ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT

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Figure 6-18 Systemic Risk (SRISK), 2005–2016 Billions of U.S. Dollars 1,200 1,000 800 600 SRISK: U.S. Financials Total 400 200 Oct-2016 0 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 Source: New York University Volatility Laboratory. Ending the Problem of Too-Big-To-Fail Another component of systemic risk has been the view that some firms may be too large to fail without threatening the whole financial system. If these firms are indeed “too big to fail” (TBTF) it gives them a substantial advantage as their counterparties in transactions will know they are less likely to fail than similar firms without an implicit government guarantee. (See Box 6-4 on the TBTF premium.) The implicit guarantee may also make these firms more willing to take large risks as both the owners and managers of these firms do not truly face the risk of downside scenarios as they may feel they can count on the government to bail them out. The existence of TBTF firms can also be a source of risk because their counterparties may be wrong about which firms are TBTF. For example, some assumed the government would never allow a firm like Lehman Brothers to fail and were left exposed when Lehman declared bankruptcy. The reforms of the last six years that the implementation of Basel III and Dodd-Frank Act put in place included a number of measures to address the risks posed by TBTF. First and foremost, these reforms have subjected the largest and most complex financial institutions to enhanced supervision designed to require these firms’ equity and debt holders to bear the costs of the firms’ failures. These enhanced supervisions increase in stringency based upon size and other risk factors. The most stringent rules apply Strengthening the Financial System | 393
Box 6-4: Have We Ended “Too-Big-To-Fail”? A financial institution that is “too-big-to-fail” (TBTF) is so large and interconnected with the financial system that market participants believe the government will intervene to prevent its failure. One of the goals of recent financial reform is to eliminate TBTF by making systemically risky banks less likely to fail, reducing the government’s ability to aid insolvent firms, and reducing the damage a failure would cause so that such firms could be allowed to fail. Major credit rating agencies have cited financial reform and the reduced likelihood of a government bailout when downgrading the credit ratings of major U.S. banks. For example, in November 2013, Moody’s lowered the so-called government support component of its credit ratings for global systemically important banks. In December 2015, the credit rating agency Standard & Poor’s downgraded eight of the largest U.S. banks by a notch, saying it believes the banks are less likely to receive a government bailout if they find themselves in financial trouble. While ratings are not necessarily reflective of general market expectations, these actions suggest that financial reform has been successful in reducing TBTF. A widely studied measure of TBTF is whether certain institutions are able to borrow more cheaply because of the perception that they will ultimately be bailed out if they fail. It was clear that many large financial firms were able to borrow more cheaply both shortly before and during the Financial Crisis because market participants did not believe that such institutions would be allowed to fail. Several more recent estimates of this funding advantage find it to be much reduced or eliminated. Although financial reforms have likely had an impact on TBTF, the improved macroeconomic atmosphere may make any existing funding advantage very difficult to detect, so a definitive measure of whether the TBTF advantage still exists may not be apparent until another crisis appears. The costs of TBTF go beyond the direct costs of bail-outs. TBTF creates incentives that many consider socially harmful. Investors are willing to provide their funds to a TBTF bank without evaluating the safety and soundness of their investment because they believe that the government will bail them out should the bank get into trouble. This allows managers to engage in risky investment behavior, with the bank keeping the gains should those investments pay off but with taxpayers bearing the loss in the event of a near failure. These institutions also enjoy a TBTF discount on their funding costs, allowing them to borrow at lower interest rates than similar institutions that are not considered by investors to be TBTF. This discount is anticompetitive as it gives large or more systemically connected firms an advantage over smaller or new institutions. 394 | Chapter 6
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ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT To
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C O N T E N T S ECONOMIC REPORT OF
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economic report of the president To
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eforms in history. Banks have sharp
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the annual report of the council of
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C O N T E N T S CHAPTER 1: EIGHT YE
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. THE ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR FEDERA
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2.4. Government Purchases as Share
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4.iii. Premium for the Benchmark Pl
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6.18. Systemic Risk (SRISK) 2005-20
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C H A P T E R 1 EIGHT YEARS OF RECO
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Figure 1-1 Actual and Consensus For
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Figure 1-3 Real Hourly Wage Growth
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Figure 1-4 Real GDP per Capita: Eur
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Figure 1-6 Household Net Worth in t
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Figure 1-8 Global Trade Flows in th
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Subsequent revisions to fourth-quar
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Percent 6 Figure 1-9 Fiscal Expansi
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substantial costs to the Federal Go
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worked to promote innovation and in
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expansion, a period of low producti
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The 2017 Economic Report of the Pre
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Chapter 4: Reforming the Health Car
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to the ACA and other factors. The A
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than 98 percent of Americans should
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Figure 1-13 Borrowers in Income Dri
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success of the financial rescue and
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einforced U.S. leadership in the ru
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Partnership (OGP), a global partner
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Figure 1-16 Labor Productivity Grow
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Labor Force Participation Household
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number of steps to ensure that econ
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C H A P T E R 2 THE YEAR IN REVIEW
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Percent 11 Figure 2-1 Unemployment
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allowing for additional investments
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Percentage Point 0.6 0.4 Figure 2-3
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public, largely highway constructio
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The size of the Federal Reserve’s
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Figure 2-5 Private-Sector Payroll E
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fell 80 percent from September 2014
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Figure 2-8 Rates of Part-Time Work,
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Figure 2-v Prime-Age Male Labor For
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Output Real GDP grew 1.6 percent ov
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Figure 2-11 Compensation and Consum
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Table 2-i Optimal Weighting for Hou
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esults suggest that, to a first app
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Figure 2-viii Real GDP, Average and
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Figure 2-13 Consumer Sentiment and
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Figure 2-xi Household Debt Service,
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Ratio to Annual DPI 1.10 1.05 Figur
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Figure 2-17 National House Price In
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Index 220 Figure 2-19 Housing Affor
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Figure 2-21 Composition of Growth i
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Figure 2-23 Capital Services per Un
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Box 2-7: Explanations for the Recen
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Figure 2-xv Business Fixed Investme
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Figure 2-26 Foreign Real GDP and U.
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somewhat generalizable (Box 2-8), b
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prices weakened and the global econ
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inadequate demand has contributed t
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Figure 2-31 Nominal Wage Inflation
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Figure 2-33 Real Hourly Wage Growth
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Index 6 Figure 2-36 Financial Condi
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Percent 4.0 Figure 2-38 Nominal Lon
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Dollars per Barrel 80 Figure 2-40 B
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Figure 2-41 IMF World Real GDP Grow
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against the Mexican peso, the Chine
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United Kingdom It has been a turbul
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for example, Japan has grown almost
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Figure 2-45 Credit to Nonfinancial
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Meanwhile, core inflation (excludin
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kept rates low across a wide range
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Investments in surface transportati
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Table 2-2 Supply-Side Components of
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Conclusion The economy continued to
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not increased from 1973 to 2013, in
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developments; individual behavior;
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action affecting income inequality
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have occurred. In doing so, these p
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Percent 24 21 18 15 12 9 6 African
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without the policy response.5 These
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Box 3-2: Income Inequality and the
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unable to obtain insurance at any p
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Figure 3-7B Percent 50 Uninsured Ra
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and have not expanded Medicaid foun
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Box 3-3: Safety Net Policies as Ins
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Millions of People 18 Figure 3-8 Im
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Figure 3-9 Effective Tax Rates for
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Box 3-4: Additional Actions to Make
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$294 million in newly appropriated
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15 10 5 0 -5 -10 -15 Figure 3-12 Pe
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Administration with those of previo
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as a share of potential GDP by Pres
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Figure 3-17 Changes in the Distribu
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30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Single Source: C
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ate on capital gains and dividends
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C H A P T E R 4 REFORMING THE HEALT
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eneficiaries have received cumulati
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form of lower premium costs and ind
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Percent 25 20 Creation of Medicare
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Figure 4-3 Health Insurance Coverag
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90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 25 55
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Percent Uninsured 25 CHIP Created 2
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Legislative actions subsequent to C
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Percent Uninsured 40 35 Figure 4-7
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ecause of the ACA’s provision all
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Box 4-2: Dynamics in the Individual
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projected during the debate over th
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whelming majority of Marketplace en
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Figure 4-v Change in Benchmark Prem
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20 Figure 4-10 Share of Workers in
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percent during the decade preceding
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Panel A: Share with a Personal Doct
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Box 4-3: Interpreting Results from
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Fortunately, the OHIE is not the on
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Figure 4-14 Uncompensated Care as a
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Figure 4-15 Uninsured Rate by Popul
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Figure 4-17 Monthly Gain in Private
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Change in Working-Age Employment to
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this cross-sectional relationship b
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ecent discussions of macroeconomic
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Figure 4-23 Life Expectancy at Birt
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Figure 4-24 Mortality Rate vs. Medi
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more to cover Medicare patients tha
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example, through CMMI, the Administ
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orient payment around the entirety
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Percent of Payments 60 Figure 4-26
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covered under ACO contracts at the
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Additional Steps to Reform the Heal
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legislation that overrides the reco
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Figure 4-28 Health Care Price Infla
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Figure 4-30 Trends in Real Prices f
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average growth rate of real per enr
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Figure 4-34 Growth in Real Costs fo
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made a large, readily quantifiable
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in states experiencing weaker and s
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distribution, holding fixed both sp
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individuals among individuals 65 an
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Figure 4-40 Average Real Deductible
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Figure 4-41 Real Per-Enrollee Presc
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educe the growth rate of Medicare s
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improvements will strengthen ACOs
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-5 0 -2 Figure 4-42 Cumulative Perc
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Woolhandler 2015). These analysts a
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productivity on the job. These bene
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Figure 4-46 Premiums and Cost Shari
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(KFF 2016). Another fifth of tradit
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2030 2028 2026 2024 2022 2020 2018
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C H A P T E R 5 INVESTING IN HIGHER
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Gainful Employment regulations. To
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Thousands of 2015 Dollars 900 800 7
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externalities, credit constraints,
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Figure 5-4 Earnings by Age and Educ
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Figure 5-5 Variation in Earnings by
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Box 5-1: Anti-Poverty Efforts and E
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careers. Some of the effects of the
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eligibility cutoff likewise finds s
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Box 5-2: Federal Investments in K-1
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Evaluations of early local Promise
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America’s College Promise Playboo
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Dollars 45,000 40,000 35,000 30,000
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pre-payment penalty. Second, by tyi
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equirements, pushed efforts associa
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Figure 5-16 Size of Outstanding Loa
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Figure 5-17 Average Monthly Payment
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Figure 5-18 Distribution of Key Out
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Figure 5-20 Earnings by Family Inco
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to student needs and improve test s
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Box 5-5: Making Sure Students Enter
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prior, the early FAFSA reform helps
Page 348 and 349: Figure 5-ii Number of Institutions
Page 350 and 351: Figure 5-23 Gainful Employment Earn
Page 352 and 353: Additionally, Pell Grants can be be
Page 354 and 355: C H A P T E R 6 STRENGTHENING THE F
Page 356 and 357: with no easy way to get the funds f
Page 358 and 359: public has limited information, run
Page 360 and 361: value added of the sector has gradu
Page 362 and 363: managers. Thus, after fees, savers
Page 364 and 365: Too Many Resources in Finance? Beyo
Page 366 and 367: of the firm after the purchase affe
Page 368 and 369: Percent 100 Figure 6-2 Mortgage Ori
Page 370 and 371: Figure 6-4 Case-Shiller Home Price
Page 372 and 373: Figure 6-7 Global OTC Derivative Ma
Page 374 and 375: consumer and investor protections.
Page 376 and 377: Figure 6-iv Top 5 Banks as Share of
Page 378 and 379: cult to replace with services from
Page 380 and 381: Are U.S. Banks Too Big? The questio
Page 382 and 383: The three federal banking agencies
Page 384 and 385: Risk Taking The Dodd-Frank Act took
Page 386 and 387: Box 6-3: The Performance of Communi
Page 388 and 389: Figure 6-ix Return on Assets of Ban
Page 390 and 391: egulators can take a more holistic
Page 392 and 393: Figure 6-13 Repo and Reverse Repo,
Page 394 and 395: Figure 6-15 Private Funds Reporting
Page 396 and 397: Days 60 Figure 6-16 Weighted-Averag
Page 400 and 401: In the absence of another financial
Page 402 and 403: lower funding costs in 2007-09, “
Page 404 and 405: through the Dodd-Frank Act and othe
Page 406 and 407: Prior to the financial crisis, one
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Page 410 and 411: findings from the NRSRO examination
Page 412 and 413: Prior to the crisis, enforcement of
Page 414 and 415: Box 6-5: Addressing the Problem of
Page 416 and 417: Table 6-i Sources of Investment Adv
Page 418 and 419: financial system and the systems of
Page 420 and 421: Box 6-6: The JOBS Act While it was
Page 422 and 423: Figure 6-23 S&P 500, 2003-2016 Inde
Page 424 and 425: Figure 6-27 Mortgage Delinquency an
Page 426: It created the FSOC to consider ris
Page 429 and 430: energy efficient and lower greenhou
Page 431 and 432: of domestic actions to reduce green
Page 433 and 434: people and vegetation (U.S. Global
Page 435 and 436: investment are much higher than the
Page 437 and 438: Delaying Action on Climate Change I
Page 439 and 440: uses and land management activities
Page 441 and 442: Carbon Pollution Standards for Powe
Page 443 and 444: a projected range of $16 billion to
Page 445 and 446: these resulted in insignificant cha
Page 447 and 448: Figure 7-4 Corporate Average Fuel E
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diesel fuel and jet fuel. The Vehic
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Box 7-3: Building Resilience to Cur
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sources in the oil and gas sector,
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emissions and total greenhouse gas
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Figure 7-7 Energy Intensity of Real
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Figure 7-10 U.S. Petroleum Consumpt
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Figure 7-12 Energy Intensity Transp
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Figure 7-14c Energy Intensity Comme
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Figure 7-16 U.S. Energy Consumption
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2008 to 7 percent in 2015. Figure 7
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Index, 2008 =0 0.1 0.0 -0.1 Figure
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Figure 7-23 Decomposition of Emissi
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three determinants of emissions? If
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Percent 100 80 Figure 7-26 Sectoral
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characteristics, and management tre
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oil and gas sector) were subsequent
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while creating new jobs and raising
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such as using similar methodologies
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Box 7-4: Supporting Increased Penet
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sector, the fee would incentivize p
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to be used to decompose emissions i
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Reinvestment Act.” NBER Working P
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D’Amico, Stefania, et al. 2012.
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______. 2016. “Chapter 3: Develop
Page 497 and 498:
Chetty, Raj, et al. 2014. “Where
Page 499 and 500:
NBER Working Paper 22170. Cambridge
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American Hospital Association and H
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Cantor, Joel C., et al. 2012. “Ea
Page 505 and 506:
______. 2012a. “Direct Spending a
Page 507 and 508:
Dranove, David, Craig Garthwaite, a
Page 509 and 510:
Wars: Global Solutions for Developi
Page 511 and 512:
Huang, Jidong, and Frank J. Chaloup
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McWilliams, J. Michael. 2016. “Ch
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Pinkovskiy, Maxim. 2014. “The Imp
Page 517 and 518:
______. 2016. “Certification of M
Page 519 and 520:
Arcidiacono, Peter, V. Joseph Hotz,
Page 521 and 522:
Bulman, George, and Caroline Hoxby.
Page 523 and 524:
______. 2015a. “Economic Costs of
Page 525 and 526:
Dobbie, Will, and Roland G. Fryer J
Page 527 and 528:
Committee on Health, Education, Lab
Page 529 and 530:
Jepsen, Christopher, Kenneth Troske
Page 531 and 532:
Marcotte, Dave E., et al. 2005. “
Page 533 and 534:
Reynolds, Arthur J., et al. 2011.
Page 535 and 536:
Chapter 6 Acharya, Viral. V., Deniz
Page 537 and 538:
Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. Fre
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Wheelock, David C., and Paul W. Wil
Page 541 and 542:
______. 2016a. “The Economics of
Page 543 and 544:
______. 2016c. Short Term Energy Ou
Page 545 and 546:
Interagency Working Group on the So
Page 547 and 548:
Office of Management and Budget (OM
Page 550:
A P P E N D I X A REPORT TO THE PRE
Page 553 and 554:
Council Members and Their Dates of
Page 556 and 557:
Report to the President on the Acti
Page 558 and 559:
consulting with a wide variety of o
Page 560 and 561:
In October, the Council released a
Page 562 and 563:
Research Economists David Boddy . .
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A P P E N D I X B STATISTICAL TABLE
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GOVERNMENT FINANCE, INTEREST RATES,
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Year or quarter Table B-1. Percent
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Table B-2. Gross domestic product,
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Table B-3. Quantity and price index
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Table B-5. Real exports and imports
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Year Total Table B-7. Real farm inc
Page 579 and 580:
Table B-9. Median money income (in
Page 581 and 582:
Labor Market Indicators Table B-11.
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Year or month Table B-12. Civilian
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Table B-14. Employees on nonagricul
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Year or month Table B-15. Hours and
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Government Finance, Interest Rates,
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Table B-19. Federal receipts and ou
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Table B-21. Federal and State and l
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Table B-23. U.S. Treasury securitie
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Year and month Bills (at auction) 1
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Year and month Table B-26. Money st
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