2011 report to congress - U.S.-China Economic and Security Review ...

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216Malicious Cyber ActivitiesDirected Against U.S. Satellites—ContinuedNotably, at least two U.S. government satellites have each experiencedat least two separate instances of interference apparentlyconsistent with cyber activities against their command andcontrol systems: *• On October 20, 2007, Landsat-7, a U.S. earth observationsatellite jointly managed by the National Aeronauticsand Space Administration and the U.S. GeologicalSurvey, experienced 12 or more minutes of interference.This interference was only discovered followinga similar event in July 2008 (see below).†• On June 20, 2008, Terra EOS [earth observation system]AM–1, a National Aeronautics and Space Administration-managedprogram for earth observation, experiencedtwo or more minutes of interference.‡ The responsibleparty achieved all steps required to command thesatellite but did not issue commands.• On July 23, 2008, Landsat-7 experienced 12 or moreminutes of interference. The responsible party did notachieve all steps required to command the satellite.• On October 22, 2008, Terra EOS AM–1 experiencednine or more minutes of interference. The responsibleparty achieved all steps required to command the satellitebut did not issue commands.The National Aeronautics and Space Administration confirmedtwo suspicious events related to the Terra EOS satellite in 2008and the U.S. Geological Survey confirmed two anomalous eventsrelated to the Landsat-7 satellite in 2007 and 2008.§If executed successfully, such interference has the potential topose numerous threats, particularly if achieved against satelliteswith more sensitive functions. For example, access to a satellite’scontrols could allow an attacker to damage or destroy the satellite.The attacker could also deny or degrade as well as forge orotherwise manipulate the satellite’s transmission. A high level ofaccess could reveal the satellite’s capabilities or information,such as imagery, gained through its sensors. Opportunities mayalso exist to reconnoiter or compromise other terrestrial or spacebasednetworks used by the satellite.dkrause on DSKHT7XVN1PROD with $$_JOB* Unless otherwise noted, the following information is derived from a briefing the U.S. AirForce provided to the Commission on May 12, 2011.† For information on the Landsat program, see James R. Irons, ‘‘The Landsat Program’’(Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, updated September 20,2011). http://landsat.gsfc.nasa.gov/.‡ For information on the Terra program, see Marc Imhoff, ‘‘Terra’’ (Washington, DC: NationalAeronautics and Space Administration, updated September 23, 2011). http://terra.nasa.gov/.§ Name withheld (staff member, National Aeronautics and Space Administration), email interviewwith Commission staff, November 8, 2011; and Name withheld (staff member, U.S. GeologicalSurvey), email interview with Commission staff, November 8, 2011.VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:46 Nov 10, 2011 Jkt 067464 PO 00000 Frm 00228 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 G:\GSDD\USCC\2011\067464.XXX 067464
217Malicious Cyber ActivitiesDirected Against U.S. Satellites—ContinuedThese events are described here not on the basis of specific attributioninformation but rather because the techniques appearconsistent with authoritative Chinese military writings. For example,according to Military Astronautics, attacks on space systems‘‘generate tremors in the structure of space power of theenemy, cause it to suffer from chain effects, and finally lose, orpartly lose, its combat effectiveness.’’ One tactic is ‘‘implantingcomputer virus and logic bombs into the enemy’s space informationnetwork so as to paralyze the enemy’s space informationsystem.’’ 321dkrause on DSKHT7XVN1PROD with $$_JOBLimitationsDespite pockets of considerable capabilities, China has weak ormoderate military space capabilities in other areas. China has fewcommunications satellites available for military purposes, even assumingthat the PLA would appropriate Chinese government-controlledassets during a crisis. Many PLA military platforms havemodest bandwidth requirements, which, when combined with thePLA’s heavy reliance on buried fiber-optic military communicationsnetworks, may offset this disadvantage in the context of a potential,near-term U.S.-China contingency on China’s periphery. However,naval forces at sea and ground forces operating outside theChinese mainland (even as close as Taiwan) would still require secure,mobile communications for military functions such as commandand control. 322 New communications satellites or some functionalequivalent, like unmanned aerial vehicles, could potentiallyfill this gap in coming years, depending on PLA investment priorities.China has limited capabilities in other areas. It operates fewweather satellites, which could pose a problem for Chinese militaryoperations, particularly in the absence of information from othernations. China still lacks comprehensive satellite navigation capabilities,even within its own region, though the Beidou system ispoised to close this gap over the next several years. China’s opticalimagery satellites, while sufficient for many military applications,still offer lower resolution imagery than is available in commercialmarkets. Finally, several satellite and launch failures over the pastfew years have led to various program delays. 323Implications for the United StatesThe U.S. Department of Defense’s current approach to space, accordingto testimony by Gregory L. Schulte, deputy assistant secretaryof Defense for space policy, ‘‘is designed to confront the‘three C’s’—a space environment that is increasingly congested,contested, and competitive. China has contributed to all three.’’ 324CongestedSpace, particularly low Earth orbit, is beset with natural andmanmade objects. Quantities of manmade objects, including debris,VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:46 Nov 10, 2011 Jkt 067464 PO 00000 Frm 00229 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 G:\GSDD\USCC\2011\067464.XXX 067464
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12011REPORT TO CONGRESSof theU.S.-C
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U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY RE
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CONTENTSPageTRANSMITTAL LETTER TO T
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23Figure 1:China’s Share of the U
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25The weakness in U.S. exports of a
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31Table 3:RMB Bond Issuances by Mul
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35of bilateral negotiations under t
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37Stonewalling the WTO: A Case Stud
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39that China’s existing system of
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41now. Because the structures of th
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43How Big Is China’s State Sector
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45Fortune Global 500, compared to j
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47panies are less profitable, after
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49erate primarily within state-cont
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57Figure 1: Chinese FDI Stock in th
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63U.S. firms with sensitive technol
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65Addendum I: SASAC Companies, Larg
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67Addendum I: SASAC Companies, Larg
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69dkrause on DSKHT7XVN1PROD with $$
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71January 2010, the heads of 19 U.S
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77cause Beijing had sought to exclu
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81China in Search of Western Techno
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83scious policy seeking to drive Ch
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89Like previous plans, the 12th Fiv
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95Consultative Conference National
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99panies account[ed] for fully 7 pe
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101Dr. Shih has testified before th
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103ment subsidies, which in turn wi
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105Addendum II: Figures 1-2Figure 1
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113drivers cited increased fuel pri
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123uating from college and hoping t
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131unfairly or unjustifiably harm U
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161gress, the DoD noted that China
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Page 173 and 174: 165eral U.S. military policies, inc
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Page 229 and 230: RECOMMENDATIONSChina’s ‘‘Area
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281trade, and dispute settlement. 2
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287of Request to the United States
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289fense, since its current fleet o
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323mation Office. Day-to-day superv
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327Although the slogans change over
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335What Constitutes a ‘‘Core In
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339Selected CAIFC/CPD Track Two Exc
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341disseminated through diplomatic
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375ecutive Schedule under section 5
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APPENDIX IIIPUBLIC HEARINGS OF THE
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APPENDIX IIIALIST OF WITNESSES TEST
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393Alphabetical Listing of Panelist
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397In TaiwanU.S. Government• Amer
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APPENDIX VLIST OF RESEARCH MATERIAL
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401The National Security Implicatio
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APPENDIX VIACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIO
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