’ Foreign Affairs(September/October 2005).60. Information Office of the State Council, China’s Peaceful Development Road(Beijing, China: December 22, 2005). Note that the Information Office of the StateCouncil has a dual identity and also functions as the CCP Office of Foreign Propaganda.61. Information Office of the State Council, China’s Peaceful Development Road(Beijing, China: December 22, 2005).VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:46 Nov 10, 2011 Jkt 067464 PO 00000 Frm 00359 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 G:\GSDD\USCC\2011\067464.XXX 067464
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12011REPORT TO CONGRESSof theU.S.-C
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U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY RE
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CONTENTSPageTRANSMITTAL LETTER TO T
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23Figure 1:China’s Share of the U
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25The weakness in U.S. exports of a
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31Table 3:RMB Bond Issuances by Mul
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35of bilateral negotiations under t
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37Stonewalling the WTO: A Case Stud
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39that China’s existing system of
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41now. Because the structures of th
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43How Big Is China’s State Sector
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45Fortune Global 500, compared to j
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47panies are less profitable, after
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49erate primarily within state-cont
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57Figure 1: Chinese FDI Stock in th
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63U.S. firms with sensitive technol
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65Addendum I: SASAC Companies, Larg
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67Addendum I: SASAC Companies, Larg
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69dkrause on DSKHT7XVN1PROD with $$
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71January 2010, the heads of 19 U.S
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77cause Beijing had sought to exclu
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81China in Search of Western Techno
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83scious policy seeking to drive Ch
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89Like previous plans, the 12th Fiv
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95Consultative Conference National
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99panies account[ed] for fully 7 pe
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101Dr. Shih has testified before th
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103ment subsidies, which in turn wi
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105Addendum II: Figures 1-2Figure 1
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113drivers cited increased fuel pri
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123uating from college and hoping t
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131unfairly or unjustifiably harm U
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161gress, the DoD noted that China
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165eral U.S. military policies, inc
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167Figure 1:Territorial Disputes in
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171provides guidelines for dealing
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173network exploitations to facilit
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181ligence, surveillance, and recon
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187Therefore, the PLA maintains the
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189Of import, the PLA’s geographi
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197ther moves toward independence,
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199trates the depth of China’s sp
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201Figure 2:Representation of Beido
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205ganization, modeled on the Europ
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207China’s leadership also places
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211[General Armaments Department] p
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213Table 2: Select Chinese Satellit
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215weapons or coorbital satellite w
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217Malicious Cyber ActivitiesDirect
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RECOMMENDATIONSChina’s ‘‘Area
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239320. Chang Xianqi, Military Astr
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243woman Jiang Yu simply expressed
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245Table 1:Timeline of Sino-North K
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249China also provides economic sup
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251economic and social strains woul
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255Iran’s South Pars Gas Field af
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257When asked by Commissioners abou
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281trade, and dispute settlement. 2
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287of Request to the United States
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289fense, since its current fleet o
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Page 383 and 384: 375ecutive Schedule under section 5
Page 395 and 396: APPENDIX IIIPUBLIC HEARINGS OF THE
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397In TaiwanU.S. Government• Amer
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APPENDIX VLIST OF RESEARCH MATERIAL
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401The National Security Implicatio
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APPENDIX VIACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIO
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