The SRA Symposium - College of Medicine
The SRA Symposium - College of Medicine
The SRA Symposium - College of Medicine
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2) Logic and emotion: “Everyone knows that emotions play a significant role in decision making<br />
and choice” (Hastie & Dawes, p 206). Or do they? Because the brain includes areas that process<br />
information logically (the frontal area) and emotionally (the limbic system), the informed consent<br />
process is both logical and emotional (Hochhauser, 2004a). <strong>The</strong> continuing emphasis on informed<br />
consent strictly as a logical process based on rules <strong>of</strong> rational thinking ignores the limbic system’s<br />
emotional reaction and response to the consent process. Moreover, research on “risk as feelings”<br />
(Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee & Welch, 2001; Finucane, Peters & Slovic, 2003) implies that clinical<br />
trial risks aren’t just analyzed logically by prospective subjects, but subjectively “felt” in ways that<br />
help them decide whether to become clinical trial subjects.<br />
3) Intuition: Defined by Random House Webster’s <strong>College</strong> dictionary as “direct perception <strong>of</strong><br />
truth, fact, etc. independent <strong>of</strong> any reasoning process,” intuition is one way patients can make<br />
quick decisions about whether to be in a clinical trial or not. In those cases where patients say<br />
“No” almost immediately after being approached by a researcher, it’s obvious that they’ve made a<br />
decision based on something other than a careful analysis <strong>of</strong> the clinical trial’s informed consent<br />
process. Or in those cases where patients say “Yes” almost immediately, not even taking the time to<br />
read or understand the consent form, that decision may be intuitive.<br />
Gladwell (2005) describes research showing that people make some intuitive decisions in the<br />
“blink <strong>of</strong> an eye” by “thin-slicing”—“the ability <strong>of</strong> our unconscious to find patterns in situations<br />
and behavior based on very narrow slices <strong>of</strong> experience.” (p. 23) <strong>The</strong>re is so much information in<br />
the consent process/consent form that most patients probably decide very quickly whether to be in<br />
a clinical trial or not. Gladwell notes that a surgeon’s traits such as lack <strong>of</strong> warmth, hostility, dominance<br />
and anxiousness were good predictors <strong>of</strong> which surgeons got sued for malpractice. From a<br />
patient’s perspective, malpractice isn’t based just on a surgeon’s skills, but on intuitive judgments<br />
about that surgeon’s demeanor. In the same way, the decision to be in a clinical trial may based on<br />
the researcher’s outward demeanor. If some researchers consistently find it harder to recruit subjects<br />
than other researchers, perhaps the recruiting problem isn’t the research, but subtle negative<br />
cues detected by patients.<br />
Because risk perception is only slightly related to actual risks, understanding clinical trial risks<br />
isn’t the strictly rational process that it seems to be. Myer’s analysis <strong>of</strong> intuition (2003) notes that<br />
people tend to overestimate well-publicized risks, while they underestimate others. A well-publicized<br />
death in a clinical trial will probably cause most patients to think that clinical trials are much<br />
more risky than they actually are, since there’s no publicity about the people who have not died in<br />
clinical trials. Why did subjects overestimate risk in the Berry, et al (2003) study: Probably because<br />
a person’s risk assessment has little to do with a statistical understanding <strong>of</strong> risk and more to do<br />
with their intuitive and emotional feeling about risk. Of course, intuitive decisions aren’t always<br />
the right decisions, but they may lead to right decisions more <strong>of</strong>ten than not.<br />
In the context <strong>of</strong> informed consent for medical treatments, Ubel and Loewenstein (1997)<br />
concluded that while such consent is <strong>of</strong>ten based on a communication model in which physicians<br />
present relevant information to patients to make informed treatment decisions. But that model<br />
does not include decision analysis strategies or intuitive factors (such as hope and fear) that are<br />
<strong>of</strong>ten unrecognized aspects <strong>of</strong> the consent process. Holmes-Rovner and Wills (2002) reviewed<br />
behavioral decision theory’s implications for two different aspects <strong>of</strong> informed consent: informing<br />
patients and consenting patients in clinical trials. Because they require different conceptual<br />
and decision making strategies, they recommended new debiasing techniques both for informing<br />
(based on effectiveness) and consenting (based social and individual values) prospective subjects<br />
Psychologically, there’s much more to these decisions than listening to a consent presentation,<br />
reading a consent form, and arriving at a decision.<br />
2005 <strong>Symposium</strong> Proceedings Book 111