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ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT

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growth in part driven by the rapid shift of women into the labor force.<br />

Controlling for the number of people in the labor force, growth in this<br />

recovery is quite similar to previous ones (Figure 2-viii).<br />

Beyond the downward pressure on GDP caused by a slower<br />

working-age population growth rate, another economic impact of<br />

demographic shifts in the United States is that they may have reduced<br />

productivity growth. A range of papers finds that higher proportions<br />

of certain age groups are correlated with higher productivity growth<br />

(Feyrer 2007; Aiyar, Ebeke, and Shao 2016; Maestas, Mullen, and Powell<br />

2016). As the share of these age groups employed in the labor force<br />

changes, productivity is affected. In particular, studies find the 40-49<br />

cohort to be correlated with higher productivity (due to a bigger pool<br />

of managerial talent) and 55 and older to be less so. Estimates based on<br />

these papers suggest that somewhere from 0.2 to 0.8 percentage point<br />

of the 1.5 percentage points productivity slowdown from 1995-2005 to<br />

2005-15 could be due to demography. Projections of the composition of<br />

the labor force suggest that the drag on productivity from demographics<br />

may soon be abating (Figure 2-ix).<br />

around its pre-recession levels, oscillating between 87 and 95, driving the<br />

strong consumption growth (Figure 2-13). The Conference Board index hit<br />

its highest level since 2007 in November 2016, although the 2016 average<br />

was only somewhat higher than pre-recession levels.<br />

Meanwhile, U.S. household debt relative to income continued to fall<br />

(Figure 2-14). Before the financial crisis, household debt relative to income<br />

rose dramatically, largely due to net mortgage originations, and then<br />

declined sharply after the crisis, a pattern known as “deleveraging.” (See<br />

Box 2-6 for more on deleveraging.) Charge–offs of delinquent mortgage<br />

debt played an important role in lowering household debt, but the decline<br />

in new mortgage originations and less consumer borrowing played roles as<br />

well (Vidangos 2015). By the end of 2016:Q2, the debt-to-income ratio was<br />

at its lowest level since 2002. The level of mortgage debt relative to income<br />

continued to decline in 2016, while consumer credit (including credit cards,<br />

automobiles, and student loans) relative to income increased slightly.<br />

Moreover, with historically low interest rates, the amount of income<br />

required to service these debts has fallen dramatically. Still, it should be<br />

noted that estimates based on aggregate data could mask higher debt<br />

burdens for some families; that is, the health of personal finances varies<br />

substantially across households. Nonetheless, in aggregate, there is evidence<br />

of deleveraging as discussed in Box 2-6.<br />

94 | Chapter 2

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