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Stories from inside summitry<br />

KEY TAKEAWAYS<br />

Continued dialogue is needed<br />

between disparate countries<br />

<strong>G20</strong> sherpas sometimes broker<br />

deals at summits<br />

5Number of <strong>G20</strong> sherpa meetings<br />

in China in 2016<br />

Sherpas lead to<br />

coordinated actions<br />

A former <strong>G20</strong> sherpa of the President of the United States,<br />

Caroline Atkinson explains the unique role sherpas play in<br />

negotiating solutions at summits<br />

WHAT IS A<br />

‘SHERPA’?<br />

A ‘sherpa’ is the official who<br />

represents the <strong>G20</strong> leader<br />

in the preparations for the<br />

meeting of the heads of state<br />

and government. The term,<br />

coined in the <strong>G20</strong> in the<br />

1970s, is borrowed from the<br />

Nepalese guides who carry<br />

the bags for mountaineers<br />

climbing to the summit of<br />

Mount Everest. It reflects<br />

the G7 ideal that these<br />

individuals are the leaders’<br />

personal representatives,<br />

distinct from the other<br />

officials in the government<br />

bureaucracy. They also<br />

provide only practical<br />

support as the policy comes<br />

from the leader alone.<br />

As leaders of the <strong>G20</strong> gather<br />

in China in September, real<br />

problems remain in the global<br />

economy. The recovery from<br />

the great recession of 2008<br />

continues, but its pace still disappoints.<br />

Inevitably the question arises of what can<br />

and will the <strong>G20</strong> leaders do.<br />

I participated in many summits behind<br />

the scenes, most recently as the sherpa to<br />

US President Barack Obama from 2013<br />

to 2015. I am therefore familiar with that<br />

question and with the scepticism behind it.<br />

It is true that bringing the leaders<br />

together once a year cannot achieve much<br />

on its own. While governments acted<br />

together with speed under the pressure of<br />

the crisis in 2008–09, there has not been<br />

concerted action on that scale since then.<br />

Instead, there has been agreement on the<br />

need to promote jobs and growth, but not on<br />

how best to do that.<br />

Is the <strong>G20</strong> out of steam or a waste<br />

of time? I do not believe so. The lack of<br />

coordinated action on macroeconomic<br />

policy has happened for two reasons, which<br />

both argue for the importance of continued<br />

dialogue within this disparate group<br />

of countries.<br />

Calming tempers<br />

First, countries have faced distinct<br />

challenges since the worst of the global<br />

crisis passed. For a time, emerging markets<br />

remained relatively strong, with commodity<br />

exporters helped by China’s decisive action<br />

to support its growth by investing heavily<br />

in domestic infrastructure. For these<br />

countries, measures to support growth in<br />

advanced economies, particularly with<br />

unconventional monetary policy, often<br />

seemed destabilising to their own currencies<br />

and economies. Meanwhile, a renewed<br />

crisis in Europe in 2011–12 exacerbated the<br />

divide between developing countries and<br />

advanced economies. While circumstances<br />

differed, the many debates among <strong>G20</strong><br />

sherpas, finance ministers, central bank<br />

governors and eventually leaders helped<br />

calm tempers and promote understanding,<br />

albeit without resolving to act together on a<br />

macroeconomic level.<br />

The second cause of a lack of<br />

coordinated action is that it has proved<br />

difficult to repeat the efforts from 2009 to<br />

2012. Views among <strong>G20</strong> members differed<br />

about how to get beyond the crisis. Almost<br />

as soon as fiscal stimulus was put in place<br />

in 2009–10, some countries began to call for<br />

renewed consolidation, fearing that large<br />

fiscal deficits risked another crisis.<br />

The United States argued for a focus on<br />

jobs and growth, rather than fiscal austerity.<br />

Germany and others, including some<br />

emerging markets, believed that the euro<br />

crisis could only be overcome by a sharp<br />

contraction in borrowing by highly indebted<br />

countries and a general return to fiscal<br />

rectitude. These contrasting views battled<br />

behind the scenes.<br />

240 <strong>G20</strong> China: The Hangzhou Summit • September 2016 G7<strong>G20</strong>.com

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