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ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT

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deposits—from 1.15 percent to 1.35 percent. The FDIC issued a final rule<br />

increasing the reserve ratio in March 2016 and paid for the increase by levying<br />

a surcharge on top of regular assessment fees for banks with more than<br />

$10 billion in assets, effectively requiring large banks to bear the full cost.<br />

Have Big Banks Become Safer?<br />

Recent research by Sarin and Summers (2016) documents that most<br />

regulatory measures of major banks such as capital levels or liquidity suggest<br />

banks are safer; however, market-based risk measures that reflect bank<br />

equity volatility and default probability seem to suggest that, though risk has<br />

decreased since its crisis peak, it is not in fact lower than the period prior<br />

to the crisis. This is consistent with evidence from sources like the NYU<br />

Volatility Lab, discussed below, that use market measures of risk and finds<br />

that, while risk in the financial system is down considerably from the crisis,<br />

based on market measures, it is not lower than prior to the crisis.<br />

It may be the case that either risk was mispriced or markets lacked the<br />

information necessary to price the risk of individual banks before the crisis.<br />

If either is the case, better information concerning the risks the banks face<br />

could make them appear riskier today relative to the pre-crisis period, when<br />

we had a poorer understanding of banks’ risk. Another explanation for this<br />

finding is that banks may simply be worth less because of the present macroeconomic<br />

environment, regulations that limit banks’ ability to take risky<br />

positions, and loss of the implicit TBTF guarantee.<br />

A central argument of the Sarin and Summers paper, and work like it,<br />

is that the franchise value of banks has fallen. Markets value bank assets and<br />

their business models as being worth less over the past few years than they<br />

were before the crisis. Consequently, one would expect the bank to appear<br />

riskier based on market metrics. Hence, a comparison of market-based<br />

measures pre- and post-crisis reflects the impact of financial reform on bank<br />

safety and soundness and the impact on banks’ profitability. The rules that<br />

made banks better capitalized almost certainly made banks safer and better<br />

able to withstand future crises; however, constant vigilance is necessary to<br />

make sure that, in a changing environment, risks are adequately managed.<br />

Systemic Risk and Identifying Sources of Risk in the System<br />

The crisis revealed the impact that the failure, or threatened failure,<br />

of even a single financial institution can pose to the larger financial system.<br />

Financial reform has helped make the financial system more secure by<br />

identifying firms that pose such a risk and subjecting them to additional<br />

regulatory oversight and other mitigation strategies. In part, it has accomplished<br />

this by improving the coordination of regulatory oversight such that<br />

384 | Chapter 6

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