2011 report to congress - U.S.-China Economic and Security Review ...

dkrause on DSKHT7XVN1PROD with $$_JOB273do not answer to the Foreign Ministry, and do not necessarily feelcompelled to coordinate their activities with it.’’ 170 Difficulties canarise when two ministries conflict with one another in carrying outChina’s foreign policy, because they are both seated at the samebureaucratic level. 171In some cases, a lack of coordination among China’s various foreignpolicy actors threatens to upset Beijing’s foreign policy goals.For example, in the South and East China Seas, there are at leastsix distinct official actors operating, including China’s five civilianmaritime administration and security agencies and the PLA Navy.In testimony to the Commission, Stacy A. Pedrozo, a U.S. Navycaptain and military fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations,noted that China’s various maritime actors are insufficiently coordinated,posing a threat to the peaceful resolution of disputes inthe region. 172 Chinese officials acknowledge this problem as welland have announced plans to enhance central coordination of actorsin the South China Sea in the future. 173 A lack of coordinationbetween Chinese government ministries and state-owned weaponsmanufacturers may also have led to a strain in Sino-Libyan relationsin 2011. A Canadian newspaper discovered evidence thatthree Chinese state-owned companies offered to sell $200 million inweapons to pro-Qaddafi forces in June in violation of a UN embargoon arms sales to Libya. Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs officialsdenied prior knowledge of the negotiations, and some analystssuggested that the state-owned weapons manufacturers may havebypassed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and instead dealt directlywith the Qaddafi government. 174Despite problems of coordination, there is little dispute that theCCP still holds firm control over China’s foreign policy. Althoughmany of the groups involved have access to the political elite in theCommunist Party, Dr. Chen testified that ‘‘[i]n the end, it is [CCP]decision-making elites who can define and determine which groupscan exist and enter the foreign policy-making process.’’ Ultimately,the top leadership, namely President Hu and the Politburo StandingCommittee, are the definitive architects of Chinese foreign policy.175Implications for the United StatesThe increasing number of voices in Chinese foreign policy-makingrequires U.S. diplomats and leaders to be adept in identifyingwhich individuals and organizations are influential and where theyfall in the Chinese foreign policy-making apparatus while ensuringthat they are mindful of the opinions of nontraditional actors aswell. As China’s foreign policy actors grow in number and diversity,the direction and intention of China’s foreign policies may becomemore difficult for U.S. policymakers to calculate. Dr. Shambaughnotes, ‘‘[t]he fact that China has such a diverse discourse suggeststhat it possesses multiple international identities and a schizophrenicpersonality.’’ 176 This can complicate how the United Statesformulates its policies vis-à-vis China and can lead tomisperceptions of what each country’s true intentions are. For example,if U.S. leaders exclusively paid attention to the hard-linevoices coming out of the PLA, they might be inclined to react towhat they perceive is a more aggressive China. During the Com-VerDate Nov 24 2008 13:46 Nov 10, 2011 Jkt 067464 PO 00000 Frm 00285 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 G:\GSDD\USCC\2011\067464.XXX 067464